Kyley Ewing

This paper presents an account of the mind-independent and non-dynamic passage of time that is consistent with the block universe theory and central features of our experience of time. Although a minimalist account of temporal passage, it provides substantial answers to core questions about the basis, workings, and explanatory power of temporal passage. In connection to the basis of temporal passage, my account proposes that temporal passage finds a basis in both the necessary and contingent features of the ontological structure of the block universe. The workings of the passage of time will be connected to the relationship between the entropy boundaries and the occupation of entities and events at different moments in the block universe. Lastly, it will follow from my account that the passage of time provides the explanatory basis for not only the earlier than and later than relations but also the direction of time.

Fragmentalism is a relatively recent and striking addition to the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time. First introduced by Fine in “Tense and Reality,” it presents a rare instance of both a theoretically intriguing and novel theory of time. My aim is to consider if and in what sense fragmentalism can join its tensed compatriots in accounting for genuine temporal passage. There are three parts to my analysis of temporal passage in fragmentalism's fragmented world. I begin by defending fragmentalism against claims that it presents a hopelessly muddled conception of reality. With a coherent conceptual picture of the basics of fragmentalism in place, I turn to the passage of time and argue that fragmentalism provides an ill‐suited environment for the mind‐independent passage of time. I conclude that, although fragmentalism is not necessarily in itself an incoherent view, it lacks the advantages of orthodox A‐theoretic tensed accounts.

This paper considers one unique solution to the puzzle of temporal passage in the block universe. argues that, although a precise description of its workings is currently beyond our understanding, time really passes. After introducing Norton’s account, I argue that it both implies a counterintuitive relationship between the “now” and passage and that it leads to an unlikely relationship between our experience and reality. I then propose that, even if one is willing to accept these consequences, there is reason to question whether Norton builds a convincing case for the claim that, since we are not able to find any of the identifying characteristics of an illusion in the case of temporal passage, the passage of time is not an illusion.

This thesis considers the relationship between the ontology of time and the passage of time, and concludes that the best way to understand this relationship is found in the combination of eternalism with the view that the passage of time is an objective, irreducible fact about the spatio-temporal world. The steps I take to reach this conclusion are as follows: first, I propose that eternalism is the best ontological basis from which to consider temporal passage; second, I argue that the moving spotlight theory, which attempts to reconcile eternalism with temporal passage, is an inadequate representation of the relationship between eternalism and temporal passage; third, I suggest that temporal passage is best understood as a mind-independent phenomenon. I argue that eternalism is preferable to presentism insofar as presentism suffers from inconsistencies that eternalism both avoids and easily solves. I then defend the rejection of the moving spotlight theory by an appeal to the incoherency of the moving now. Finally, I dismiss mind-dependent temporal passage in favour of mind-independent temporal passage based on the irreducibility of temporal passage in and of itself