Lavender McKittrick-Sweitzer

We consider the apparent inability of theories of exploitation to capture common intuitions about structural exploitation. For example, it seems that consumers participate in the exploitation of sweatshop workers, but there is no direct transaction between the parties. This poses a problem for transactional accounts of exploitation. Many address this problem by appealing to structural exploitation. Existing structural accounts fall, primarily, into two families: weak structural exploitation and strong structural exploitation. We argue neither appropriately captures intuitions about sweatshops. Weak accounts can capture aggregate inequalities but fail to consider relationships or discrete connections. Strong accounts, on the other hand, are sensitive to relationships between exploiters and exploitees, but too demanding about what it takes to exploit to capture consumers' role in sweatshops. We propose a third option, ‘moderate structural exploitation’, that fits ‘between’ existing approaches. Moderate structural exploitation focuses on relationships between the exploited and their exploiter (unlike weak accounts), without appealing to overly strong conditions for who counts as an exploiter (like strong accounts do). We then show that our moderate structural account can not only accommodate intuitions about sweatshops, but also helps assess the exploitation of teachers in the US public education system.

Rawls’ The Law of Peoples is vulnerable to the criticism of instability, which is exemplified by his oversight of the aggressive state. In order to address this criticism in keeping with Rawls’ overall project, I argue that the grounds for intervention in the Society of Peoples ought to be extended from merely human rights violations to also include the imposition of unjust inequalities by one state upon another. I also argue that Rawls’ conception of public reason is too narrow, and must be expanded to include participation of all reasonable citizens, not merely representatives of the peoples with membership in the Society of Peoples. In refuting objections to each of these alterations, I establish that this two-part revision is a successful route to be taken in addressing the concern of instability while also remaining in keeping with – and perhaps making more Rawlsian – Rawls’ overall project. My solution does this by further advancing liberalism, reflecting a commitment to pluralism and the social contract tradition, and more resolutely recognizing a possible divergence in moral capacities between representatives and citizens.