L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya

Conceptual mandelanisation is an Africanisation response to the challenge inherent in conceptual decolonisation, which is concerned primarily with the linguistic decolonisation project in African philosophy. Although conceptual mandelanisation is an Africanisation project, it fails by deflecting African philosophy’s focus from the language problem to an African personage problem. Conceptual articulation is a mechanism for developing concepts from indigenous African languages, and employing them to address existential/philosophical problems confronting humans within and beyond Africa. In this article, I argue that conceptual articulation is a more plausible approach to the substance problem in African philosophy: what should constitute the focus of problem-solving in African philosophy? Its plausibility lies in the fact that it focuses on the substantive issues that can lead to the universalisation of African philosophy as a discipline.

Even after all its nations have attained political independence, Africa still relies on foreign aid for economic development. Scholars are divided when it comes to the question of whether aid is good or bad for Africa. Through the use of conversational thinking as a method, on the one hand, we interrogate the views of scholars such as Sachs (End of poverty: Economic possibilities of our time. The Penguin press, New York, 2005), Easterly (2006), Collier (The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About it. Oxford University Press, New York, 2007), who believe that aid is good for Africa’s development. These scholars give the impression that Africa is incapable of economic growth without Western assistance. On the other hand, there are scholars such as Abuzeid (Stanford Journal of International RelationsXI(1):16–23, 2009), Moyo (Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is A Better Way for Africa. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2009), Deaton (The Great Escape: Healthy, Wealthy, and the Origins of Inequality. Princetown University Press, New Jersey, 2013), who argue for Africa to be self-sufficient and do away with aid, citing that it keeps Africa economically dependent, encourages corruption and conflict and discourages free enterprise. This position seems to neglect the global interconnectedness and lack of self-sufficiency of nations. Contrary to these two positions, Metz (2019) argues that since its nations are not technologically self-sufficient, Africa needs to enter into a relationship of interdependence with West in order to become technologically and economically viable. In this chapter, we seek to affirm Metz’s relational ethics which is informed by Ubuntu ethics and argue further that his notion of economic interdependence must be built on the idea of economic self-reliance in Africa and among Africans. The notion of economic self-reliance that we argue for is one that acknowledges the technological insufficiency of Africa that should warrant its borrowing technology from the West in order to grow its local economy, without depending on external economic aid.

This chapter deepens the formulation of the theory of cogno-normative epistemology as an exercise in decoloniality. Questions regarding the power and influence of knowledge not only in human life but in the universe as a whole, the moral implications of knowledge and the ontology of knowledge are investigated. The chapter also investigates the two components of epistemology, namely knowledge and ignorance, and discusses their varied categories. In doing this, nmekọ or relationship and logical trivalence as key features of the African philosophical tradition are deployed to tease out the value and mechanism of the African perspective to discourses on epistemology.

African philosophy continues to see the emergence of new concepts, new formulations and new ideas in the twenty-first century. Consolationism is one of such formulations. As propounded by Ada Agada, its chief objectives are exploring the meaningfulness of human existence in a universe that does not readily yield its secrets, in particular, secrets about origin and destiny. The preoccupation with the meaning of human existence gives the concept of purpose a central position in Agada’s consolationist system. This chapter will explore key metaphysical propositions of consolationism and uncover some of its epistemological underpinnings. It will demonstrate the decolonial leaning of consolationism by grounding its assumptions on conversational thinking and Ezumezu logic.

The focus of this book is on a decolonial approach to philosophy, specifically as it concerns African philosophy as a discipline. In writing this work, we have avoided the temptation of comparing and contrasting the philosophical ideas, insights and thoughts gleaned from the African philosophical place with those from other philosophical places. We have concerned ourselves with discussing African metaphysics and epistemology through the framework of the conversational method grounded in Ezumezu logic and teased out of the principle of nmekọ. In the two parts of the book, which deal with metaphysics and epistemology, we did not focus on the polemic of whether African metaphysics and epistemology exist or not. Where we tried to address that in any of the chapters, we did not dwell on them. We passively highlighted some of the salient points to keep records straight. We were primarily concerned with discussing the nature of African metaphysics and epistemology as captured in the treatises of some African philosophers in addition to throwing in our own proposals. Each part contains chapters that discussed ideas in the literature and a chapter that made a theoretic proposal as a way of extending the frontiers of knowledge in African metaphysics and epistemology. Specifically, the work proposed nmekọka as a robust metaphysical theory and a theory of knowledge called cogno-normative epistemology.

In this chapter, we present ụwa ontology, a theory of being articulated by Pantaleon Iroegbu, as a decolonial project. This ontological theory is articulated to address the lapses inherent in some ontological theories in Western and African philosophies. The word ụwa is taken from the Igbo language and conceptualized to mean ‘an englobing phenomenon.’ For Iroegbu, ụwa is the only existing reality, which consists of other beings. The idea is that being is because it belongs to ụwa. This is to say that without ụwa there can be no being. We show that for Iroegbu, being that is enfolded in ụwa is multidimensional, multifaceted and relational, and that it can be explained through the decolonial methodology of conversational thinking grounded in Ezumezu logic.

What are the basic principles of the African system of thought? This question calls for clarification on what binds some of the salient features that can be found in many African worldviews. Here, I show how the logical principle of trivalence, which characterizes a mode of reasoning that rests on a truth-glut, three-valued logic, and the principle of nmekọ or relationship, which highlights not only the significance of binary complementarity of seemingly opposed variables but the importance of the notion of context, represent the two basic principles of the African system of thought. I will show how the African system and any methodology mechanized from it, such as conversational thinking, can be construed as decolonial in order to provide a logico-methodological landing for this book.

Our focus in this chapter is to curate some epistemological ideas in African philosophy in light of decolonial methodology and logic. The task is necessary because very few works in African philosophy, and in particular African epistemology, have paid attention to curating what has been done, and the concepts or ideas that have been articulated by different thinkers. Here, we are not concerned with doing a metaphilosophical discourse on African epistemology’s existence. This is because we take it for granted that African epistemology is being done in African philosophy, by African philosophers. Some of the epistemological concepts or ideas discussed in this chapter include Senghor’s negritude, Anyanwu’s epistemological relativity, Wiredu’s notion of truth, Ijiomah’s humanizing epistemology, Chimakonam’s cogno-normative epistemology, Hountondji’s endogenous knowledge, Ozumba-Chimakonam’s integrative epistemology and Tavernaro-Haidarian’s deliberative epistemology. The essence of this chapter is to demonstrate that African epistemology has come of age and that there is the need to take stock and document it properly.

This chapter adopts decolonial method and logic in surveying the discussions on personhood, focusing on the Afro-communitarian metaphysical and ethical theories of Mbiti and Menkiti, now popularly known as the radical version, that of Gyekye known as moderate communitarianism and that of Matolino known as limited communitarianism. The chapter discusses the two main categories or conceptions: the metaphysical and the normative. The chapter shows that while most discussions in African philosophy center on the normative conception of personhood, the metaphysical conception cannot be left out. The chapter argues that both conceptions are connected such that discussing one should spillover into the other, assuming it has not been unduly trivialized. The chapter claims that the metaphysical has been trivialized and contends that any comprehensive discussion of personhood in African philosophy cannot leave out the metaphysical because to understand personhood requires understanding the nature of entities that bear the characteristics or features of the normative personhood.

This chapter taps into ideas present in extant literature to construct an African metaphysical theory called nmekọka metaphysics. The chapter shows that the metaphysics of nmekọka is a collectivist metaphysics, which highlights the attributes of ‘dynamism’ and ‘relationship’ as features that shape realities. The chapter identifies some metaphysical concepts and ontological positions developed so far in African philosophy, and observes, to the best of our knowledge, that a full-fledged theory in African metaphysics fitted with a discernible background logic and a method(s) that drive(s) its discourse has yet to be formulated. The chapter argues that a theory of African metaphysical thinking that gives an account of reality as a whole is long overdue. The chapter unbundles nmekọka as a decolonized theory of metaphysics.

Our goal in this chapter is to give an insightful presentation and examination of Innocent Asouzu’s conception of being showing its decolonial leaning. Some philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle, had articulated notions of being that are bifurcating and polarizing. Asouzu suggests that any conception of being that is lopsided is mistaken. To remedy this misconception, Asouzu explains that there is a need to reconceptualize being. The idea of being that he articulates is one that overcomes the bifurcation and polarization of being. He proposes a system he calls ibuanyidanda ontology. This ontological system is complementary and non-bifurcatory in keeping with decolonial logic. In it, being is that on account of which anything that exists serves as a missing link of reality. We shall employ the conversational method for our discussion in this chapter and demonstrate the compatibility of Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology with the trivalent logic system of Ezumezu.

This chapter carries out a decolonial study in epistemology. Our argument is that African epistemology exists as a branch of African philosophy and that it varies from other epistemologies in terms of method and background logic. This contention is necessitated by the fact that there continues to be some doubt on the possibility of other branches of African philosophy even after the affirmation of the existence of African philosophy. The argument is that knowledge and human knowing faculties are the same everywhere; hence, there is no need for a distinct epistemological system and theory called African epistemology. The preceding has been countered by some African philosophers who argue that, inasmuch as African philosophy exists as a separate tradition from other philosophies, African epistemology as one of its branches must also exist. We go beyond this sentiment to argue that what we call African epistemology is epistemology from an African perspective. It is a contribution from the African philosophical tradition to the theory of knowledge, and its principles and ideas are universalizable. We survey a handful of contributions in the literature and show the methodological and logical nuances that make epistemology in African philosophy different from epistemology in other philosophical traditions.

This chapter contends that the criterion question—“what is it that makes a philosophy African?”—is the most enduring question about the existence, and future direction, of African philosophy. Hountondji, Oruka, Bodunrin, Uduma, and Chimankonam are among those who have engaged with this question. I align myself with Chimakonam’s arguement that the proposals in respect of the criterion question put forward by a number of African philosophers are inadequate. However, I claim that he is mistaken to propose logic as the criterion for African philosophy. I argue that what makes a philosophy African is not its logic but its African background ontology. This chapter adopts the conversational method as its interrogative paradigm.

In this paper, we argue that Pantaleon Iroegbu’s Uwa ontology can be employed as a framework for conceptualizing an ecocentric environmental philosophy that grounds moral consideration in the intrinsic value of the ecosystem itself. The theory we will develop will not treat the ecosystem as a unique entity different or that subsumes other entities in it. It will be one that regards the ecosystem as a network composed of biotic and abiotic entities. To reach this objective, we will identify and highlight the anthropocentric and bio-centric frameworks as contrasting but limited approaches, which seek to protect the environment for the sake of humanity’s well-being and the wellbeing of living things, respectively; unlike the ecocentric vision that covers the welfare of the ecosystem as a whole. For their limitations, we will argue that the anthropocentric and bio-centric orientations have not helped to improve and sustain the ecosystem, hence the gap that our research will attempt to fill. As a remedy, we here deploy Iroegbu’s Uwa ontology, which holds that being is belonging, to tap into the underexplored African notion of relationship to construct an ecocentric philosophy that conceives the ecosystem as a globe of interconnected and interdependent realities without any prejudice.

In line with the tradition of the Conversational School of Philosophy, this essay provides a rare and unique space of discourse for the authors to converse about the place of the ‘ethno’ in African philosophy. This conversation is a revisit, a renewal of the key positions that have coloured the ethnophilosophy debate by the conversers who themselves are notable contributors to arguments for and against the importance of ethnophilosophy in the unfolding of African philosophy particularly in the last decade or so. There are four key positions that have been argued for in the pages of this paper: ethnophilosophy is not African philosophy and it is useless and inimical to the growth of African philosophy and should thus be jettisoned – Matolino; ethnophilosophy is the foundation for African philosophy as it provides the raw materials for African philosophical discourse – Ogbonnaya and Agada; ethnophilosophy has some value for African philosophy but it is definitely not the foundation for genuine African philosophy the way criticism and rigours are – Attoe; and ethnophilosophy can be adequately conceived as African philosophy particularly in terms of its etymology as culture or race philosophy, dealing with a philosophical or critical reflections on, and exposition of, immanent principles in African thought – Mangena and Etieyibo. These conversers provide good arguments for the positions they hold, arguments that are of course, open for further interrogation. Two points can be concluded from the ethnophilosophy debate provided in this essay: the disparities in views among conversers it seems, stem ultimately from the understanding of ethnophilosophy that each converser holds, which varies from the notion of a method used at some point in the history of African philosophy, to an etymological understanding as culture philosophy; and the debate about ethnophilosophy in the spirit of any philosophical tradition remains a perennial one that is yet to be concluded. This essay certainly concretises what is on ground and paves the way for further discussions.

In line with the tradition of the Conversational School of Philosophy, this essay provides a rare and unique space of discourse for the authors to converse about the place of the ‘ethno’ in African philosophy. This conversation is a revisit, a renewal of the key positions that have coloured the ethnophilosophy debate by the conversers who themselves are notable contributors to arguments for and against the importance of ethnophilosophy in the unfolding of African philosophy particularly in the last decade or so. There are four key positions that have been argued for in the pages of this paper: ethnophilosophy is not African philosophy and it is useless and inimical to the growth of African philosophy and should thus be jettisoned – Matolino; ethnophilosophy is the foundation for African philosophy as it provides the raw materials for African philosophical discourse – Ogbonnaya and Agada; ethnophilosophy has some value for African philosophy but it is definitely not the foundation for genuine African philosophy the way criticism and rigours are – Attoe; and ethnophilosophy can be adequately conceived as African philosophy particularly in terms of its etymology as culture or race philosophy, dealing with a philosophical or critical reflections on, and exposition of, immanent principles in African thought – Mangena and Etieyibo. These conversers provide good arguments for the positions they hold, arguments that are of course, open for further interrogation. Two points can be concluded from the ethnophilosophy debate provided in this essay: the disparities in views among conversers it seems, stem ultimately from the understanding of ethnophilosophy that each converser holds, which varies from the notion of a method used at some point in the history of African philosophy, to an etymological understanding as culture philosophy; and the debate about ethnophilosophy in the spirit of any philosophical tradition remains a perennial one that is yet to be concluded. This essay certainly concretises what is on ground and paves the way for further discussions. Keywords: Ethno, African philosophy, Foundationalist, Universalist, Particularist, The common moral position, Ethnophilosophy

The notion of belongingness in African philosophy has its most profound expression in Pantaleon Iroegbu’s uwa ontology, which stipulates that being is that which exists in the community, or, as he puts it, “To be is to belong.” The main contention of this article is that Jonathan O. Chimakonam’s ezumezu logic is fully equipped to explain this ontology of belongingness. This is due to the trivalent and dynamic nature of this African culture–inspired logic, which adequately captures the African conception of reality. According to this conception, individual entities continue to coexist or to belong in the community without losing their respective identities.

This article investigates whether Conversational Thinking can suitably serve as a pedagogical approach for philosophy education in African schools (primary and secondary levels). We argue that there is a need to introduce and teach philosophy in schools in Africa. Additionally, we argue that it would be apropos to adopt a decolonial approach in developing such curricula, which, amongst others, could accommodate African approaches to philosophy. We contend that African homegrown frameworks, such as Conversational Thinking, can serve as appropriate decolonial strategies for philosophy education in parts of Africa. Our reason is that the proposed approach can train the emerging young generations in Africa, not only to be critical, creative, and innovative, but also to view reality from African epistemic perspectives. This stems from the fact that Conversational Thinking is one strategy amongst others that can promote African culture-inspired approaches to knowledge that combine with basic thinking skills to offer truly African forms of epistemic liberation.

The reality and severity of the COVID-19 pandemic question God’s omnibenevolence and omnipotence. Two questions that stare us in the face are a) is God omnibenevolent given the current reality? b) is God omnipotent? This paper addresses these questions from the African place using the African theory of duality and its underlying logic, Ezumezu. We argue that the reality of the COVID-19 pandemic and its adverse effects (such as death, hardship and social isolation) do not negate God’s benevolence and powerfulness. We assert that while the current reality cannot sustain a defence of the traditional theistic qualities of omnipotence and omnibenevolence, the notions of a powerful and benevolent God are not necessarily undermined by the reality of Covid-19. In the light of the African theory of duality and Ezumezu logic, we contend that the COVID-19 pandemic brings out the argument that inherent in God’s benevolence is wickedness and inherent in God’s powerfulness is weakness.

Multicultural societies are faced with the problem of xenophobia – the fear, dislike, and discrimination against strangers. Xenophobia has its root in the ontology of ‘the self’ and ‘the other’, where ‘the self’” is ‘the indigenes’ and ‘the other,’ ‘the strangers’, who must be denied the privileges and rights of the indigenes and the opportunity to contribute towards the development of their societies. In this paper, I employ conversational thinking – a method and philosophy grounded in the sub-Saharan African notion of ‘relationship’ as a viable theoretical option that can help us live beyond the problem of xenophobia. In conversational thinking, there are two ontological and epistemic agents, nwa-nsa and nwa-nju, involved in an arumaristic relationship at an ontological point, nwa-izugbe. I ground my argument in this ‘arumaristic relationship’ which allows for nwa-nsa taken as ‘the self’ and nwa-nju, ‘the other’ to come to the realm of nwa-izugbe, and exhibit nmeko. I contend that the notion ‘nmeko’, emphasized in conversational thinking, is key to putting xenophobia in the past since it stresses ‘arumaristic complementary relationship’ irrespective of socio-cultural and racial differences among people.

What is the constituent nature of God? Most scholars project the idea that God is an absolute, pure spirit devoid of matter. In this paper, I engage this position from the African philosophical place. First, I contend that the postulation that God is pure spirit stems from an ontological system known as dualism. This system bifurcates reality into spirit and matter and sees spirit as good, and matter as evil. Therefore, scholars who subscribe to this theory of dualism, posit that God, the Supreme Being is the ultimate good that is, and is pure spirit. Secondly, I disagree with this position. Using the African theory of duality, I argue that everything that is has both spirit and matter, and that spirit and matter are good. Thus, God as an existent reality consists of spirit and matter. I will support my argument using Asouzu’s Ibuanyidanda ontology and Ijiomah’s Harmonious Monism, two African culture-inspired philosophical systems. In this paper, I employ conversationalism as my philosophical method.

In this chapter, I contend that conversational philosophy has benefited immensely from the particularist and universalist projects in African philosophy tradition. As a result, it has been able to overcome the lapses inherent in particularism, universalism and eclecticism/pluralism. I argue that conversational philosophy is a more robust approach than the above-mentioned approaches, which have the problems of uniqueness, aping of Western philosophy and vagueness, respectively. I claim that conversational philosophy conceives African philosophy not as a tradition peculiar to a given place, nor as one that apes Western tradition, nor as an eclectic discipline enshrouded in vagueness; but as a philosophical tradition that is both selectively particular and universal in nature in which ideas are conceptualized using linguistic resources from African worldviews but with universal applicability. I conclude by demonstrating that the mechanism of conversational philosophy is one that carefully approaches discourse on African philosophy by borrowing a leaf from both the particularist vision and the universalist vision in order to establish the discipline of African philosophy as a tradition in its own right.

This book focuses on African metaphysics and epistemology, and is an exercise in decoloniality. The authors describe their approach to "decoloniality" as an intellectual repudiation of coloniality, using the method of conversational thinking grounded in Ezumezu logic. Focusing specifically on both African metaphysics and African epistemology, the authors put forward theories formulated to stimulate fresh debates and extend the frontiers of learning in the field. They emphasize that this book is not a project in comparative philosophy, nor is it geared towards making Africa/ns the object/subjects of philosophy. Rather, the book highlights and discusses philosophical insights that have been produced from the African perspective, which the authors argue must be further developed in order to achieve decoloniality in the field of philosophy more broadly.

What is the constituent nature of God? Most scholars project the idea that God is an absolute, pure spirit devoid of matter. In this paper, I engage this position from the African philosophical place. First, I contend that the postulation that God is pure spirit stems from an ontological system known as dualism. This system bifurcates reality into spirit and matter and sees spirit as good, and matter as evil. Therefore, scholars who subscribe to this theory of dualism, posit that God, the Supreme Being is the ultimate good that is, and is pure spirit. Secondly, I disagree with this position. Using the African theory of duality, I argue that everything that is has both spirit and matter, and that spirit and matter are good. Thus, God as an existent reality consists of spirit and matter. I will support my argument using Asouzu’s Ibuanyidanda ontology and Ijiomah’s Harmonious Monism, two African culture-inspired philosophical systems. In this paper, I employ conversationalism as my philosophical method.

One of the most debated issues in African philosophy concerns the question of ethnophilosophy. While most Particularists equate it to African philosophy, theUniversalists reject it as philosophy let alone being African philosophy. The rationale behind the second position is that ethnophilosophy is said to be descriptive and lacks argumentation, criticality, rigor and systematicity, which are the hallmarks of philosophy. What these two views revolve around is the question of the place of ethnophilosophy in African philosophy. Here, I focus on two scholars who have sought to address this question. The first is Ada Agada, who opines that ethnophilosophy plays a foundational role to African philosophy. The other is Aribiah Attoe, who sees this view as a myth that must be done away with. In this paper, I show two things: first, I show that these two conflicting views arose due to both scholars’ failure to clarify their ideas of what makes a philosophy African. Second, I converse with Attoe on his critique of the foundational role of ethnophilosophy as a myth. Here, I contend that Attoe’s view is a misreading of Agada’s views and that Attoe’s position that critical rigor instead of ethnophilosophy should be the foundation of African philosophy is unfounded. My argument is that criticality is just one among other tools of philosophy; and a tool of philosophy cannot be its foundation.

This work is of the view that the question of being is not only a problem in Western philosophy but also in African philosophy. It, therefore, posits that being is that which is and has both abstract and concrete aspect. The work arrives at this conclusion by critically analyzing and evaluating the views of some key African philosophers with respect to being. With this, it discovers that the way that these African philosophers have postulated the idea of being is in the same manner like their Western philosophers whom they tried to criticize. This work tries to synthesize the notions of beings of these African philosophers in order to reach at a better understanding of being. This notion of being leans heavily on Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology which does not bifurcate or polarize being, but harmonizes entities or realities that seem to be contrary or opposing in being.

One of the most debated issues in African philosophy concerns the question of ethnophilosophy. While most Particularists equate it to African philosophy, the Universalists reject it as philosophy let alone being African philosophy. The rationale behind the second position is that ethnophilosophy is said to be descriptive and lacks argumentation, criticality, rigor and systematicity, which are the hallmarks of philosophy. What these two views revolve around is the question of the place of ethnophilosophy in African philosophy. Here, I focus on two scholars who have sought to address this question. The first is Ada Agada, who opines that ethnophilosophy plays a foundational role to African philosophy. The other is Aribiah Attoe, who sees this view as a myth that must be done away with. In this paper, I show two things: first, I show that these two conflicting views arose due to both scholars’ failure to clarify their ideas of what makes a philosophy African. Second, I converse with Attoe on his critique of the foundational role of ethnophilosophy as a myth. Here, I contend that Attoe’s view is a misreading of Agada’s views and that Attoe’s position that critical rigor instead of ethnophilosophy should be the foundation of African philosophy is unfounded. My argument is that criticality is just one among other tools of philosophy; and a tool of philosophy cannot be its foundation. Keywords: Agada, African Philosophy, Attoe, criticality, ethnophilosophy, Ezin’ulo Ontology

This work is of the view that the question of being is not only a problem in Western philosophy but also in African philosophy. It, therefore, posits that being is that which is and has both abstract and concrete aspect. The work arrives at this conclusion by critically analyzing and evaluating the views of some key African philosophers with respect to being. With this, it discovers that the way that these African philosophers have postulated the idea of being is in the same manner like their Western philosophers whom they tried to criticize. This work tries to synthesize the notions of beings of these African philosophers in order to reach at a better understanding of being. This notion of being leans heavily on Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology which does not bifurcate or polarize being, but harmonizes entities or realities that seem to be contrary or opposing in being.