Lassi Jakola

Taking Plato’s uses of the noun σῶμα as a starting point, this article presents an overview of the development of the Greek concept of body/σῶμα from Homer to the early 4th Century BCE by examining the uses of the word σῶμα in Greek poetry and literature. Four stations of the term’s semantic development are identified: (i) σῶμα as a corpse or a body of a moribund living being, (ii) σῶμα as a living mortal being, (iii) σῶμα in contrast with its parts and (iv) σῶμα in abstraction. It is argued that the development may be viewed as a continuous extension of the scope of the term, where none of the previous uses become obsolete. The Stations (iii) and (iv) also testify of an emergence of a new, abstract criterion for the use of the term. This conceptual history also partly explains the multifaceted use of the word in the 4th century BCE, setting the stage for further developments.

The writings from the last two years of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s life have been made available in three thematically organized publications: 'On Certainty' (1969), 'Remarks on Colour' (1977) and 'Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2: The Inner and the outer, 1949–51' (1992). Some material from this period is also included in 'Vermischte Bemerkungen' (1977). The article focuses on the editorial policies and decisions behind this publication strategy, giving an overview of each posthumous edition in relation to their underlying manuscript material. On the basis of archival materials and correspondence, it is shown that the editions as we know them mainly represent Elizabeth Anscombe’s editorial vision. However, both G. H. von Wright and Rush Rhees made substantial proposals concerning the publication format. The editorial history of Wittgenstein’s ‘last writings’ is thus a particularly interesting case study of editorial dialogue, exhibiting also the characteristic differences in Anscombe’s, von Wright’s and Rhees’s respective editorial approaches to Wittgenstein’s writings.

This doctoral dissertation in Social and Moral Philosophy (University of Helsinki) consists of five articles and an introductory chapter. The dissertation is a study of Georg Henrik von Wright’s (1916–2003) philosophical treatise The Varieties of Goodness (1963), which has been unduly neglected in later developments of philosophical ethics and theory of value. The first, value-theoretical half of The Varieties of Goodness contains an examination of the conceptual varieties of goodness, or of the different ways of employing the word “good” in language. Von Wright distinguishes six basic varieties: 'instrumental', 'technical', 'utilitarian', 'medical' and 'hedonic goodness', and 'the good of some being'. The second half of the book contains von Wright’s (normative) moral philosophy, which consists of a series of explications of concepts familiar from traditional philosophical ethics, such as 'moral goodness', 'virtue', 'moral duty' and 'justice'. The dissertation has three objectives: (i) to revisit and discuss von Wright’s basic value-theoretical ideas and proposals, (ii) to give an account of von Wright’s moral philosophy, and (iii) to relate his views to select other currents of the mid 20th century ethics. The scholarly approach is a combination of historical contextualization and (philosophical) critical reconstruction. The research utilizes unpublished archival materials and correspondence. Introduction examines von Wrights basic philosophical proposals and sums up critically the main lines of his moral philosophy. This is done, first, by identifying and discussing a number of axiological and moral-philosophical 'Grundgedanken' (basic ideas) and their repercussions, and second, by giving an overview of von Wright’s explicative accounts of moral notions. I suggest that von Wright’s normative moral philosophy is an early example of a welfarist position in ethics. I also argue that some of his basic ideas still provide illuminating perspectives to philosophical disputes. On the critical side, I point out that some of these ideas are open to different interpretations and that some of von Wright’s methodological presuppositions are problematic. In the Articles, The Varieties of Goodness is approached from various angles. Article I discusses von Wright’s conception of philosophy and the analytical method that is used in charting the varieties of goodness. Article II focuses on one of the key ideas of von Wright’s moral-philosophical endeavour: the idea that moral goodness is a non-autonomous form of goodness 'in search of a meaning'. Article III discusses the notion of 'the good of man' (human welfare), which is a pivotal notion in von Wright’s explication of moral value. Articles IV and V are devoted to the relation between The Varieties of Goodness and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889–1951) philosophical heritage. Article IV traces the development of von Wright’s work in the 1950s and shows how his philosophical approach is variously indebted to Wittgenstein’s late work. Article V contains a thorough criticism of James Klagge’s recent interpretation of von Wright’s and Wittgenstein’s views on the varieties of goodness.

This edited volume (in Swedish) brings together a comprehensive set of writings by G. H. von Wright (1916–2003) that concern Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) and his philosophy. The writings of this collection were written or published between 1936 and 2001 in von Wright's native language, Swedish. The material includes scholarly articles, memorabilia, biographical texts, chapters from philosophical textbooks, newspaper articles, letters, and some unpublished archive materials. The collection contains an Introduction by the editors Lassi Jakola and Thomas Wallgren, and a Contextualising Essay "Von Wright som Port till Wittgenstein" by Lassi Jakola. Each item is presented in a short editorial note by Lassi Jakola.

The development of G. H. von Wright’s work in ethics is traced from the early 1950s to the publication of The Varieties of Goodness in 1963, with special focus on the influences stemming from Wittgenstein’s later thought. In 1952, von Wright published an essay suggesting a formal analysis of the concept of value. This attempt was soon abandoned. The change of approach took place at the time von Wright started his work on Wittgenstein’s Nachlass and tried to articulate the main lines of Wittgenstein’s Philosophische Untersuchungen in spoken and written form. This preoccupation with Wittgenstein led to a new approach to value judgments in an 1954 article, which shows strong late-Wittgensteinian influences on methodical as well as stylistic levels. Some traces of the 1954 approach are still visible in The Varieties of Goodness, while the stylistic imitations and allusions have mostly been dropped. Furthermore, von Wright’s approach in The Varieties is wider in scope, aiming at a broad overview of the phenomenon von Wright calls the “varieties of goodness”. But new conncections to the later Wittgenstein also seem to emerge: the idea of a "perspicuous presentation" of ethical concepts and the will to make philosophy relevant for "kulturens större sammanhang".

Part II of this contribution makes available materials preserved of G. H. von Wright’s hitherto unknown edition of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s last writings from 1967–68. The edition was never published. The underlying MS material was, instead, published in four different edited volumes in 1969, 1977 and 1992. Part I, an introduction to the archival items, contextualizes von Wright’s edition historically, presents a reconstruction of its structure, compares it with the published volumes and discusses reasons for its abandonment.

This article revisits G. H. von Wright’s value-theoretical treatise The Varieties of Goodness (1963) by discussing von Wright’s analytical methods and by contextualizing his work historically. Section 2 provides an overview of von Wright’s general approach to conceptual analysis and identifies two levels of analytic work—descriptive and moulding analysis—and pinpoints parallels with Peter Strawson’s proposal of connective analysis and Rudolf Carnap’s method of explication. Section 3 focuses on what I call the analytical topoi of goodness, i.e., the variety of methodological tools used by von Wright in his analysis of the conceptual varieties of goodness (see Appendix). It is suggested that von Wright’s focus on the criteria of goodness, demonstrably indebted to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, indirectly addresses R. M. Hare’s non-cognitivist account on the meaning of “good”. Finally, it is suggested that von Wright’s non-reductive approach in the analysis of meaning, consisting in a systematic use of many analytical topoi, is best viewed as a post-Wittgensteinian contribution, which, despite its originality, draws, in small and large, from Wittgenstein’s later philosophical methodology.

James C. Klagge (2018) readings of G. H. von Wright’s and Wittgenstein’s views concerning goodness and family resemblance are criticised and new interpretations are provided: Pace Klagge, (i) von Wright’s arguments against goodness as a family-resemblance concept do not concern cases of goodness but the interrelations between the conceptual varieties of goodness; (ii) Wittgenstein did not endorse a ‘constitutivist account of goodness’ in his 1933 lectures; and (iii) Wittgenstein did not come close to Stevenson’s emotivism in his Philosophical Investigations. Rather, Wittgenstein’s later remarks on goodness may be read as ‘objects of comparison’ (PI §130), implying no strong theoretical commitments.

This article revisits G.H. von Wright’s 1963 proposal of a ‘broad approach to ethics’ and his idea that moral goodness is a non-autonomous form of goodness ‘in search of a meaning’. In von Wright’s view, moral notions are to be examined in a broad framework consisting of various groups of ethically relevant concepts. This framework is described and some connections to Elizabeth Anscombe’s work in the late 1950s are identified. It is argued that von Wright’s broadly construed ethics provides tools for understanding contextual and temporal variation of ‘moral points of view’ and puts traditional ideas concerning the nature of moral philosophy in a new light. However, von Wright failed to draw all the consequences of his own suggestions: accordingly, it is suggested that we have to abandon his view of a philosopher as a ‘moulder’ of concepts for a more context-oriented and elucidative conception of moral philosophy.