Léna Mudry

Cultural cognition is the thesis that laypersons' factual beliefs about politically important issues are often shaped by their political values. The question, then, is whether a layperson who believes in anthropogenic climate change should doubt her beliefs insofar as they might be influenced by values. Cultural cognition raises concerns for the epistemic status of these beliefs and appears to threaten the viability of debunking strategies in contexts of expert disagreement. Such strategies consist in attributing bias to dissenters to rationally dismiss their views, but if laypersons are also biased, debunking may be self‐defeating. I shall refute this challenge on three grounds. First, there is controversy over whether the empirical literature on cultural cognition has genuinely identified a form of motivated reasoning, since the data can also be explained in non‐motivational, rational terms. Second, even if it has, this is not evidence that a particular individual is biased. Greater caution is needed when moving from statistical generalisations to individual cases. Finally, evidence of bias is not always evidence of error – something especially clear in the case of belief in anthropogenic climate change. The discussion allows me to explore the general sceptical import of the psychological literature on cultural cognition.

Cultural cognition is the thesis that laypersons' factual beliefs about politically important issues are often shaped by their political values. The question, then, is whether a layperson who believes in anthropogenic climate change should doubt her beliefs insofar as they might be influenced by values. Cultural cognition raises concerns for the epistemic status of these beliefs and appears to threaten the viability of debunking strategies in contexts of expert disagreement. Such strategies consist in attributing bias to dissenters to rationally dismiss their views, but if laypersons are also biased, debunking may be self-defeating. I shall refute this challenge on three grounds. First, there is controversy over whether the empirical literature on cultural cognition has genuinely identified a form of motivated reasoning, since the data can also be explained in non-motivational, rational terms. Second, even if it has, this is not evidence that a particular individual is biased. Greater caution is needed when moving from statistical generalisations to individual cases. Finally, evidence of bias is not always evidence of error – something especially clear in the case of belief in anthropogenic climate change. The discussion allows me to explore the general sceptical import of the psychological literature on cultural cognition.

The ethics of belief is concerned with the question of what we should believe. According to evidentialism, what one should believe is determined by evidence only. Pragmatism claims that practical considerations too can be relevant. But pragmatism comes in two shapes. According to a more traditional version, practical considerations can provide practical reasons for or against belief. According to a new brand of pragmatism, pragmatic encroachment, practical considerations can affect positive epistemic status, such as epistemic rationality or knowledge. In the literature, the distinction between the two versions of pragmatism is not always made. If it is mentioned, it is quickly put aside. Sometimes, it is simply overlooked. As evidentialists face two distinct pragmatist challenges, they must get clearer on the distinction. But it matters for pragmatists too. As I see it, if one accepts one version of pragmatism, one should reject the other. This paper’s goals are to get clearer on the distinction and argue that both pragmatisms are independent. Accepting one version does not commit one to accept the other. Moreover, even if both pragmatisms tend to be neutral toward one another, I will argue that traditional pragmatism has good reasons to reject pragmatic encroachment and vice versa.