Kyle J. Barbour

In this essay, I argue that Bradley’s engagement with Kant’s theoretical philosophy, often mediated by Herbart, Hamilton, and Lotze, led him to reassess his early Hegelianism and to develop a critical metaphysics. Bradley’s philosophy is examined diachronically, from early writings (2) to Appearance and Reality (4) through The Principles of Logic (3). I also provide a preliminary overview of Kant’s reception in Britain (1) to set the historical background for other sections. This essay explores a topic not previously investigated, as other contributions on Bradley and Kant compare them without historical concern. By focusing on Bradley’s sources, we can appreciate the influence of Kantianism through some understudied thinkers. In addition, I adopt a historical-diachronic approach that clarifies the development of Bradley’s philosophy by exploiting documents such as manuscripts and reading notes. In particular, I present the first analysis of a 1877–1878 manuscript – Bradley’s initial formulation of his peculiar metaphysics.

In this essay, I argue that Bradley’s engagement with Kant’s theoretical philosophy, often mediated by Herbart, Hamilton, and Lotze, led him to reassess his early Hegelianism and to develop a critical metaphysics. Bradley’s philosophy is examined diachronically, from early writings (2) to Appearance and Reality (4) through The Principles of Logic (3). I also provide a preliminary overview of Kant’s reception in Britain (1) to set the historical background for other sections. This essay explores a topic not previously investigated, as other contributions on Bradley and Kant compare them without historical concern. By focusing on Bradley’s sources, we can appreciate the influence of Kantianism through some understudied thinkers. In addition, I adopt a historical-diachronic approach that clarifies the development of Bradley’s philosophy by exploiting documents such as manuscripts and reading notes. In particular, I present the first analysis of a 1877–1878 manuscript – Bradley’s initial formulation of his peculiar metaphysics.

Principlism, the bioethical theory championed by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, is centered on the four moral principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy, and justice. Two key processes related to these principles are specification—adding specific content to general principles—and balancing—determining the relative weight of conflicting principles. I argue that both of these processes necessarily involve an appeal to human goods and evils, and therefore require a theory of the good. A significant problem with principlism is that it lacks a theory of the good and consequently does not have an adequate solution to the problems of specification and balancing. My conclusion is that principlism must adopt some account of human well-being in order to be a satisfactory bioethical framework.