An agent who acts intentionally knows what she’s doing. There are reasons for thinking that the agent’s warrant for such kind of agential knowledge isn’t based on observation. How can an agent attain warrant for her agential knowledge non observationally though? Recently, some philosophers have borrowed the entitlement based approach to self knowledge about our mind in attempt to answer this question. By highlighting the proof v s. explanation distinction, I’ll argue that this approach faces a d…
Read moreAn agent who acts intentionally knows what she’s doing. There are reasons for thinking that the agent’s warrant for such kind of agential knowledge isn’t based on observation. How can an agent attain warrant for her agential knowledge non observationally though? Recently, some philosophers have borrowed the entitlement based approach to self knowledge about our mind in attempt to answer this question. By highlighting the proof v s. explanation distinction, I’ll argue that this approach faces a dilemma: its key argument works neither as a proper proof for the relevant kind of entitlement nor as a proper explanation of how the relevant kind of entitlement is generated.
