• The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology (3rd Edition) (edited book)
    with Jonathan Dancy, Matthias Steup, and Ernest Sosa
    Wiley Blackwell. forthcoming.
  • Responsibilism within reason
    In Christoph Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches, Cambridge University Press. 2020.
  •  460
    The Possibility of Internalist Epistemology
    In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition, Wiley-blackwell. 2024.
    Internalism holds that epistemic justification is determined by what is internal to the mind, not by facts about the mind-independent world. This paper introduces and defends a new kind of internalism that is rooted in rationalist ideas that have been neglected in recent epistemology, despite inspiring internalist projects in cognitive science. Ignoring rationalist insights has, I argue, damaged the prospects for internalism, by needlessly saddling internalists with empiricist burdens. Intern…Read more
  •  15
    Realisms Interlinked is a sublime work. It reanimates theoretical philosophy with a distinctive synthesis of ideas and methods drawn from the common-sense metap.
  •  76
    Beginning in Wonder: Suspensive Attitudes and Epistemic Dilemmas
    with Errol Lord
    In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas, Oxford University Press. 2021.
    We argue that we can avoid epistemic dilemmas by properly understanding the nature and epistemology of the suspension of judgment, with a particular focus on conflicts between higher-order evidence and first-order evidence.
  •  91
    On Suspending Properly
    with Errol Lord
    In Luis Oliveria & Paul Silva (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification, Routledge. forthcoming.
    We argue for a novel view of suspending judgment properly--i.e., suspending judgment in an ex post justified way. In so doing we argue for a Kantian virtue-theoretic view of epistemic normativity and against teleological virtue-theoretic accounts.
  •  332
    Non‐epistemic perception as technology
    Philosophical Issues 30 (1): 324-345. 2020.
    Some epistemologists and philosophers of mind hold that the non-epistemic perceptual relation of which feature-seeing and object-seeing are special cases is the foundation of perceptual knowledge. This paper argues that such relations are best understood as having only a technological role in explaining perceptual knowledge. After introducing the opposing view in §1, §2 considers why its defenders deny that some cases in which one has perceptual knowledge without the relevant acquaintance rela…Read more
  •  70
    Epistemic Consequentialism and its Aftermath
    Analysis 79 (4): 773-783. 2019.
    Epistemic Consequentialism represents a shooting-star movement nearing its zenith but already passing its peak of apparent solidarity, with clear fault-lines no.
  •  47
    The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason (edited book)
    with Ruth Chang
    Routledge. 2020.
    The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reasonis an outstanding reference source to this exciting and distinctive subject area. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors the handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the field covering questions such as: What is the nature of the reasons for which we act and what is the nature of the faculty of practical reason? What are normative reasons for action? What is practical irrationality and what are the requirements, perm…Read more
  •  358
    Responsibilism within Reason
    In Christoph Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches, . forthcoming.
    According to ambitious responsibilism (AR), the virtues that are constitutive of epistemic responsibility should play a central and fundamental role in traditional projects like the analysis of justification and knowledge. While AR enjoyed a shining moment in the mid-1990s, it has fallen on hard times. Part of the reason is that many epistemologists—including fellow responsibilists—think it paints an unreasonably demanding picture of knowledge and justification. I agree that such worries undermi…Read more
  •  661
    Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental
    with Errol Lord
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (1). 2019.
    Reasons fundamentalists maintain that we can analyze all derivative normative properties in terms of normative reasons. These theorists famously encounter the Wrong Kind of Reasons problem, since not all reasons for reactions seem relevant for reasons-based analyses. Some have argued that this problem is a general one for many theorists, and claim that this lightens the burden for reasons fundamentalists. We argue in this paper that the reverse is true: the generality of the problem makes life h…Read more
  •  532
    It is often assumed that believing that p for a normative reason consists in nothing more than (i) believing that p for a reason and (ii) that reason’s corresponding to a normative reason to believe that p, where (i) and (ii) are independent factors. This is the Composite View. In this paper, we argue against the Composite View on extensional and theoretical grounds. We advocate an alternative that we call the Prime View. On this view, believing for a normative reason is a distinctive achieveme…Read more
  •  535
    Respect and the reality of apparent reasons
    Philosophical Studies 178 (10): 3129-3156. 2021.
    Rationality requires us to respond to apparent normative reasons. Given the independence of appearance and reality, why think that apparent normative reasons necessarily provide real normative reasons? And if they do not, why think that mistakes of rationality are necessarily real mistakes? This paper gives a novel answer to these questions. I argue first that in the moral domain, there are objective duties of respect that we violate whenever we do what appears to violate our first-order duties.…Read more
  •  425
    Many epistemologists treat rationality and justification as the same thing. Those who don’t lack detailed accounts of the difference, leading their opponents to suspect that the distinction is an ad hoc attempt to safeguard their theories of justification. In this paper, I offer a new and detailed account of the distinction. The account is inspired by no particular views in epistemology, but rather by insights from the literature on reasons and rationality outside of epistemology. Specifically, i…Read more
  •  821
    Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3): 525-555. 2018.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
  •  1410
    An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism
    The Philosophical Review 129 (1): 1-51. 2020.
    Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attrac…Read more