L.b. Wolf

In this dissertation I examine how the English philosopher-theologian Samuel Clarke (1675--1729) attempted to reasonableness of Christianity and its compatibility with the new natural philosophy. In reaction to what he perceived as the problematic excesses of mechanical philosophy, with its looming threat of atheism, Clarke developed a series of arguments against atheism which aimed to show the shortcomings of a purely material or mechanical explanation of the universe, and demonstrate the overall `reasonability' of the Christian religion. Clarke aimed to demonstrate the `reasonableness' of Christianity by turning the `mathematical' style of reasoning of the mechanical philosophy against his atheist adversaries. Clarke's writings offer us a valuable case-study for the complex interplay of philosophy, science and religion in England at the start of the eighteenth century, and the impact of mechanical philosophy on natural theology. This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of Clarke's philosophy through careful examination of its principal components: The active role of God in the world, the perfection of God's plan, the existence of immaterial substances and powers, and the subsequent reasonability of the Christian religion. Taken together, the four chapters show Clarke's solutions to the atheist threats, and provide a coherent picture of Clarke's ideas about the nature of God and God's role in the world.

The distinction between voluntarism and intellectualism has recently been criticized for inaccurately characterising early modern theories of divine freedom. In response, defenders of the distinction have argued that these labels are needed in order to account for the famous correspondence between Leibniz (intellectualist) and Clarke (voluntarist). In this paper, I argue that the voluntarism/intellectualism distinction is unable to account for the opposition between Leibniz and Clarke. In the first part, I provide an analysis of Clarke’s theory of divine freedom, and show how he employs the distinction between activity and passivity in order to account for the separation between God’s will and intellect, which ultimately safeguards God’s freedom. I also analyse Clarke’s correspondence with Leibniz, and show how Clarke deals with choice among equals, the principle of sufficient reason, and the principle of the best. In the second part, I argue on the basis of this analysis that Clarke is not a voluntarist, but should instead be interpreted as an intellectualist (if one wants to keep the labels). Therefore, the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence cannot be explained as a clash between voluntarism and intellectualism. Published on 2022-02-18 12:23:56.

In the past, experts have disagreed about whether Samuel Clarke accepted the idea that gravity is a power superadded to matter by God. Most scholars now agree that Clarke did not support superaddition. But the argumentation employed by Clarke to reject superaddition has not been studied before in detail. In this paper, I explicate Clarke's argumentation by relating it to an important discussion about the possibility of superadded gravity in the Clarke-Collins correspondence. I examine Clarke's responses to Collins and draw on his other works to reconstruct Clarke's reasons for rejecting superadded gravity.