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27Two Problems of Self-Blame for Accounts of Moral StandingErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (n/a). 2021.Traditionally, those writing on blame have been concerned with blaming others, including when one has the standing to blame others. Yet some alleged problems for such accounts of standing arise when we focus on self-blame. First, if hypocrites lack the standing to blame others, it might seem that they also lack the standing to blame themselves. But this would lead to a bootstrapping problem, wherein hypocrites can only regain standing by doing that which they lack the standing to do. Second, in …Read more
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431Understanding the Dangers of Mind Changes in Political Leadership (and How to Avoid Them)Social Theory and Practice 49 (4): 653-679. 2023.Political leaders may change their mind about a policy, or even a significant moral issue. While genuinely changing one’s mind is not hypocritical, there are reasons to think that leaders who claim such a change are merely hypocritically pandering for political advantage. Indeed, some social science studies allegedly confirm that constituents will judge political leaders who change positions as hypocritical. Yet these studies are missing crucial details that we normally use to distinguish genuin…Read more
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754A Standing Asymmetry between Blame and ForgivenessEthics 132 (4): 759-786. 2022.Sometimes it is not one’s place to blame or forgive. This phenomenon is captured under the philosophical notion of standing. However, there is an asymmetry to be explained here. One can successfully blame, even if one lacks the standing to do so. Yet, one cannot successfully forgive if one lacks the standing to do so. In this article we explain this asymmetry. We argue that a complete explanation depends on not only a difference in the natures of the standing to blame and forgive but also a diff…Read more
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523Two Problems of Self-Blame for Accounts of Moral StandingErgo. forthcoming.Traditionally, those writing on blame have been concerned with blaming others, including when one has the standing to blame others. Yet some alleged problems for such accounts of standing arise when we focus on self-blame. First, if hypocrites lack the standing to blame others, it might seem that they also lack the standing to blame themselves. But this would lead to a bootstrapping problem, wherein hypocrites can only regain standing by doing that which they lack the standing to do. Second, in …Read more
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53The Importance of Rights to the Argument for the Decriminalization of DrugsAmerican Journal of Bioethics 21 (4): 46-48. 2021.In “Racial Justice Requires Ending the War on Drugs,” Earp and colleagues argue that the personal use or possession of all currently illicit psychoactive substances should be immediately decriminal...
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371Unjustified Asymmetry: Positive Claims of Conscience and Heartbeat BillsAmerican Journal of Bioethics 21 (8): 46-59. 2021.In 2019, several US states passed “heartbeat” bills. Should such bills go into effect, they would outlaw abortion once an embryonic heartbeat can be detected, thereby severely limiting an individual’s access to abortion. Many states allow health care professionals to refuse to provide an abortion for reasons of conscience. Yet heartbeat bills do not include a positive conscience clause that would allow health care professionals to provide an abortion for reasons of conscience. I argue that this …Read more
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751The Unique Badness of Hypocritical BlameErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6. 2019.It is widely agreed that hypocrisy can undermine one’s moral standing to blame. According to the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, R has the standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some norm N only if R is not hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N. Yet this condition is seldom argued for. Macalester Bell points out that the fact that hypocrisy is a moral fault does not yet explain why hypocritical blame is standingless blame. She raises a challenge: one must ex…Read more
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120When Hypocrisy Undermines the Standing to Blame: a Response to RossiEthical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2): 379-384. 2019.In our 2018 paper, “Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame,” we offer an argument justifying the Nonhypocrisy Condition on the standing to blame. Benjamin Rossi (2018) has recently offered several criticisms of this view. We defend our account from Rossi’s criticisms and emphasize our account’s unique advantage: explaining why hypocritical blamers lack the standing to blame.
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100Responsibility for Wrongdoing Without Blameworthiness: How it Makes Sense and How it Doesn'tPhilosophical Quarterly 64 (257): 569-589. 2014.Some writers, such as John Fischer and Michael McKenna, have recently claimed that an agent can be morally responsible for a wrong action and yet not be blameworthy for that action. A careful examination of the claim, however, suggests two readings. On one reading, there are further conditions on blameworthiness beyond freely and wittingly doing wrong. On another innocuous reading, there are no such further conditions. Despite Fischer and McKenna’s attempts to offer further conditions on blamewo…Read more
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139Hypocrisy, Inconsistency, and the Moral Standing of the StateCriminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2): 309-327. 2019.Several writers have argued that the state lacks the moral standing to hold socially deprived offenders responsible for their crimes because the state would be hypocritical in doing so. Yet the state is not disposed to make an unfair exception of itself for committing the same sorts of crimes as socially deprived offenders, so it is unclear that the state is truly hypocritical. Nevertheless, the state is disposed to inconsistently hold its citizens responsible, blaming or punishing socially depr…Read more
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86Moral Responsibility, Voluntary Control, and Intentional ActionPhilosophia 46 (4): 831-855. 2018.Many theorists writing about moral responsibility accept that voluntary control is necessary for responsibility. Call such theorists volitionists. Recently, volitionism has been called into question by theorists I call nonvolitionists. Yet neither volitionists nor nonvolitionists have carefully articulated a clear volitionist thesis, nor have they sufficiently explained the concept of voluntary control that somehow seems connected to volitionism. I argue that attempts to explain the volitionist …Read more
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1121Hypocrisy and the Standing to BlamePacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1): 118-139. 2018.Hypocrites are often thought to lack the standing to blame others for faults similar to their own. Although this claim is widely accepted, it is seldom argued for. We offer an argument for the claim that nonhypocrisy is a necessary condition on the standing to blame. We first offer a novel, dispositional account of hypocrisy. Our account captures the commonsense view that hypocrisy involves making an unjustified exception of oneself. This exception-making involves a rejection of the impartiality…Read more
Oxford, Mississippi, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Applied Ethics |
Normative Ethics |