Lel Jones

Gentle readers, a question: Is forgiveness as straightforward as it first seems? Lady Violet Bridgerton has this to say concerning forgiveness: “However difficult forgiving someone may be, it is necessary to move forward.” And while we may take this as sage advice, is it actually true? It has come to these authors’ attention that too little heed has been paid to whether, and how, our esteemed members of the ton have come to be forgiven. In a show focusing on interpersonal relationships, it is unsurprising that many of the themes of Bridgerton focus on failure, resolve, and repair. From Simon forgiving Daphne, to “the ton” forgiving Lady Whistledown, it is clear that accountability is a central theme of Bridgerton. But not all accountability ends in forgiveness, rather sometimes we excuse, justify, or simply forget the wrongs done against us. In ordinary use these concepts are somewhat interchangeable, but in the hands of philosophers these are technical terms — all of which reserve different meaning and space. Using the Bridgertons and company as examples, we can seek to understand more about the value and conditions of forgiveness. Via Penelope, Eloise, and Cressida, we analyze examples of interpersonal, self, and third-party forgiveness; applying philosophical accounts to better understand the characters, their pleas, and the forgiveness they choose to bestow and withhold. We hope that a deeper understanding of forgiveness will enrich the experience of the show for its viewers, and shed new light on its fraught interpersonal connections and dilemmas.

Much of the literature on forgiveness is dedicated to understanding the reasons to forgive and what changes in attitude are required to do so. But philosophers have been much less attentive to what happens after agents forgive. This is a serious oversight, since the reasons to forgive do not always retain their force and it is not always possible, or advisable, to maintain the changes in attitudes that forgiveness requires. Fortunately, Monique Wonderly has begun to fill this lacuna in the literature with her recent work on un-forgiveness. According to the author, un-forgiveness involves altering our attitudes, by either reinhabiting an adversarial stance towards an agent for their wrongdoing and/or returning one’s relationship with them to the state it was in prior to forgiveness taking place. While Wonderly’s account of un-forgiveness is both novel and illuminating, it is incomplete. In this paper, we argue that one can also un-forgive by forgetting that the wrong in question occurred and/or that the previously forgiven agent was the perpetrator of the wrong. We contend that not only is it possible to un-forgive by forgetting, but doing so can be both justified and morally important. We defend our view by considering the objection that un-forgiveness by forgetting can negatively impact victims’ relationships with wrongdoers as well as addressing the concern that agents cannot exercise their agency over their memories in order to un-forgive by forgetting.

Despite the broad agreement that microaggressions cause harm, there is disagreement on how to capture microaggressor's accountability. Friedlaender (2018) argues that, in many cases, survivors of microaggressions are not justified in holding the microaggressor blameworthy or blaming them (Friedlaender 2018, 14). I argue, in contrast, that we are generally justified in holding most microaggressors blameworthy and blaming them. By adopting a broadly blame-inclusive account of microaggressor accountability, we are in a position to satisfy the desiderata an ideal account should meet: (1) account for cumulative harm; (2) consistently allow for standing to forgive; and (3) be risk sensitive to the microaggressed. By possessing these virtues, I believe my view of microaggressor accountability better equips us to take seriously the harm caused by microaggressions and center the well-being of microaggressees. I respond to Friedlaender's concerns regarding epistemic ignorance and what they call the disaggregation problem. In contrast to Friedlaender's broadly blame-exclusive responsibility model, I motivate a broadly blame-inclusive model for holding microaggressors accountable, explaining how it fulfills the desiderata. I respond to the objection that my account is too blame-inclusive by providing examples of (1) justified microaggressions; (2) excused microaggressions; and (3) blameworthiless microaggressions where blame is justified all the same.

This paper addresses the problem of racism against Latinx and Black people in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and offers possible solutions. This ethical analysis is necessary because with a dramatic increase in the production of AI, the way we use it is critical in eliminating its current perpetuation of racism. I offer evidence of the current perpetuation of racism through AI by analyzing its use in banking and in law enforcement. I argue that the current way we produce and use AI needs to be seriously reconsidered and reinforce this argument with the use of Rawls’ theories of justice.