Leila Haaparanta

Following ancient Pyrrhonists, Husserl called his methodological step from the natural to the phenomenological attitude by the name “epoché,” even if he seemed to be paving the way for philosophical knowledge rather than casting doubts on its possibility. Charles Peirce was also a phenomenologist, although he wished to call his phenomenology by the name “phaneroscopy.” Peirce was also a fallibilist; on his view, all inquiry presupposes that there is an element of doubt in knowledge. Peirce and Husserl were transcendental philosophers, even if in their own ways. The present paper asks how the two philosophers combined the emphasis on uncertainty and suspension of judgment with the belief in the possibility of philosophical knowledge. It argues that in order to understand how skepticism and transcendental philosophy were related in Husserl’s views, we have to consider transcendental and eidetic reductions separately, even if they were intertwined in his thought. Similarly, even if Peirce did not make such a distinction, his phenomenology allows an interpretation in which the two points of view are separated. The paper concludes that Peirce’s and Husserl’s ways of combining skepticism and belief in the possibility of philosophical knowledge differed in that Husserl distinguished between the infallible core of knowledge and its fallible surrounding area, while Peirce emphasized similarities between phenomenology and geometry.

This edited volume is a comprehensive presentation of views on the relations between metaphysics and logic from Aristotle through twentieth century philosophers who contributed to the return of metaphysics in the analytic tradition. The collection combines interest in logic and its history with interest in analytical metaphysics and the history of metaphysical thought. By so doing, it adds both to the historical understanding of metaphysical problems and to contemporary research in the field. Throughout the volume, essays focus on metaphysica generalis, or the systematic study of the most general categories of being. Beginning with Aristotle and his Categories , the volume goes on to trace metaphyscis and logic through the late ancient and Arabic traditions, examining the views of Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham. Moving into the early modern period, contributors engage with Leibniz's metaphysics, Kant's critique of metaphysics, the relation between logic and ontology in Hegel, and Bolzano's views. Subsequent chapters address: Charles S. Peirce's logic and metaphysics; the relevance of set-theory to metaphysics; Meinong's theory of objects; Husserl's formal ontology; early analytic philosophy; C.I. Lewis and his relation to Russell; and the relations between Frege, Carnap, and Heidegger. Surveying metaphysics through to the contemporary age, essays explore W.V. Quine's attitude towards metaphysics; Wilfrid Sellars's relation to antidescriptivism as it connects to Kripke's; the views of Putnam and Kaplan; Peter F. Strawson's and David M. Armstrong's metaphysics; Trope theory; and its relation to Popper's conception of three worlds. The volume ends with a chapter on transcendental philosophy as ontology. In each chapter, contributors approach their topics not merely in an historical and exegetical fashion, but also engage critically with the thought of the philosophers whose work they discuss, offering synthesis and original philosophical thought in the volume, in addition to very extensive and well-informed analysis and interpretation of important philosophical texts. The volume will serve as an essential reference for scholars of metaphysics and logic.

At the turn of the century, Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl both participated in the discussion concerning the foundations of logic and mathematics. Since the 1960s, comparisons have been made between Frege's semantic views and Husserl's theory of intentional acts. In quite recent years, new approaches to the two philosophers' views have appeared. This collection of articles opens with the first English translation of Dagfinn Føllesdal's early classic on Husserl and Frege of 1958. The book brings together a number of new contributions by well-known authors and gives a survey of recent developments in the field. It shows that Husserl's thought is coming to occupy a central role in the philosophy of logic and mathematics, as well as in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The work is primarily meant for philosophers, especially for those working on the problems of language, logic, mathematics, and mind. It can also be used as a textbook in advanced courses in philosophy.

In his classic work on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Erik Stenius described Wittgenstein’s study as a critique of pure language, thus pointing to a connection between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and Kant’s critique of pure reason. Besides similarities, there also seems be important differences between the two philosophers. In Kant’s critique, one discerns a subject who does something, namely, constructs the world of experience, while Wittgenstein draws a picture in which neither an agent nor an act is visible. Like Kant and Wittgenstein, contemporary normative theories of assertion are also interested in limits, although in limits set to assertions. They appear to pay special attention to the one who asserts and to the act of asserting. This paper is an effort to search for the traces of normative theories of assertion in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus by focusing on the one who uses language and on the limits of that use. It is shown that both in Wittgenstein and in normative theories of assertion, there is an important ethical dimension, which, however, plays different roles in the two approaches. It is argued that despite the differences in the ways of construing the limits of language, Tractatus and normative theories of assertion share similar ethical concerns.

There are several similarities between Robert B. Brandom’s and the later Wittgenstein’s views on linguistic meaning. Like Wittgenstein, Brandom rejects representationalism and takes linguistic practices to be the basis where all meaning rests. His inferentialism is a holistic view, already envisaged by Frege. The idea of a language game connects Brandom to Wittgenstein, although Wittgenstein’s idea has also been developed in various other directions. However, unlike Wittgenstein, Brandom pays special attention to the game of giving and asking for reasons. This difference already suggests that Brandom has a strong ethical overtone in his philosophy of language. For Wittgenstein, normativity seems to be normativity of language, while for Brandom it is basically normativity of actions for which persons are responsible. Brandom’s philosophy, which is loaded with deontic vocabulary, is a philosophy of human encounters. The present paper studies this very aspect of Brandom’s thought. It focuses on his theory of assertions in his Making It Explicit and elaborates a view of assertions that is possible on Wittgenstein’s terms. The paper then reappraises Wittgenstein’s views on philosophy and philosophical, particularly ethical, propositions. It seeks to show that Wittgenstein comes closest to the Brandomian ethical model of discursive practice in his comments on the limits of language. These comparisons also reveal that Brandom and Wittgenstein agree on the nature of ethical vocabulary; neither of them goes in for ethical theorizing. Brandom’s later works, such as his Reason in Philosophy, open up new perspectives on his ethical thought. This paper is primarily a study of the role that ethics plays in his philosophy of language in 1994.

It is a commonly held view that Frege's doctrine of senses and references is not compatible with the idea that there are de re beliefs. The present paper is meant to challenge that view. Moreover, it seeks to show that, instead of forcing Frege's semantic framework to answer questions raised by twentieth-century philosophy of language, we could try to find other questions to which it might be an answer. It is argued that the proper treatment of Frege's views requires the acknowledgement of the central role of individualistic epistemology in his thought. Once this is recognized, Frege's doctrine of senses and references can be considered a theory, or at least a sketch of a theory, of cognition, which has interesting connections with Kant's and Husserl's views

At the turn of the century, Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl both participated in the discussion concerning the foundations of logic and mathematics. Since the 1960s, comparisons have been made between Frege's semantic views and Husserl's theory of intentional acts. In quite recent years, new approaches to the two philosophers' views have appeared. This collection of articles opens with the first English translation of Dagfinn Føllesdal's early classic on Husserl and Frege of 1958. The book brings together a number of new contributions by well-known authors and gives a survey of recent developments in the field. It shows that Husserl's thought is coming to occupy a central role in the philosophy of logic and mathematics, as well as in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The work is primarily meant for philosophers, especially for those working on the problems of language, logic, mathematics, and mind. It can also be used as a textbook in advanced courses in philosophy.

: In his paper "Explanation of Curiosity the First" Charles Peirce describes Euclid's procedure in proving theorems. Euclid first presents his theorem in general terms and then translates it into singular terms. Peirce pays attention to the fact that the generality of the statement is not lost by that move. The next step is construction, which is followed by demonstration. Finally the ergo-sentence repeats the original general proposition. Peirce lays much emphasis on the distinction between corollarial and theorematic reasoning in geometry. He takes an argument to be corollarial if no auxiliary construction is needed. For Peirce, construction is "the principal theoric step" of the demonstration. Peirce also stresses that it is the observation of diagrams that is essential to all reasoning and that even if no auxiliary constructions are made, there is always the step from a general to a singular statement in deductive reasoning; that means introducing a kind of diagram to reasoning.This paper seeks to argue for two theses. One is that the way of thinking of reasoning which stresses the role of observation is essential to Peirce's discovery of the new logic. The other is that Peirce wants to consider both logical reasoning and philosophical thinking in general via the model of geometry. However, it is argued in this paper that it is the model of problematic analysis in geometry that is the most important for Peirce when he discovers the new structure of propositions. Moreover, this paper seeks to show that this very feature in Peirce's thought connects him with philosophers and logicians who emphasise the role of praxis instead of theoretic contemplation and that one who wants to reconstruct Peirce's metaphilosophical views must pay special attention to the model of problematic analysis.Key-words: construction; demonstration; corollarial and theorematic reasoning; diagrams.Resumo: Em seu artigo "Explanation of Curiosity the First", Charles Peirce descreve o procedimento de Euclides para demonstrar teoremas. Euclides primeiramente apresenta seu teorema em termos gerais, e então o traduz para termos singulares. Peirce presta atenção ao fato de que a generalidade do enunciado não é perdida por esse movimento. O próximo passo é a construção, que é seguida pela demonstração. Finalmente, a sentença-ergo repete a proposição geral original. Peirce dá bastante ênfase à distinção entre o raciocínio corolarial e o teoremático em geometria. Ele considera um argumento como corolarial se nenhuma construção auxiliar se fizer necessária. Para Peirce, a construção é "o principal passo teórico" da demonstração. Peirce também enfatiza que a observação de diagramas é essencial para todo raciocínio e que, mesmo se não são feitas construções auxiliares, há sempre o passo de um enunciado geral para o particular no raciocínio dedutivo; o que significa introduzir um tipo de diagrama no raciocínio.Este artigo procura defender duas teses. A primeira, que a maneira de pensar o raciocínio que enfatiza o papel da observação é essencial para a descoberta da nova lógica por Peirce. A outra, que Peirce deseja considerar tanto o raciocínio lógico quanto o pensamento filosófico em geral pelo modelo da geometria. Entretanto, defende-se neste artigo que o modelo de análise problemática em geometria é o mais importante para Peirce, quando ele descobre a nova estrutura das proposições. Este artigo procura mostrar, ainda, que é exatamente essa característica do pensamento de Peirce que o liga aos filósofos e lógicos que enfatizam o papel da práxis em vez da contemplação teórica, e que quem deseje reconstruir as visões metafilosóficas de Peirce deve prestar atenção especial ao modelo da análise problemática.Palavras-chave: construção, demonstração, raciocínios corolarial e teoremático, diagrama.

The chapter begins with the observation that one disagreement between logical empiricism and early analytic philosophy, on the one hand, and early phenomenology, on the other, concerned the relations between logic and metaphysics. This chapter seeks to open up that disagreement. The chapter first discusses Frege’s doctrine of “being” and being and elaborates the interpretation she proposed and developed in the eighties. The chapter argues that Frege’s ideas of “being” and being fall between those of Carnap and Heidegger. The chapter also discusses Carnap’s attack against metaphysics in general and against Heidegger’s metaphysics in particular. In the end, it makes a few remarks on Frege’s view of judging and being. The chapter argues that the so called veridical meaning of “is” played a central role in Frege’s conceptual notation; moreover, if we take that point seriously, we may have reason to modify the view that Frege held the thesis concerning the ambiguity of “is”.

Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centers of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This volume offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. The rise of this trend is illustrated by original articles of Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka. Contributions of Finnish philosophers are then systematically discussed in the fields of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, ethics and social philosophy. Metaphilosophical reflections on the nature of philosophy are highlighted by the Finnish dialogue between analytic philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism, and critical theory

This chapter gives a survey of the field of philosophy where the philosophical foundations of modern logic were discussed and where such themes of logic were discussed that were on the borderline between logic and other branches of the philosophical enterprise, such as metaphysics and epistemology. The contributions made by Gottlob Frege and Charles Peirce are included since their work in logic is closely related to and also strongly motivated by their philosophical views and interests. In addition, the chapter pays attention to a few philosophers to whom logic amounted to traditional Aristotelian logic and to those who commented on the nature of logic from a philosophical perspective without making any significant contribution to the development of formal logic.

This paper deals with two opposite metaphilosophical doctrines concerning the nature of philosophy. More specifically, it is a study of the naturalistic view that philosophical, hence also epistemological, knowledge cannot be distinguished from empirical knowledge, and of the antinaturalistic view that philosophical, hence also epistemological, knowledge, is pure, that is, independent of empirical knowledge and particularly of the special sciences. The conditions of the possibility of naturalistic and of pure epistemology are studied in terms of phenomenological philosophy. It is concluded that pure epistemology is possible under relatively strong conditions but that the version of naturalistic epistemology which denies the pure basis leads to contradiction. That, however, does not shake the possibility of cognitive science. Following Husserl, we may argue that studies of human cognition are possible on the condition that a first basis is assumed which is not naturalized.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Die Philosophische Logik Gottlob Freges. Ein Kommentar, mit den Texten des Vorworts zu Grundgesetze der Arithmetik und der Logischen Untersuchungen I–IVLeila HaaparantaWolfgang Künne. Die Philosophische Logik Gottlob Freges. Ein Kommentar, mit den Texten des Vorworts zu Grundgesetze der Arithmetik und der Logischen Untersuchungen I–IV. RoteReihe 30. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 2010. Pp. 840. Paper, €29.80.Frege’s thought has been a permanent point of interest among philosophers for several decades. In the late sixties a few philosophers, such as Christian Thiel and Ignacio Angelelli, published studies on Frege’s logic, semantics, and metaphysics. In 1973 Michael Dummett’s work on Frege’s philosophy of language appeared, which held the stage for a long time. It presented Frege as a predecessor, even as a representative, of the analytic tradition. New approaches came up in the late 1970s and early 1980s, such as Hans Sluga’s work in 1980 and other studies, which paid special attention to Frege’s German background, where Kant played a significant role. Several scholars, including Michael Dummett, started to dig into Frege’s background. Positions varied; some studied Frege’s background in order to show that there is nothing that could help us understand his philosophical insights; others found the origins of his philosophical and logical ideas precisely in his background and philosophical environment, in such philosophers as Leibniz, Kant, Trendelenburg, and Lotze.After a few somewhat more quiet years, Frege scholarship expanded after 2000. A number of books have appeared that discuss Frege in the analytic context and also seek [End Page 507] to find more details about his philosophical sources. Wolfgang Künne’s work is a most welcome contribution to contemporary scholarship in the field. Lothar Kreiser’s Gottlob Frege: Leben—Werk—Zeit (2001) has already been available, and interpretations of Frege’s philosophy as well as editions and translations of his books contain short biographies. Still, because of its special composition, Künne’s work serves to fill a gap in the scholarship and significantly contributes to what is known about Frege’s logic and philosophy.The volume consists of three parts. First, there is an extensive biography (about 50 pages) of Frege that places Frege’s thought in its historical context and also contextualizes those of his articles that are included in the work. The main projects Frege pursued, most notably the project of logicism, receive proper attention in the first part of the volume. The four texts that are included in the volume are the Preface of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I (1893) and the three logical investigations that were published during Frege’s lifetime, namely “Der Gedanke” (1918), “Die Verneinung” (1919), and “Gedankengefüge” (1923), which were originally published in Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus. Künne has also included a posthumously published text, “Logische Allgemeinheit,” in the volume, as that fragment, which was not written before 1923, was intended to be a fourth logical investigation. The five texts written by Frege that are included in the edition discuss topics that we would now call philosophical logic, such as meaning, reference, and truth, although they also study themes that we would include in ontology and the philosophy of mind. The title of the volume is thus sufficiently motivated.Frege’s texts take up about 100 pages of the volume, while the commentary is about 600 pages. The book also contains an appendix on Bolzano and Frege, where Künne pays attention to similarities between the two logicians and philosophers but also shows his skepticism about the thesis that Frege had read Bolzano. Apart from this position, Künne prefers to read Frege’s texts closely and inform his reader of historical and philological matters rather than take part in any heated debates concerning interpretations; his own positions become visible only indirectly, through the extensive footnotes. The work also contains a very useful bibliography and indexes of names and subjects.The book is extremely rich. If one, for example, wishes to know more about the views of Frege’s German contemporaries, about the standpoints that Russell or Wittgenstein had on Fregean topics, or about the arguments of Frege scholars, one can find...

The paper deals with a doctrine called the analogy theory of thinking. Its contemporary proponents have been Wilfried Sellars and Peter Geach. The paper is an attempt to give an exact formulation for one answer to the question concerning the relation of thought and speech. That answer is a reduced of Sellar's theory. A semiformal explication of the view is suggested by means of the classical analogy theory and Bochenski's treatment of that theory. It is argued that even if the analogy theory of thinking is subject to serious criticism, it offers us tools for considering some old philosophical problems in a new way