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3Ramon M. Lemos, 1927-2006Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (5). 2006.
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6Event Identity and a Significant PhysicalismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 19 (2): 171-180. 1981.
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6Out-Gunning SkepticismCanadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3). 1987.Bredo C. Johnsen1 misconceives my strictures concerning acceptance of the following principle : If A both knows that p and knows that p entails q, then A can come to know that q.Johnsen seems unaware that my criticism was intended to apply only after is made to appear in its most plausible light; that is, only after its consequent is interpreted as: ’It is logically possible for A to know that q.’ Without this interpretation might be dismissed simply on the grounds that A suffers from some physi…Read more
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4The Irreducibility of KnowledgeLogique Et Analyse 77 (Sommaire): 167-176. 1977.In this article it is argued that it is impossible to give a reductive analysis of knowledge, given that knowledge is an "epistemic" concept with these marks: (1) like necessity, it is only partially truth-functional; and, (2) unlike necessity, it includes an "intentional" component (belief) which is completely non-truth-functional. a reductive analysis would have to contain at least one extensional component, one intentional component, and none that is itself epistemic. but any plausible analys…Read more
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12The impossibility of massive errorPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2): 405-409. 1993.I argue that Davidson's anti-skeptical thesis can survive objections made against it by treating skepticism as logically possible, but not epistemically possible. That is, the skeptical hypothesis of massive error conflicts with what we must take ourselves to know if we are to have coherent thought and speech.
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6The time-gap argumentAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3): 263-272. 1969.I argue that the time-gap argument poses no objection to Direct Realism. In the case of exploded stars many light years from us, what we see is no longer the star, but its light. I argue that in all cases of seeing we see light, but only when physical objects exist at the time of our seeing do we see them.
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2Free will and intentional actionPhilosophia 16 (3-4): 355-364. 1986.I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.
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5On What We Know We Don't Know. Explanation, Theory, Linguistics, and How Questions Shape ThemPhilosophical Books 35 (1): 38-39. 1994.
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11Time-gap myopiaAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1): 55-57. 1972.I answer objections to my article, "The Time-Gap Argument," made by C. Daniels in his "Seeing Through a Time Gap."
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3The Impossibility of Massive ErrorPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2): 405-409. 1993.
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10Aristotelian materialismPhilosophia 34 (3): 253-266. 2006.I argue that a modern gloss on Aristotle’s notions of Form and Matter not only allows us to escape a dualism of the psychological and the physical, but also results in a plausible sort of materialism. This is because Aristotle held that the essential nature of any psychological state, including perception and human thought, is to be some physical property. I also show that Hilary Putnam and Martha Nussbaum are mistaken in saying that Aristotle was not a materialist, but a functionalist. His func…Read more
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Skepticism about Epistemic ReasonsIyyun, The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 44 (July): 273-292. 1995.
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10PerversityPhilosophical Quarterly 26 (104): 229-242. 1976.I argue that there are perverse actions, in the sense that they are acts performed in the belief that they are wrong. They are also, however, acts done in the belief that they are right. What makes them perverse is, not only that they have conflicting motivations, but that the motivation that wins out is not in accord with reason. That is, a perverse act is one resulting from one's strongest motivation but not based on all one's available reasons.
Coral Gables, Florida, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
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Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
20th Century Philosophy |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Social and Political Philosophy |