Kurt C. M. Mertel

The aim of this paper is to contribute to critical discourse on mindfulness in education through Heidegger’s notion of Besinnung and what I have called an “appropriative approach” to selfhood and social ontology. In particular, I focus on the “contemplative turn” towards the self as a crucial site of contestation and debate within the current literature on mindfulness in education. In the process, I show how Besinnung as an extension of the appropriative approach can provide the basis for an account of mindfulness as desubjectivation which, according to Michel Foucault, has “the function of wrenching the subject from itself, of seeing to it that the subject is no longer itself, or that it is brought to its annihilation or its dissolution”.

Building upon the interpretive framework and core commitments of fundamental ontology elaborated in the previous chapter, this chapter continues the sketch of the appropriative approach by focusing on crucial dimensions of selfhood in Division One of Being and Time, viz. understanding, interpretation, discourse/language, and attunement. In each case, the three modes—authentic, inauthentic, and undifferentiated—are clearly distinguished to make space for authenticity within the structure of everyday existence. Self-appropriation, moreover, is glossed as a hermeneutical and dialogical relation oriented toward applicable meaning that always already implies a relation to other and world. Hence, through a careful reading and reconstruction of Heidegger’s account of everydayness, it is possible to show not only that the sociality of the self does not condemn Dasein to inauthenticity a priori but also that it is not possible to adequately grasp Dasein’s existential possibilities without accounting for the kinds of social relations and environments or societies into which it is "‘thrown", i.e., whether they are authenticity- or inauthenticity-promoting. The fulfillment of the emancipatory aims of fundamental ontology, therefore, necessitates a return to concrete social reality.

This chapter critically reconstructs the core commitments of the appropriative view as a critical social ontology and, in the process, distinguishes between the essential and incidental aspects of fundamental ontology as an emancipatory project. First, ‘appropriation’ is governed by a second-personal logic of addresser/addressee: my existence is mine to appropriate in one way or another only because it always already addresses me in meaningful way and calls for a response. Second, Heidegger’s “unity thesis” implies that that self, other, and world are mutually interdependent, irreducible parts of a whole such that reification and/or alienation in one infect the others. This implies that it is not possible to have an authentic self-relation without an authentic—free and individualized—relation to others and the world. Third, the philosophical and emancipatory import of Heidegger’s tripartite distinction between ‘inauthentic’, ‘authentic’, and ‘undifferentiated’ modes of existence is articulated. The undifferentiated mode, which is neither authentic or inauthentic, helps to avoid pathologizing the social in advance, thereby leaving the necessary freedom for individuals to appropriate these structures in light of their concrete, socio-historical conditions. Hence, I introduce what I have called Heidegger’s ‘social difference’ between society and the social, which is the cornerstone of his post-foundationalist social ontology: the former refers to the ontic-empirical level of concrete societies and the latter to their ontological features.

The fourth and final chapter is devoted to addressing important criticisms of Being and Time from Ernst Tugendhat and Michael Theunissen that have impeded a proper understanding of the relationship between fundamental ontology and critical theory, thereby clearing ground for a more fruitful dialogue between the two. In particular, I respond to claims that call into question the ethical and social-ontological viability of fundamental ontology. While Tugednhat focuses exclusively on the self-relation and Theunissen on social ontology, neither are able to bring both perspectives together, which the appropriative view accomplishes. As a result, the appropriative view avoids the long-standing charges of individualism, irrationalism, decisionism, and voluntarism. Finally, the chapter addresses an important ‘meta’ objection from Raymond Geuss that calls into question the very possibility of a quasi-transcendental, ontological approach to social criticism to vindicate the appropriative view as a viable approach to critical theory.

This chapter addresses the question of the “essence” of selfhood by examining different ways of construing its defining feature, viz. reflexivity or the self-relation. This, in turn, frames an ‘appropriative’ reading of Heidegger’s account of reflexivity. As the “Ur-phenomenon” of the self-relation, self-appropriation is not primarily an epistemic relationship to third personal, objective facts, but rather a practical relation to possibilities of existence that always already implies a simultaneous relation to self, other, and world. The kind of existential possibilities made available to Dasein and the ways in which they are appropriated, in turn, bear critically upon the question of both individual and collective emancipation. The central claim is that the self-relation must be understood from the holistic perspective of the interdependence of self, other, and world and, as a result, an adequate ontology of the self is possible only as a critical social ontology. Hence, the appropriative view is distinguished from predominating paradigms of Heidegger interpretation and its core features as an approach to social ontology are outlined to frame the reading of Volume One of Being and Time developed in the subsequent chapters.

This book is the first in a two-volume project that provides a social-philosophical interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time as an emancipatory enterprise by arguing that fundamental ontology is essentially animated by an intent shared with critical theory, viz. to make philosophy concrete for the sake of individual and collective freedom. Focused on Division One of Being and Time, this volume argues that the possibilities of individual emancipation and self-actualization are inextricably bound to their environmental and intersubjective preconditions. An adequate ontology of the self, therefore, is possible only as a social ontology. To fulfill the emancipatory aims of fundamental ontology, however, it is necessary to show that the fact that agents are always already appropriated by society does not preclude the possibility of authentic self-appropriation. Hence, this volume critically reconstructs the core commitments of the ‘appropriative approach’ to social ontology and distinguishes between the foundational and incidental aspects of fundamental ontology. The final part is devoted to addressing important criticisms of Being and Time that have impeded a fruitful dialogue between fundamental ontology and critical theory to clear the ground for a fresh re-appraisal of the former as an emancipatory project.

Providing a comprehensive engagement with the work of Hans-Herbert Kögler, this is the first volume to expand upon and critique his distinctive approach to critical theory: critical hermeneutics. In the current climate of crisis, the relevance and fruitfulness of Kögler's work has never been greater, as he fuses the philosophies of Michel Foucault, Hans­ Georg Gadamer, and his mentor, Jürgen Habermas, to respond to critical international issues surrounding politics, agency, and society. Working towards a truly non-ethno-centric and global conception of intercultural dialogue, an essential aspect of Kögler's critical hermeneutics is his account of selfhood as reflexive: socially situated, embodied, and linguistically articulated, permeated by power, but yet critical and creative. Leading international scholars, representing a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, build upon Kögler's approach in this volume and explore the methodological, theoretical, and applicative scope of critical hermeneutics beyond the Frankfurt School. In doing so, they address some of the most pressing issues facing global society today, from multilingual education to the urgent need for interreligious and intercultural understanding. Closing with a response from Kögler himself, Hans-Herbert Kögler's Critical Hermeneutics also offers an exclusive account of the philosopher's contemporary re-appraisal of the core tenets of critical hermeneutics.

Tanabe Hajime and Martin Heidegger are two thinkers who broach the larger question of the implications of mindfulness beyond subjective experience and self-control and, therefore, also think of the possibility of freedom as something lying beyond the will to power. They accomplish this through a deconstruction of traditional notions of subjectivity in their own, distinctive ways. As a result, bringing both philosophers into a critical dialogue can positively contribute to an emancipatory understanding of mindfulness and subjectivity. This chapter thus examines this relationship from the perspective of their respective deconstructions of traditional conceptions of subjectivity with an emancipatory intent through their distinctive accounts of mindfulness. First, it explores Tanabe's preferred method for “overcoming” subjectivity, viz. mindfulness as metanoetics, which he considers to be a superior alternative to Heidegger's existentialism. Second, it puts Tanabe's metanoetics into a critical dialogue with Heidegger's own stand-in for mindfulness, namely Besinnung. While Tanabe's metanoetics aims to overcome subjectivity by dissolving it into a communal subject or “species”, Heidegger's Besinnung does so by way of a deconstruction of all such ecological or species-centric modes of thought. The main claim, therefore, will be that Besinnung provides a more compelling basis for an emancipatory project by avoiding the ethical and political problems that plague metanoetics.

This chapter examines the hitherto unexplored relationship between Johann P. Árnason’s civilizational analysis and contemporary post-foundationalist social and political thought, particularly “Left-Heideggerianism”. In the first part of the chapter, I provide a brief account of the core features of what I call the “political paradigm” of Left-Heideggerianism, which is based on the reformulation of the ontological difference as the political difference between politics and the political. This, in turn, sets the stage for an alternative social-ontological approach that takes the social difference between society and the social as a point of departure. I spell out some core features and commitments of the social paradigm of Left-Heideggerianism, clearing the path for situating Árnason’s civilizational analysis within its framework and the current landscape of post-foundationalist thought. This is achieved primarily by showing how the History or Histories of Being [Seinsgeschichte] can play the role of an ‘empty placeholder’ for civilizational analysis by introducing a crucial zeitdiagnostische dimension to fundamental ontology not only for the purposes of social criticism, but also for enabling a comparative analysis of different social imaginaries and their corresponding modes of being-in-the-world. As a result, the basic upshot of the chapter will be to serve as a point of departure for future research on the relationship between and potential role of civilizational analysis within Left-Heideggerianism and post-foundationalist thought broadly construed.

Civilization, Modernity, and Critique provides the first comprehensive, cutting edge engagement with the work of one of the most foundational figures in civilizational analysis: Johann P. Arnason. In order to do justice to Arnason's seminal and wide-ranging contributions to sociology, social theory and history, it brings together distinguished scholars from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds and geographical contexts. Through a critical, interdisciplinary dialogue, it offers an enrichment and expansion of the methodological, theoretical, and applicative scope of civilizational analysis, by addressing some of the most complex and pressing problems of contemporary global society. A unique and timely contribution to the ongoing task of advancing the project of a critical theory of society, this volume will appeal to scholars of sociology and social theory with interests in historical sociology, critical theory and civilizational analysis.

In this paper, I defend the viability and relevance of Heidegger's philosophy of technology and consider its emancipatory potential in the field of education. First, I situate Heidegger's philosophy of technology within the broader emancipatory project of his early work—the fundamental ontology of Being and Time—and emphasise the role of language and (self-)appropriation in human subjectivity. Second, in light of the importance Heidegger placed on education for resisting the reifying and alienating effects of technology, I conclude with some critical reflections on recent attempts to develop a positive Heideggerian programme of education. In particular, I reveal some crucial limitations of the pragmatist or ‘bodily coping’ approach—defended by Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall and argue that an ‘appropriative’ alternative yields a more compelling philosophy of education, which emphasises the cultivation of moral articulacy.

In spite of his status as a highly original thinker whose views were, in many ways, ahead of his time and anticipate those of more famous successors, the work of Johann Gottfried von Herder has not received the attention it deserves in mainstream philosophical discourse. In Herder's Hermeneutics, Kristin Gjesdal successfully addresses this deficit by exploring the enlightenment origins of the hermeneutic tradition through a careful and compelling reconstruction of Herder's theory of interpretation. Breaking with the widespread view of Herder as a contra-Enlightenment thinker, Gjesdal conceives of Herder's hermeneutics as contributing to the enlightenment of the Enlightenment project through an immanent critique of...

In “Understanding Demonstratives”, Gareth Evans bites the bullet regarding Rip van Winkle cases in cognitive dynamics: the fact that Rip sleeps for twenty years and completely loses track of time means he is unable to retain his original belief that “Today is a fine day”. In this paper, the author argues that Evans need not bite this bullet because there are resources in his account of the cognitive dynamics involved in belief retention developed in The Varieties of Reference to successfully confront the challenge posed by the Rip van Winkle case. In particular, when we combine the two central elements of Evans’s cognitive dynamics – the skill of keeping track of one’s spatio-temporal location in addition to memory – it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that it is indeed possible for Rip to retain and re-express his original belief.

ABSTRACTIn recent work, Maeve Cooke has criticised Jürgen Habermas’s post-metaphysical model in order to motivate an alternative “post-secular” conception of the state, which involves the replacement of the “institutional translation proviso” with the “nonauthoritarian reasoning requirement”. I provide a qualified defence of the Habermasian model by arguing that it does not lead to the kind of negative consequences regarding legitimacy and solidarity Cooke attributes to it. This, in turn, means that Cooke’s proposal for the secular foundation of political authority on a post-secular basis is insufficiently motivated. In the process, I argue that the point of departure for the debate about religion in the public sphere shared by both Habermas and Cooke – the picture of the “total” religious citizen – should be rejected because it presupposes an overly simplistic view of religions and religious identities.

It is widely held that reflexivity is the defining feature of selfhood: the ability of the self to stand in a certain relation to itself. The question of how exactly to theorize this self-relation, however, has been the source of ongoing debate. In recent years, Kantian and post-Kantian approaches such as Christine Korsgaard’s constitutivism and Richard Moran’s commitment view, have attempted to establish the priority of the agential over the epistemic self-relation, thereby re-orientating the debate away from metaphysics and epistemology towards ethics and moral psychology. Despite the important progress they make towards a de-alienated and reified understanding of the self-relation, however, I argue that the Kantian paradigm is ultimately inadequate because its methodological individualism makes it incapable of accounting for the irreducibly social dimension of the self-relation and, therefore, of successfully making the transition from ethics to social and political philosophy. In other words, an adequate ontology of the self-relation is possible only as a social ontology. In order to motivate this thesis, I appeal to two examples that expose the “social deficit” of the Kantian approach: Frantz Fanon’s phenomenology of race/racism in “The Lived Experience of the Black” and the phenomenon of cultural collapse in Jonathan Lear’sRadical Hope. I then go on to provide a sketch of an alternative approach based on the notion of “self-appropriation”, distinguishing it from Rahel Jaeggi’s use of the term in her recent critique of alienation, in the process.

This article is concerned with the question of the relative priority between political and social ontology within left-Heideggerianism, a tradition recently reconstructed by Oliver Marchart. Although the title seems to imply that this question is an open and live one within left-Heideggerianism – that the two paths at the crossroads have been clearly delineated when, in fact, the current predicament of left-Heideggerianism resembles more a one-way street – this is somewhat misleading: the identification of left-Heideggerianism with a post-foundationalist political ontology that enjoys systematic priority over the social has contributed to the suppression of the question of the Being of the social and, therefore, prevented a critical re-examination of its relationship to the political. The aim of this article is both modest and ambitious: modest, in that it merely seeks to pose and motivate the question of the social within left-Heideggerianism both at an exegetical and at a systematic level; ambiti...

In Another Philosophy of History, J.G. Herder claims that his aim is not to compare and judge different cultures, but merely to describe and explain how each came into being and thus to adopt the standpoint of an impartial observer. I argue, however, that there is a tension between Herder's understanding of his own project—his stated doctrine of historicism and cultural relativism—and the way in which it is actually put into practice. That is, despite Herder's stated aims, he is nevertheless unable to avoid justifying premodern forms of life and making context-transcending evaluative judgments in the process of trying to understand cultures on their own terms and holding them up as exemplars vis à vis the Enlightenment. This tension presents the challenge of accounting for it in the most charitable and illuminating way. I argue that this goal can be achieved by appealing to the resources of the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, which enables us to disclose two enabling conditions for Herder's project of which he was not explicitly aware, viz., the internal connection between understanding and justification and the enabling character of prejudice as the condition for the possibility of understanding as such.