Lauren Nunes

The study aimed to assess the impact of diets containing Pornunça hay (Manihot sp) and fresh cactus pear (Opuntia ficus-indica Mill) on the intake, digestibility, ingestive behavior, production, and quality of milk, as well as the economic feasibility of lactating goats. Eight multiparous goats with 30 lactation days were used and distributed in a double Latin square design (4 x 4). The treatments consisted of different proportions of Pornunça hay and fresh cactus pear (60:0; 50:10; 40:20; 30:30) in the diet of lactating goats. Incorporating cactus pear into the diet of lactating goats resulted in a significant decrease in water intake and intake of most evaluated nutrients, directly reflected in the diet effectively consumed by the animals. However, it did not affect milk or fat-corrected milk production. Incorporating cactus pear into the diet of lactating goats resulted in a significant decrease in production costs, water intake, and the intake of most evaluated nutrients. The 30:30 ratio of Pornunça hay and fresh cactus pear in the diet of lactating goats improved the milk production efficiency maintaining a good composition of solids and improved gross profit and benefit/cost ratio.

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} O presente artigo aborda dois tópicos específicos em ética: o problema dos conflitos morais em filosofia e a questáo da consistência em teorias morais. A relaçáo entre conflitos morais e consistência moral estabelecida neste trabalho foi realizada graças à natureza de alguns tipos de conflitos morais, a saber: os insolúveis ou genuínos - que seráo explicados ao longo do trabalho. Conflitos desse tipo sáo capazes de causar inconsistências nas normas de certos sistemas morais, como por exemplo, os preponderantemente racionalistas. Partindo desse problema, os autores que se dispõe a trabalhar este tema demonstram opiniões divididas: alguns optam por defender a genuinidade dos conflitos morais insolúveis e consideram as eventuais inconsistências na teoria moral como secundárias, enquanto outros optam por salvaguardar a lógica do pensamento e das teorias morais, negando os conflitos morais insolúveis. Este artigo busca esboçar tal “divisáo” entre os autores, ao explorar brevemente as argumentações de ambas as partes. Por fim, fica demonstrado que uma discussáo sobre consistência e conflitos morais precisa considerar tanto a esfera metaética quanto a esfera normativa da ética

This work aims at elucidate the reasons for appropriating the sentiments and emotions in the approach of moral dilemmas. Therefore, first it will start with an analysis of Williams in his article Ethical Consistency where the author approaches de role of the emotions such as remorse and regret, and also introduces the idea of “moral remainder” in moral dilemmas. In a second moment, this work will be concentrated in the analysis of Statman in his article The debate over the so-called reality of moral dilemmas and his systematization of the “sentiments argument” in favor of moral dilemmas. In a third moment, the analysis will focus on the article Sentiment and Value, of D’arms and Jacobson which approaches important questions concerning the possibility of a moral sentimentalism with a rational basis. Finally, the focus will be in the question if in such approaches the appeal of “moral facts” could possibly justify the feelings of regret, guilty or remorse experienced by the agent in moral dilemmas, then these feelings cannot be disregarded in a more intuitive and broader approach of the issue

Este artigo busca situar a questão do confl ito de deveres enquanto inserida dentro do sistema ético kantiano,admitindo que essa tenha sido uma questão pouco abordada nas obras kantianas. Inicialmente,discutem-se os conceitos centrais de dever e de máxima, para que se adentre com elementos conceituaissufi cientes na problemática. A abordagem kantiana do confl ito de deveres é explicitada através da exposiçãoda passagem da Metafísica dos Costumes, na qual Kant menciona que uma colisão de deveresseria inconcebível em seu sistema ético. É possível notar que o argumento kantiano na presente passagemé vago e baseia-se quase inteiramente no conceito de “fundamentos de obrigação”, o qual o autor nãoelucida claramente. Além disso, os exemplos utilizados na casuística da mesma obra deixam a questãoda negação do confl ito em aberto, difi cultando a interpretação. Na tentativa de melhorar esse quadro,explora-se qual a correspondência de tal negação feita por Kant na Metafísica dos Costumes, em suasoutras obras éticas: a Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes e a Crítica da Razão Prática. Deposse disso, enumeram-se, da forma mais clara possível, os instrumentos kantianos na “suposta” negaçãodo confl ito moral.This article aims at situating the question of confl ict of duties when inserted in Kant’s Ethical System, considering that this question was not widely approached in Kant’s works. Initially, the central concepts of duty and maxim are discussed in order to have enough conceptual elements for the problematic. The Kantian approach to confl icts of duty is shown through the exposition of a passage from The Metaphysics of Morals, in which Kant mentions that a collision of duties would be inconceivable in his ethical system. However, it is possible to notice that the kantian argument in the passage is quite vague and is based almost entirely on the concept of “ground of obligation”, which the author does not clearly elucidate. Besides, the examples used in the casuistic of the work do not answer the question of the denial of confl ict, making the interpretation harder. In order to try to improve this scenario, the correspondence between this denial made by Kant in the Metaphysics of Morals is explored in two of his other ethical works: Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. Thereafter, the instruments used in Kant’s supposed denial of the moral confl ict are enumerated and described in the clearest possible way.