Lei Niu

Disinformation has been observed to affect individual beliefs, leading to the adoption of false beliefs or the reduced likelihood of accessing and evaluating true information. Accordingly, previous research has largely focused on individual beliefs-oriented countermeasures to combat disinformation. However, the impact of disinformation on group beliefs has been overlooked in these discussion. Through a review of relevant cases, it becomes clear that the influence of disinformation on groups cannot be solely attributed to individual beliefs. Consequently, individual beliefs-oriented strategies are not sufficient, and a comprehensive approach to countering disinformation should target both individual beliefs and group beliefs. In light of this, a group beliefs-oriented strategy is proposed as a potential means to effectively combat disinformation.

How do we understand trust in human experts? The total evidence view suggests that the beliefs of experts provide additional reasons for beliefs. Correspondingly, one should combine the beliefs of experts with one’s own beliefs and at least give some epistemic weight to one’s own evidence. On the contrary, the preemption view suggests that unequivocal deference to experts can be reliable and rational. Because AI is predictably becoming more accurate and reliable, it makes sense to ask how to trust AI and whether trust in AI is similar to or different from trust in human experts. By comparing human experts with AI and reflecting the debate between the total evidence view and the preemption view, this paper explores the epistemological dimension of trust in AI.