László Bene

This chapter deals with the Plotinian reception of the teachings of three major Hellenistic schools. While Plotinus severly criticises the Stoics’ corporealist ontology and empiricist theory of knowledge, he sometimes incorporates Stoic physical and ethical notions, which he adjusts to the Platonic metaphysical framework of his own philosophy. The main example of this is the use he makes of the Stoic notions of logos and sympatheia. Moreover, Plotinus’ account of autonomy draws on Epictetus. Plotinus’ reception of Epicureanism is mainly polemical, but occasionally he is also prepared to make positive use of Epicurean notions and distinctions. The Sceptics provided important inspiration for Plotinus’ doctrine of the Intellect in that he develops the thesis of the identity of the knower with the known in the face of Sceptical arguments against the possibility of (self-)knowledge.

This chapter deals with three roles Plotinus assigns to Platonic Forms. First, the Forms constitute the intelligible paradigm on which the perceptible world is modelled. The Forms create by being what they are, and they endow their participants with properties which they themselves do not possess – an interpretation of causality which allows for expanding the traditional scope of the Forms. Secondly, Sceptical doubts as to the possibility of (self-)knowledge are answered with the thesis of the internality of intelligible Forms to the Intellect, which secures infallibility. Thirdly, the Forms of the virtues make ethical conduct and purification possible; more generally, the contemplation of Forms constitutes an important stage in the ascent of the soul to the first principle of reality. In addition, the metaphysical difficulties arising from positing Platonic Forms are addressed, including their relation to the One and their mode of presence in the perceptible world.