Laura Georgescu

For Margaret Cavendish, every single part of matter has self-knowledge, and almost every part has perceptive knowledge. This paper asks what is at stake for Cavendish in ascribing self-knowing and perceptive properties to matter. Whereas many commentators take perception and self-knowledge to be guides to Cavendish’s epistemology, this paper takes them to be guides to her metaphysics, in that it shows that these categories account for individual specificity and for relationality. A part of matter is a unique individual insofar as it is self-knowing – and it is a part in relation to other parts, and to the whole of matter, insofar as it is a perceptive part. This is so because self-knowledge is purely self-referential and complete, while perceptive knowledge is purely relational.

In De magnete, Gilbert frequently appealed to diagrams. As result of a focus on the experimental methodology of the treatise, its diagrammatic dimension has been overlooked in the scholarship. This paper argues that, in De magnete, at least some diagrams are epistemically relevant; specifically, Gilbert moves from experiments to concepts and theories through diagrams. To show this, I analyze the role that the “Diagram of motions in magnetick orbes” plays in the formulation of Gilbert's rule of alignment of magnetic bodies within the orb of virtue. If it turns out that diagrams play a genuine role in Gilbert's magnetic investigations, then his investigative strategy goes beyond mere experimentalism.

In A Treatise of Artificial Magnets, John Michell observes, Not being aware of this property [i.e. the equality of attraction and repulsion], he [Gilbert] concluded from some experiments he had made, not very irationally [sic], that the Needle was not attracted by the magnet, but turned into its position by, what he calls, a disponent virtue […]. For Michell, the disponent virtue 1 is the underlying cause of magnetic phenomena in Gilbert’s treatment. He is not alone. Ridley and Carpenter also read Gilbert’s magnetism as positing a disponent virtue.2 I agree. In this paper, I show what it would entail to treat Gilbertian magnetism as...

This book examines the philosophical and scientific achievements of Sir Kenelm Digby, a successful English diplomat, privateer and natural philosopher of the mid-1600s. Not widely remembered today, Digby is one of the most intriguing figures in the history of early modern philosophers. Among scholars, he is known for his attempt to reconcile what perhaps seem to be irreconcilable philosophical frameworks: Aristotelianism and early modern mechanism. This contributed volume offers the first full-length treatment of Digby’s work and of the unique position he occupied in early modern intellectual history. It explores key aspects of Digby’s metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical method, and offers a new appraisal of his contributions to early modern natural philosophy and mathematics. A dozen contributors offer their expert insight into such topics as Body, quantity, and measures in Digby's natural philosophy Ecumenism and common notions in Digby Aristotelianism and accidents in Digby's philosophy Digby on body and soul Digby on method and experiments This book volume will be of benefit to a broad audience of scholars, educators, and students of the history of early modern science and philosophy.

In The Sea–Mans Kalendar, Henry Bond predicted that magnetic declination would be 0° in 1657, and would then increase westerly for 30 years. Based on these predictions, Bond went on to claim in The Longitude Found that, by using his model of magnetism, he can offer a technique for determining longitude. This paper offers an assessment of Bond’s method for longitude determination and critically evaluates Thomas Hobbes’s so–far neglected response to Bond’s proposal in Decameron physiologicum, in which Hobbes complains about what he takes to be Bond’s implicit natural philosophy and about his use of spherical trigonometry.