Kyle Fruh

Stanford University
Duke Kunshan University
  • Duke Kunshan University
    Assistant Professor
  • Stanford University
    Thinking Matters
    Post-doctoral Fellow
Georgetown University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2014
Stanford, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory
Applied Ethics
Normative Ethics
  •  41
    The Power to Promise Oneself
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (1): 61-85. 2014.
    Considerable attention has been devoted to the peculiar obligating force of interpersonal promises. But paradigmatic promising is not an orphan in the family of our moral concepts, and the focus on interpersonal promises has overshadowed sibling phenomena that any account of promises should also cover. I examine the case of single-party promises and argue, against the prevailing view, that we have good reason to take the phenomenon of making promises to oneself seriously. This supports what I ca…Read more
  •  44
    Coping with Climate Change: What Justice Demands of Surfers, Mormons, and the Rest of us
    with Marcus Hedahl
    Ethics, Policy and Environment 16 (3): 273-296. 2013.
    Henry Shue has led the charge among moral philosophers in arguing that harms stemming from anthropogenic climate change constitute violations of basic rights and are therefore prohibited by duties of justice. Because frameworks such as Shue’s argue that duties of justice are at stake, one could object that the special urgency of those duties threatens to overrun the normatively protected space in which an agent makes her life her own. We argue that an alternative conception of how moral reasons …Read more
  •  54
    Moral Heroism and the Requirement Claim
    Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (1): 93-104. 2014.
    Acts of moral heroism are often described by heroes as having been in some sense or another required. Here I elaborate two rival strategies for accounting for what I call the requirement claim. The first, originating with J.O. Urmson, attempts to explain away the phenomenon. The second and more popular among moralists is to treat the requirement claim as a moment of moral insight and to make sense of it in terms of moral duty. I argue that both of these strategies are flawed, in that both fail a…Read more
  •  37
    Neither Owners Nor Guardians: In Search of a Morally Appropriate Model for the Keeping of Companion Animals
    with Wolodymyr Wirchnianski
    Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 30 (1): 55-66. 2017.
    The institution of owning pets has been subjected to compelling criticism on moral grounds. Yet advocates of a reformed, guardian/dependent model may yet face an abolitionist conclusion. We argue that treating companion animals as dependents entails an indefensible moral priority for them in the face of their guardians’ competing moral demands. An abolitionist dilemma arises as a result: if the property and reformed models fail, a morally acceptable characterization of the moral relationship bet…Read more