Leanne Russell

In previous articles I have been concerned with various aspects of science; and I have now to endeavour to look at scientific activity as a whole, and to view it in its relation to other activities of man. I have been trying to avoid those pleasant sweeping generalizations which strike the imagination and which are so easy to write and to read about: such as that science is our only avenue to truth; or that science is abstract and tells us nothing about the concrete nature of things; or that knowledge of particular facts is the object of science, generalizations being merely a means thereto; or that generalizations are the object of science, investigation of particular facts being merely a means thereto; all of which can be defended by a rich array of arguments, none of which can finally stand confrontation with the actual nature of scientific activity as a whole. The situation seems to be much more complicated than any such generalizations would suggest.

I noted two directions in which the scientific worker is seeking to advance. He is trying to give a more complete account of the actual detail of what is happening, and he is seeking wider and wider generalizations. As an observer, he must note what he observes, and, it would seem, omit nothing. But in seeking generalizations he must select, from among the features he observes, only those which he takes to be of general significance. Thence arises at least the appearance of a conflict in his activities. If he is too intent on the details of what he observes, his generalizations suffer; but if he leaves aside details too readily, his generalizations suffer equally. There is danger both in omitting and in not omitting