Kutlu Tuncel

In Leibniz’s mature philosophy, contingency was a necessary condition for freedom. Yet it remains a puzzle in what exact sense free acts are contingent for him. I argue that his faculty psychology holds the key to resolving this puzzle. On my interpretation, an act is contingent if it is metaphysically contingent given the considerations of the agent’s power (but not her will). I argue that there is a deep connection between the power/will distinction and a largely overlooked logical distinction at the core of Leibniz’s per se possibility theory. According to this theory, something is per se possible if it lacks an internal contradiction, even if its actualization is incompatible with God’s goodness. I argue that if this logical distinction and its connection with Leibniz’s faculty psychology are appreciated, Leibniz’s views on the contingency of free acts become far more plausible than their general reception in the literature suggests.

While often overlooked, loss and grief play a fundamental role in Spinoza’s practical philosophy. In this paper, I offer the first comprehensive reconstruction of Spinoza’s account of loss and grief, focusing on the Latin term desiderium and the Dutch term beklag. Three main theses are advanced. First, Spinoza regards loss not just as one affection among many but as the fundamental event underlying all sad passions, distinguishing between two determinations of desire: cupiditas and desiderium. Second, Spinoza provides a rich and philosophically significant account of grief, structured around three key claims: (1) The object of loss is the powers and capacities constitutive of one’s individual striving: in experiencing loss, we do not lose something we possess but something we are; (2) Grief arises when a unique and irreplaceable configuration of powers central to one’s striving is lost permanently or for an indeterminate time; (3) Accommodating loss involves a transformation of one’s individual striving, such that the desires and powers defining one’s existence change radically; Third and finally, his analysis of loss and grief supports nuanced interpretations of Spinoza that assign sad affects a crucial constitutive role in the cultivation of the good life, both at the individual and collective levels.

This Element is an opinionated introduction to Heidegger's phenomenology in Being and Time and surrounding works, framed in terms of Heidegger's debts to and divergence from Husserl's phenomenology. Section 1 situates Heidegger's and Husserl's phenomenology with respect to the 'identity-crisis of philosophy,' in particular the debate over whether philosophy is a science or a mere cataloguing of worldviews. Section 2 critically evaluates Heidegger's claims that various forms of conscious intentionality central to Husserl's phenomenology are 'derivative' or 'founded.' Section 3 turns to method, exploring whether Heidegger adopts Husserl's reductions, platonism, and method of essential seeing and imaginative variation. Section 4 explores Heidegger's hermeneutical turn in phenomenology and explains the uses to which he puts religious sources, mythology, and ordinary language.