Laura Nuño de la Rosa

This paper introduces the concept of the functional ambivalence of mental symptoms as a contribution to Enactive Psychiatry. Drawing on the autonomy-centered foundations of the enactive approach, we argue that mental disorders are not purely dysfunctional, but complex, multi-scale patterns of organization that can display functional and dysfunctional aspects at once. Functionality is understood as graded and context-dependent, emerging from interactions among multiple domains of normativity and across temporal scales. In dialogue with Russell’s perspective problem, we argue that the ambiguity of functional evaluation is not a shortcoming but a predictable consequence of plural autonomy. Our proposal is intended to be complementary to related theses developed in other frameworks. These perspectives can help clarify why certain symptoms persist and which meaningful and self-regulatory roles they may serve. Using anorexia, self-harm, and dietary restraint as examples, we show how behaviors typically treated as dysfunctional can play functional roles even as they generate harm. Clinically, the framework supports interventions that identify what symptoms do for the person while fostering alternative and more sustainable forms of regulation. Ethically, it promotes a less pathologising understanding of mental disorder by integrating first-person perspectives that can disclose functional dimensions often missed by third-person evaluation.

El giro pragmatista en filosofía de la ciencia comenzó a gestarse a principios de los años ochenta, impulsado por el agotamiento de la orientación teoreticista característica del empirismo lógico que había dominado los grandes debates de la disciplina: la explicación y la representación científica, el debate entre realismo y antirrealismo y la teoría de la verdad. A partir de entonces, numerosos filósofos de la ciencia retomaron propuestas del pragmatismo norteamericano y las aplicaron al análisis de las prácticas científicas, dando lugar a la proliferación de nuevas perspectivas que, lejos de abandonar la reflexión general sobre cuestiones comunes a todas las ciencias (cfr. Diéguez, 2010), ofrecen una nueva manera de abordar estos problemas. Esta entrada se estructura en cinco secciones. En la primera sección se distinguen las estrategias comunes que atraviesan a las distintas filosofías pragmatistas de la ciencia, incluyendo el enfoque naturalista, la atención a las prácticas científicas, la contextualización del conocimiento en función de los objetivos de la investigación, el minimalismo metafísico y la interrelación entre hechos y valores. A partir de este marco general, revisamos cómo los problemas clásicos en filosofía de la ciencia se han abordado desde una perspectiva pragmatista: la explicación científica (sección 2), la representación científica (sección 3), el problema del realismo (sección 4) y el problema de la verdad (sección 5).

This paper explores the question of when the influence of values is legitimate in climate change research. Using the case of climatologist John Christy as a focal point, we examine how climate-skeptic research, which challenges the consensus on anthropogenic global warming, has been shaped by non-epistemic values. These values have influenced both his scientific decisions and his political stances, ultimately impacting U.S. climate policies. The analysis addresses the broader challenge of the "new demarcation problem"—distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate values in scientific research—and evaluates two proposed solutions: the epistemic priority and the aims approach. We argue that while the aims approach provides a more effective framework for managing the influence of values in climate science, democratic value-management risks reproducing social and geographical inequalities in scientific decision-making. To address these limitations, we propose an engaged aims approach that integrates political restrictions related to climate justice, offering a more equitable framework for managing values in climate research.

Biogeochemistry has traditionally been grounded in a substance-based ontology, modeling ecosystem dynamics through discrete nutrient pools and linear fluxes. While such frameworks have advanced our understanding of carbon, methane, and phosphorus cycling, they often obscure the dynamic, relational, and emergent character of biogeochemical processes. This paper introduces a process-ontological framework for biogeochemistry that reconceptualizes elemental transformations not as state transitions between static compartments but as evolving networks of interdependent processes. Drawing on process philosophy, complexity theory, and resilience science, we articulate four foundational principles (relationality, scale dependence, temporal continuity, and emergence) that underpin a processual understanding of biogeochemical systems. Through empirical cases focused on methane and phosphorus cycling, we demonstrate how process ontology informs both modeling strategies and governance practices, including the detection of early warning signals, policy design, and cross-scale management of tipping points. Rather than replacing substance-based approaches, this framework complements them, revealing their underlying metaphysical assumptions and situating them within a broader ontology of dynamic interdependence. It also emphasizes the epistemic–ontological reciprocity of scientific practice, in which conceptual frameworks and empirical observation iteratively refine one another. By embedding ontological reflection within empirical and governance contexts, this work contributes to a broader rethinking of how scientific models mediate between conceptual frameworks and ecological realities, supporting adaptive, transformative and process-aware strategies for environmental management.

Since the early 21st century, processualist approaches have gained prominence in analytic metaphysics and the philosophy of science, prompting diverse responses from advocates of substantialism. However, the polarization of the debate between process and substance metaphysics has often led to oversimplifications that obscure the potential for constructive dialogue. This paper argues that these frameworks should not be treated as monolithic systems, but rather analyzed through the lens of specific metaphysical problems—namely, fundamentality, persistence, and individuation. Focusing primarily on process metaphysics, we examine how different interpretations within both traditions conceptualize these issues. Our analysis reveals areas of compatibility as well as points of divergence, indicating that the divide between processualism and substantialism is more nuanced than commonly assumed. We conclude by advocating for a metaphysical approach that allows for the integration of criteria from both frameworks.

Since the late 1970s, the field of evolutionary biology has undergone empirical and theoretical developments that have threaten the pillars of evolutionary theory. Some evolutionary biologists have recently argued that evolutionary biology is not experiencing a paradigm shift, but an expansion of the modern synthesis. Philosophers of biology focusing on scientific practices seem to agree with this pluralistic interpretation and have argued that evolutionary theory should rather be seen as an organized network of multiple problem agendas with diverse disciplinary contributors. In this paper, I apply a computational analysis to study the dynamics and conceptual structure of one of the main emerging problem agendas in evolutionary biology: evolvability. I have used CiteSpace, an application for visualizing and analyzing trends and patterns in scientific literature that applies cocitation analysis to identify scientific specialities. I analyze the main clusters of the evolvability cocitation network with the aim to identify the main research lines and the interdisciplinary relationships that structure this research front. I then compare these results with the existing classifications of evolvability concepts, and identify four main conceptual tensions within the definitions of evolvability. Finally, I argue that there is a lot of usefulness in the inconsistency in which the term evolvability is used in biological research. I claim that evolvability research has set up “trading zones” in biology that make possible interdisciplinary exchanges.

The definition of homology and its application to reproductive structures, external genitalia, and the physiology of sexual pleasure has a tortuous history. While nowadays there is a consensus on the developmental homology of genital and reproductive systems, there is no agreement on the physiological translation, or the evolutionary origination and roles, of these structural correspondences and their divergent histories. This paper analyzes the impact of evolutionary perspectives on the homology concept as applied to the female orgasm, and their consequences for the biological and social understanding of female sexuality and reproduction. After a survey of the history of pre-evolutionary biomedical views on sexual difference and sexual pleasure, we examine how the concept of sexual homology was shaped in the new phylogenetic framework of the late 19th century. We then analyse the debates on the anatomical locus of female pleasure at the crossroads of theories of sexual evolution and new scientific discourses in psychoanalysis and sex studies. Moving back to evolutionary biology, we explore the consequences of neglecting homology in adaptive explanations of the female orgasm. The last two sections investigate the role played by different articulations of the homology concept in evolutionary developmental explanations of the origin and evolution of the female orgasm. These include the role of sexual, developmental homology in the byproduct hypothesis, and a more recent hypothesis where a phylogenetic, physiological concept of homology is used to account for the origination of the female orgasm. We conclude with a brief discussion on the social implications for the understanding of female pleasure derived from these different homology frameworks.

While niche construction theory and developmental approaches to evolution have brought to the front the active role of organisms as ecological and developmental agents, respectively, the role of agents in reproduction has been widely neglected by organismal perspectives of evolution. This paper addresses this problem by proposing an agential view of reproduction and shows that such a perspective has implications for the explanation of the origin of modes of reproduction, the evolvability of reproductive modes, and the coevolution between reproduction and social behavior. After introducing the two prevalent views of agency in evolutionary biology, namely those of organismal agency and selective agency, I contrast these two perspectives as applied to the evolution of animal reproduction. Taking eutherian pregnancy as a case study, I wonder whether organismal approaches to agency forged in the frame of niche construction and developmental plasticity theories can account for the goal-directed activities involved in reproductive processes. I conclude that the agential role of organisms in reproduction is irreducible to developmental and ecological agency, and that reproductive goals need to be included into our definitions of organismal agency. I then explore the evolutionary consequences of endorsing an agential approach to reproduction, showing how such an approach might illuminate our understanding of the evolutionary origination and developmental evolvability of reproductive modes. Finally, I analyze recent studies on the coevolution between viviparity and social behavior in vertebrates to suggest that an agential notion of reproduction can provide unforeseen links between developmental and ecological agency.

Pere Alberch played a pivotal role in shaping the field of evolutionary developmental biology during the 1980s and 1990s. Whereas initially his contributions were sidelined by the empirical advancements of the molecular revolution in developmental and evolutionary biology, his theoretical insights have left a lasting impact on the discipline. This article provides a comprehensive review of the legacy and evolvability of Alberch's ideas in contemporary evo-devo, which included the study of morphogenesis as the proper level of developmental causation, the interplay between developmental constraints and natural selection, the epistemic role of teratologies, the origin of evolutionary novelties and the concept of evolvability.

This paper delves into the character concept as applied to reproduction. Our argument is that the prevailing functional-adaptationist perspective falls short in explaining the evolution of reproductive traits, and we propose an alternative organismal-relational approach that incorporates the developmental and interactive aspects of reproduction. To begin, we define the functional individuation of reproductive traits as evolutionary strategies aimed at enhancing fitness, and we demonstrate how this perspective influences the classification of reproductive characters and modes, the comprehension of shared traits as resulting from conflicts of evolutionary interest between individuals, and the explanation of reproductive diversity. After outlining the shortcomings of this framework, we introduce an organismal-relational approach grounded in evolutionary developmental studies of reproduction. This view provides a revised classification for reproductive characters and modes and offers a new understanding of interorganismal traits that takes into account their inherently relational nature. Lastly, we present the research agenda that emerges from this approach, which addresses the core explanatory gaps left by the adaptationist perspective, including the explanation of reproductive homologies and homoplasies, the developmental constraints associated with the evolution of reproductive modes, and the evolvability of reproductive characters.

The work of Pere Alberch is crucial to study the early stages of evo-devo. In particular, it illustrates very persuasively why developmental systems have so much to say about the course of evolutionary change. In addition to an important empirical work, he elaborated a stimulating framework of theoretical ideas on biological form, morphological variation, and how developmental processes establish possible evolutionary paths previous to the action of natural selection. In this framework, the study of development and evolution are related through the notion of possible morphologies. In his view, the morphology of organisms shows internal coherence and structure, emergent from complex non linear interactions among parts and with the environment

In the evolutionary biology of the Modern Synthesis the study of patterns refers to how to identify and systematise order in lineages, looking for hierarchies or for branching/splitting events in the tree of life, whereas the resulting order is supposed to be due to underlying processes or mechanisms. But patterns and processes play distinct roles in evo-devo: four different views on the role of patterns and processes in descriptions and explanations of development and evolution: A) transformational; B) generative; C) processual; and D) complex are reviewed in this paper. Then, this discussion is related to two issues in evo-devo: homology and variation.

The notion of fitness is usually equated to reproductive success. However, this actualist approach presents some difficulties, mainly the explanatory circularity problem, which have lead philosophers of biology to offer alternative definitions in which fitness and reproductive success are distinguished. In this paper, we argue that none of these alternatives is satisfactory and, inspired by Mumford and Anjum’s dispositional theory of causation, we offer a definition of fitness as a causal dispositional property. We argue that, under this framework, the distinctiveness that biologists usually attribute to fitness—namely, the fact that fitness is something different from both the physical traits of an organism and the number of offspring it leaves—can be explained, and the main problems associated with the concept of fitness can be solved. Firstly, we introduce Mumford and Anjum's dispositional theory of causation and present our definition of fitness as a causal disposition. We explain in detail each of the elements involved in our definition, namely: the relationship between fitness and the functional dispositions that compose it, the emergent character of fitness, and the context-sensitivity of fitness. Finally, we explain how fitness and realized fitness, as well as expected and realized fitness are distinguished in our approach to fitness as a causal disposition.

Aristotle’s influence on D’Arcy Thompson was praised by Thompson himself and has been recognized by others in various respects, including the aesthetic and normative dimensions of biology, and the multicausal explanation of living forms. This article focuses on the relatedness of organic forms, one of the core problems addressed by both Aristotle’s History of Animals (HA), and the renowned chapter of Thompson’s On Growth and Form (G&F), “On the Theory of Transformations, or the Comparison of Related Forms.” We contend that, far from being an incidental inspiration stemming from Thompson’s classicist background, his translation of HA played a pivotal role in developing his theory of transformations. Furthermore, we argue that Thompson’s interpretation of the Aristotelian method of comparison challenges the prevailing view of Aristotle as the founder of “typological essentialism,” and is a key episode in the revision of this narrative. Thompson understood that the method Aristotle used in HA to compare animal forms is better comprehended as a “method of transformations,” leading to a morphological arrangement of animal diversity, as opposed to a taxonomical classification. Finally, we examine how this approach to the relatedness of forms lay the foundation for a causal understanding of parts and their interconnections. Although Aristotle and Thompson emphasized distinct types of causes, we contend that they both differ in a fundamental sense from the one introduced by Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which was formulated as a solution to the species problem rather than the form problem. We conclude that Thompson’s interpretation of Aristotle’s approach to form comparison has not only impacted contemporary scholarship on Aristotle’s biology, but revitalized a perspective that has regained significance due to the resurgence of the problem of form in evo-devo.

While the notion of chance has been central in discussions over the probabilistic nature of natural selection and genetic drift, its role in the production of variants on which populational sampling takes place has received much less philosophical attention. This article discusses the concept of chance in evolution in the light of contemporary work in evo-devo. We distinguish different levels at which randomness and chance can be defined in this context, and argue that recent research on variability and evolvability demands a causal understanding of variational probabilities under which development acquires a creative, rather than a constraining role in evolution. We then provide a propensity interpretation of variational probabilities that solves a conceptual confusion between causal properties, variational probabilities and extant variation present in the literature, and explore some metaphysical consequences that follow from our interpretation, specifically with regards to the nature of developmental types.

La crítica kantiana legó una doble herencia a la biología decimonónica: su noción de ciencia basada en el mecanicismo newtoniano configuró epistemológicamente la teoría de la evolución darwinista, mientras que su comprensión de los organismos se tradujo en una morfología teleológica. En este artículo planteamos dos cuestiones en torno la relación entre las ideas de Kant y Darwin: 1) si Kant habría considerado a Darwin el Newton de la biología, a lo que, con matices, respondemos afirmativamente; 2) si la física newtoniana es hoy suficiente para naturalizar lo orgánico. Nuestra respuesta negativa se fundamenta en las ciencias de la autoorganización y la evo-devo, que permiten plantear la naturalización de la concepción kantiana de los organismos.

A number of biologists and philosophers have noted the diversity of interpretations of evolvability in contemporary evolutionary research. Different clusters of research defined by co-citation patterns or shared methodological orientation sometimes concentrate on distinct conceptions of evolvability. We examine five different activities where the notion of evolvability plays conceptual roles in evolutionary biological investigation: setting a research agenda, characterization, explanation, prediction, and control. Our analysis of representative examples demonstrates how different conceptual roles of evolvability are quasi-independent and yet exhibit important relationships across scientific activities. It also provides us with the resources to detail two distinct strategies for how evolvability can help to synthesize disparate areas of research and thereby potentially serve as a unifying concept in evolutionary biology.

A disposition or dispositional property is a capacity, ability, or potential to display or exhibit some outcome. Evolvability refers to a disposition to evolve. This chapter discusses why the dispositional nature of evolvability matters—why philosophical distinctions about dispositions can have scientific implications. To that end, we build a conceptual toolkit with vocabulary from prior philosophical analyses using a different disposition: protein foldability. We then apply this toolkit to address several methodological questions related to evolvability. What entities are the bearers of evolvability? What features causally contribute to the disposition of evolvability? How does evolvability manifest? The various possible answers to these questions available from philosophical distinctions suggest key implications for why the concept of evolvability as a disposition is useful in evolutionary research. These include (1) securing scientific virtues (e.g., explanatory depth and generalization, prediction or retrodiction, and control or manipulation) and (2) fostering interdisciplinary collaboration through the coordination of definitional diversity and different types of inquiry. Together these facilitate concentration on a variety of research questions at different levels of organization and on distinct time scales, all of which should be expected for a complex dispositional property such as evolvability.

Criticisms of the “container” model of pregnancy picturing female and embryo as separate entities multiply in various philosophical and scientific contexts during the last decades. In this paper, we examine how this model underlies received views of pregnancy in evolutionary biology, in the characterization of the transition from oviparity to viviparity in mammals and in the selectionist explanations of pregnancy as an evolutionary strategy. In contrast, recent evo-devo studies on eutherian reproduction, including the role of inflammation and new maternal cell types, gather evidence in favor of considering pregnancy as an evolved relational novelty. Our thesis is that from this perspective we can identify the emergence of a newhistoricalindividual in evolution. In evo-devo, historical units are conceptualized as evolved entities which fulfill two main criteria, their continuous persistence and their non-exchangeability. As pregnancy can be individuated in this way, we contend that pregnant females are historical individuals. We argue that historical individuality differs from, and coexists with, other views of biological individuality as applied to pregnancy (the physiological, the evolutionary and the ecological one), but brings forward an important new insight which might help dissolve misguided conceptions.

In identifying intrinsic molecular chance and extrinsic adaptive pressures as the only causally relevant factors in the process of evolution, the theoretical perspective of the Modern Synthesis had a major impact on the perceived tenability of an ontology of dispositional properties. However, since the late 1970s, an increasing number of evolutionary biologists have challenged the descriptive and explanatory adequacy of this “chance alone, extrinsic only” understanding of evolutionary change. Because morphological studies of homology, convergence, and teratology have revealed a space of possible forms and phylogenetic trajectories that is considerably more restricted than expected, evo-devo has focused on the causal contribution of intrinsic developmental processes to the course of evolution. Evo-devo’s investigation into the developmental structure of the modality of morphology – including both the possibility and impossibility of organismal form – has led to the utilisation of a number of dispositional concepts that emphasise the tendency of the evolutionary process to change along certain routes. In this sense, and in contrast to the perspective of the Modern Synthesis, evo-devo can be described as a “science of dispositions.” This chapter discusses the recent philosophical literature on dispositional properties in evo-devo, exploring debates about both the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the central dispositional concepts utilised in contemporary evo-devo and addressing the epistemological question of how dispositional properties challenge existing explanatory models in evolutionary biology.

La biología sintética mantiene una relación muy singular con la teoría evolutiva: por un lado, parte de una interpretación ingenieril de la evolución para fundar su aproximación al diseño de bioartefactos; por otro, la biología sintética aspira, en última instancia, a deshacerse de la evolución creando organismos de novo que se comporten de un modo predecible. Tras examinar las tres grandes propiedades que aparecen recurrentemente en la descripción sintética de los nuevos artefactos orgánicos (su caracterización como sistemas modulares, computables y producto del diseño), argumentaré que la biología sintética se erige sobre una concepción de los organismos y en particular de la relación de estos con su legado histórico que ha sido profundamente cuestionada por la biología evolucionista contemporánea.

Despite the radical importance of embryology in the development of organi- cism, developmental biology remains philosophically underexplored as a theoretical and empirical resource to clarify the nature of organisms. This paper discusses how embryology can help develop the organisational definition of the organism as a differentiated, function- ally integrated, and autonomous system. I distinguish two conceptions of development in the organisational tradition that yield two different conceptions of the organism: the life- history view claims that organisms can be considered as such during their whole ontogeny; the constitutive view distinguishes two periods in the life history, a period of generation and a period of self-maintenance of a constitutive organisation. Arguing in favour of the con- stitutive view, it will be claimed that the organisational criteria for the definition of organ- ism (i.e., differentiation, functional integration, and autonomy) can only be applied to the developmental system when it has entered the period of self-maintenance of a constitutive organisation. under the light of current research in developmental biology, it is possible to make explicit how organisms come to be as organisms. To this end, I explore key onto- genetic events that help us clarify the core aspects of animal organisation and allow us to identify the developmental stage that marks the ontological transition between an organism in potency and an organism in actuality. The structure of this ontogenetic unfolding paral- lels the conceptual structure of the very notion of organism; the generation of the being of a particular organism parallels its definition.

In September 2008, 10 years after the untimely death of Pere Alberch (1954–1998), the 20th Altenberg Workshop in Theoretical Biology gathered a group of Pere’s students, col- laborators, and colleagues (Figure 1) to celebrate his contribu- tions to the origins of EvoDevo. Hosted by the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research (KLI) outside Vienna, the group met for two days of discussion. The meeting was organized in tandem with a congress held in May 2008 at the Cavanilles Institute for Biodiversity and Evolutionary Biology (ICBiBE) in Valencia, Spain. The talks at the KLI were equal parts: nostalgic remembrance, excitement over new ways of thinking about old problems, and an unrepressed vitriol against the resurgence of reductionist thinking in EvoDevo. Here we highlight some of the key aspects of Pere’s life and work that informed and infused the talks.

Despite the proliferation of articles and edited volumes on EvoDevo (evolutionary developmental biology), only a couple of monographs dealing systematically with the conceptual challenges posed by the reintroduction of development into the structure of evolutionary theory are available (Gould 2002; Amundson 2005). In Requiem for the Centaurus: An Epistemological Approach to Evolutionary Developmental Biology, Footnote1 Gustavo Caponi reorganizes the pieces of work he has been publishing in recent years on different historical and conceptual aspects of evolutionary biology into a long, coherent, elegant, and thought-provoking argument that deserves to be read from beginning to end.