Lawrence M. Hinman

Distributive Justice is a truly innovative website, one of the first of what we could call “second-generation” websites in ethics. First generation sites may be rich in content, but typically reveal their origins in a print mindset, if not an actual print format. Although first generation sites may contain many hyperlinks and database-driven searches and pages, essentially they still present the reader—and the assumption is that the visitor is a reader—with successive screens full of information.

How are we to make sense of this, especially from a moral point of view? Do we simply say, as some have, that if it’s technologically possible, then it’s morally permissible? Or that, since men have been fathering children at ever more advanced ages, women should be permitted to do the same thing? (We might christen this "The Tony Randall Argument," in honor of the seventy-seven year old actor who is a new father.) Or do we say that such births are simply selfish acts that put the desires of the parents ahead of any consideration about the well-being of the children? Or do we see this as yet one more reflection of our society’s unrelenting quest for eternal youth?

It is a tacit assumption among most contemporary American and British philosophers that the question of style in philosophy is, at most, an issue of peripheral importance. Although it is generally agreed that a well developed sense of style may make a philosopher’s work more accessible and thus be a factor in its acceptance by a wider audience, and although it seems self-evident to many that the apparent inaccessibility of much of continental philosophy is due in part to stylistic vagaries to which it is particularly prone, few would accord to style an importance beyond this. Certainly style is not an integral part of a philosophical position. It is always possible in principle, so the dominant view today suggests, to separate the position being expressed from the style the author employs in expressing it. The position itself is equated with the body of propositions that the philosopher is asserting; the style in which these are expressed either has no bearing on the truth value of the propositions and is consequently irrelevant or else it can be incorporated into either the propositions themselves or the structure of the argument, in which case it is no longer primarily a stylistic consideration. In either case, a philosopher’s style is ultimately not integral to the position which he advances.

This paper explores various methods of developing a website that caters to the pedagogical needs of an introductory ethics course. Incorporating web sites into the course curriculum allows students to access a range of journal articles, a database for relevant secondary materials, and links to helpful websites. Online educational spaces are also an important pedagogical tool to facilitate student discussion. The site can be use for a discussion board for students within the course and from different institutions that are interested in similar topics. Students are able to upload their own research and discuss it with their peers without the direct presence of the instructor.

In recent years, a particular doctrine about forms of life has come to be associated with Wittgenstein's name by followers and critics of his philosophy alike. It is not a doctrine which Wittgenstein espoused or even, given his understanding of philosophy, one which he could have accepted; nor is it worthy of acceptance on its own merits. I shall here outline the standard interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks on forms of life, consider the textual basis for such a reading of Wittgenstein, present a more consistent reading of the texts, place the problem of forms of life within a wider philosophical context, and show the ways in which it is indeed possible to say that a form of life is wrong. In the process, I shall note some important similarities between Wittgenstein's actual position, Quine's analysis of scientific knowledge, and Hans-Georg Gadamer's claims about the fusion of horizons.