Lenny Clapp

This paper motivates and describes a non-alethic approach to faultless disagreement involving predicates of personal taste (PPTs). In section 1 I describe problems faced by Sundell's indexicalist approach, and MacFarlane's relativist approach. In section 2 I develop an alternative, non-alethic, approach. The non-alethic approach is broadly expressivist in that it endorses both the negative semantic thesis that simple sentences containing PPTs do not semantically encode complete propositions and the positive pragmatic thesis that such sentences are used to express evaluative mental states. Finally, in section 3 I explain how the non-alethic approach explains faultless disagreement.

Strawson (in Mind 59:320–344, 1950; Theoria 30(2):96–118, 1964) argued that definite NPs trigger presuppositions as an aspect of their conventional meanings, and this semantic conception of presupposition triggers is incorporated into the binding theory of presuppositions (van der Sandt, in J Semant 9:333–377, 1992 and Geurts, in Presupposition and pronouns, 1999). The phenomenon of presupposition denials, however, presents a problem for the semantic conception of presupposition triggers, for in such denials the alleged semantic presuppositions seem to be “cancelled” by a negation operator. Geurts (in Language 74(2):274–307, 1998; Presupposition and pronouns, 1999) attempts to solve this problem by utilizing the binding theory’s allowance for local accommodation. Geurts’ proposal, however, is inadequate, primarily because Geurts formulates the binding theory within discourse representation theory (DRT), which makes no allowance for the illocutionary force of denial. Asher and Lascarides’ (in J Semant 15:239–299, 1998a; J Semant 15:83–113, 1998b; The logics of conversation, 2003) segmented discourse representation theory (SDRT), however, has the resources to account for the illocutionary force of denial. Utilizing a version of SDRT I demonstrate that the “cancelling” of a presupposition by echoic negation in presupposition denials crucially depends upon the denial of information that is pragmatically communicated by accommodation.

Since its introduction by Evans, the generality constraint has been invoked by various philosophers for different purposes. Our purpose here is, first, to clarify what precisely the GC states by way of an interpretive framework, the GC Schema, and second, to demonstrate in terms of this framework some problems that arise if one invokes the GC without clearly specifying an appropriate interpretation. By utilizing the GC Schema these sorts of problems can be avoided, and we thus propose it as a tool to facilitate argumentation that appeals to the GC.

When one speaks duplicitously one performs a (risky) speech act and at the same time intends that one have deniability regarding that speech act. What is it for a speaker who performs an illocutionary act to have deniability regarding that act? I first review an answer to this question proposed by Alexander Dinges and Julia Zakkou. According to them, deniability is “an epistemic notion. A speaker has deniability if she can make it epistemically irrational for her audience to reason in certain ways” (2023, p. 373). I argue, however, that the epistemic account is refuted by a counterexample, and informed by the counterexample, I propose an alternative. According to my alternative account, deniability concerns illocutionary norms: a speaker has deniability regarding an illocutionary action iff (i) she is permitted to deny having performed the action, and (ii) if she denies having performed the action, she thereby avoids being responsible for it. I conclude by considering the implications of illocutionary norms account of deniability for the vexed issue of the determinants of illocutionary force; I argue that the illocutionary norms account of deniability provides evidence in support of McDonald’s (2021) “collaboration” view.

Contrary to what seems to be predicted by a Strawson-inspired view, in presupposition denials the presupposition triggered by, e.g., ‘the king of France’ seems to be cancelled. To explain this puzzling instance of the projection problem, defenders of a Strawson-inspired view have proposed various ad hoc ambiguities. I develop a version of Segmented Discourse Representation Theory that explains the puzzling presupposition-cancelling phenomenon relying only on independently motivated pragmatic processes. Appealing to Kripke’s “test” for the adequacy of ambiguity motivating counterexamples, I argue that my analysis is to be preferred over proposals that posit ad hoc ambiguities. Two key insights of my analysis are, first, that the “cancellation” of presuppositions in presupposition denials depends upon the illocutionary effects of rejection and correction, and, second, that the process of presupposition accommodation often involves the speaker performing an ancillary sort of speech act, viz. the speech act of presupposing.

Scientific Essentialism defends the view that the fundamental laws of nature depend on the essential properties of the things on which they are said to operate, and are therefore not independent of them. These laws are not imposed upon the world by God, the forces of nature, or anything else, but rather are immanent in the world. Ellis argues that ours is a dynamic world consisting of more or less transient objects that are constantly interacting with each other, and whose identities depend on their roles in these processes. The laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, and consequently, there are necessary connections between events.

Le Verrier’s attempts to use ‘Vulcan’ to refer to an inter-Mercurial planet failed: Vulcan is a mere mythical entity. But, as the previous sentence demonstrates, we now use ‘Vulcan’ not in failed attempts to refer to a planet, but in seemingly successful attempts to refer to a mythical entity. These different uses of ‘Vulcan’ present critical pragmatics with a dilemma. On one horn, my use of ‘Vulcan’ cannot be conditionally co-referential with Le Verrier’s uses, because he failed to refer (to a planet), whereas I (seemingly successfully) refer to a mythical entity. But, on the other horn, such uses of ‘Vulcan’ are not a simple case of nambiguity, because what I say in uttering ‘Vulcan is a mythical entity’ is incompatible with Le Verrier’s assertion of, e.g., ‘Vulcan is hot’. I propose to escape this dilemma by appeal to a different relation between uses of names which I call converse conditional co-reference.

Paradigmatic uses of negative existentials such as ‘Vulcan does not exist’ are problematic because they present the interpreter with a pragmatic paradox: a speaker who uses such a sentence seems to be asserting something that is incompatible with what she presupposes. An adequate solution must therefore explain why we interpret paradigmatic uses of negative existentials as saying something true, even though such uses present us with a pragmatic paradox. I provide such an explanation by analyzing paradigmatic uses of negative existentials as corrections of previous assertions that are judged to suffer from referential presupposition failure. I present the explanation within the framework of a simple version of segmented discourse representation theory.

To solve the referential sub-problem of negative existentials one must explain why we interpret uses of, e.g., ‘Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist’ as saying something coherent and intuitively true, even though the speaker purports to refer to something. Pragmatic Meinongism solves this problem by allowing ‘does not exist’ to be pragmatically modulated to express an inclusive sense under which it can be satisfied by something. I establish three points in defense of pragmatic Meinongism: (i) it is superior to Russell-inspired solutions; (ii) it is supported by independent evidence of pragmatic modulation; and (iii) it requires no dubious ontological commitments.

We provide an account of necessary a posteriori identity statements that relies upon Perry’s multipropositionalism. On our account an utterance of, e.g., ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, semantically makes available several propositions, one of which is necessary (and a priori) and another of which is a posteriori (and contingent). Since our view resembles two-dimensionalism, one might assume that it is undermined by the sorts of nesting arguments that Soames and others have raised against two-dimensionalism. We demonstrate, however, that our account is immune to such nesting arguments.

Philosophy for Us is a collection of accessible and engaging philosophical papers on topics that matter to all of us. The text features select papers written by contemporary, professional philosophers specifically for beginning students. These papers are organized into five sections, each dealing with a philosophical issue or problem: Is there a God?; Do we have free will?; Are there objective moral truths?; What sort of thing is a person?; Is it moral to eat animals? Each section includes a brief introduction to the topic. Key terms and concepts are defined as they occur naturally within the text. Philosophy for Us bridges the gap between philosophers and introductory philosophy students, making it ideal for introductory philosophy courses. Leonard Clapp has been teaching introductory philosophy classes for over twenty-five years. He earned his Ph.D. at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Clapp specializes in the philosophy of language at Northern Illinois University. In addition to teaching courses on this aspect of the discipline he also teaches classes on the history of analytic philosophy and the philosophy of mind. His writing has been featured in journals such as The Journal of Philosophy, Mind and Language, Philosophical Studies, the Journal of Pragmatics, and Linguistics and Philosophy.

The primary purposes of my dissertation are, first, to motivate Russellian theories of propositional attitudes and propositional attitude ascriptions by criticizing Fregean theories, and second, to defend Russellian theories from the arguments and problems posed by the phenomenon of opacity. A theory of propositional attitudes and propositional attitude ascriptions is Russellian just in case it respects both the Principle of Direct Reference, and the Principle of Semantic Innocence. The Principle of Direct Reference states, roughly, that the sole contribution a referring term makes toward the content expressed by a sentence in which the term appears is the referent of the term, and not a Fregean sense or a "way of thinking of the referent of the term." And the Principle of Semantic Innocence states, roughly, that a term has the same referent or designation regardless of whether the term occurs inside or outside of the that-clause of an attitude ascription. Fregean theories, on the other hand, are theories based upon Frege's theory of sense and reference, and thus Fregean theories respect neither the Principle of Direct Reference, nor the Principle of Semantic Innocence. Fregean theories are often alleged to be superior to Russellian theories, however, on the grounds that Fregean theories can avoid the arguments and problems posed by the phenomenon of opacity. I argue that this allegation is false.

Several of the better essays in On Quine are critical of Quine’s views. In “Against Naturalized Epistemology,” Bas Van Fraassen challenges empiricists to provide a self-consistent statement of their view; if empiricism is the view that “experience is our one and only source of information,” then that piece of information must itself have experience only as its source. Van Fraassen argues that Quine’s naturalized epistemology cannot meet this challenge and thus “is itself a metaphysics of the sort which empiricists disdain”. Barry Stroud argues in “Quine on Exile and Acquiescence” that there is a tension between Quine’s thesis of “immanence”—that we can work only from within our language and/or conceptual scheme—and Quine’s doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation. And in “Quine’s Experiment with Intensional Objects and His Existentialist Quantified Modal Logic,” Hector-Neri Castañeda explores how “pseudo-Quine,” the Quine who experimented with modal logic in his 1947, might respond to the attack on quantified modal logic presented in his 1961.

Indexicalism is a strategy for defending truth-conditional semantics from under-determination arguments. According to indexicalism the class of indexical expressions includes not only the obvious indexicals, e.g. demonstratives and personal pronouns, but also unobvious indexical expressions, expressions which allegedly have been discovered to be indexicals. This paper argues that indexicalism faces significant obstacles that have yet to be overcome. The issue that divides indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics is first clarified. And then three general problems for indexicalism are presented, and some potential solutions that have been proposed in its defense are criticized.

Fodor (Mind Lang 16:1–15, 2001 ) endorses the mixed view that thought, yet not language, is compositional. That is, Fodor accepts the arguments of radical pragmatics that language is not compositional, but he claims these arguments do not apply to thought. My purpose here is to evaluate this mixed position: Assuming that the radical pragmaticists are right that language is not compositional, what arguments can be provided in support of the claim that thought is compositional? Before such arguments can be evaluated, the relevant notion of compositionality must be clarified. So I first clarify this notion of compositionality, and then consider three arguments in support of the mixed position. All three of these arguments are found to be inadequate, and thus I conclude that the mixed position is unstable: If one endorses the arguments of radical pragmatics against the compositionality of language, then one should also reject the compositionality of thought.

En "Existenciales negativos como denegaciones metalingüísticas" (García 2012), Eduardo García presenta una propuesta metalingüística sobre los existenciales negativos y argumenta en contra de la propuesta de la corrección dinámica (Clapp 2008). Aquí argumento que aunque la posición de García es atractiva porque satisface un criterio importante que muchas interpretaciones de los existenciales negativos no logran hacer justicia, no presenta una posición convincente en contra de la propuesta de la corrección dinámica ni a favor de su propuesta metalingüística. In his "Existenciales negativos como denagaciones metalinguísticas" (García 2012) Eduardo García presents a metalinguistic approach to negative existentials, and he argues against the dynamic correction proposal (Clapp 2008). Here I argue that García's proposal is attractive because it satisfies an important criterion that many approaches to negative existentials do not satisfy. However, I also argue that García has made neither a persuasive case against the dynamic correction proposal, nor a persuasive case in favor of his metalinguistic proposal.