León Trelles

Ian Hacking has proposed a series of notions for analyzing the human sciences. In this paper, we explore his idea of the looping effect in relation to the classification of mental illnesses. While his proposal has met with objections, we believe that the notion of the looping effect retains significant value for critically analyzing the classification system of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). In particular, we understand that the dynamics of interaction involved in the looping effect, which are established between the diagnostic categories and the classified individuals, could shed light on the ongoing revision of some of the psychiatric diagnoses listed in this manual. The article begins by analyzing the notion of the looping effect in the context of classifications of mental illnesses. Next, we examine the distinction between indifferent and interactive kinds, their relationship to the looping effect, and the instability of certain psychiatric objects and categories. We then present some of the main objections raised to this Hackinian proposal, particularly those that question the general scope of the looping effect and its capacity to differentiate between human and natural kinds. Finally, we argue that, despite existing criticisms, the notion of the looping effect remains a fruitful conceptual tool for the critical analysis of the DSM, and fundamentally for explaining the recurrent revision of some of its diagnostic categories.

Wakefield’s “hybrid” theory of mental illness defines the (dys)function of mental traits in terms of the evolutionary account of biological functions known as the Selected-Effect Theory. This evolutionary framework, however, has been subject to serious challenges in recent decades. Accordingly, the article sets out—programmatically and through a detailed literature review—an appraisal of hybrid accounts of mental health in light of debates around the philosophy of biological functions. Our analysis proceeds in two stages. First, it extends and systematizes three central critiques to the Selected-Effect Theory to Wakefield’s account: (i) the explanatory inadequacy of historical and population-based accounts of function for defining mental illness, (ii) the possibility that the origins and persistence of mental traits may resist functional explanation, and (iii) the claim that functional explanations of the mind’s evolution extend beyond selection-based accounts. Second, we explore alternative frameworks through which biological theories of function can shape the definition of mental illness—particularly the causal-role theory and the organizational account.