This paper presents a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s negative definitions of recollection (ἀνάμνησις) in De memoria et reminiscentia 2 (451a18–452a4), arguing that his apophatic method critiques Plato’s core definitional claims rather than merely setting up the positive definition of recollection as a simile reasoning process (453a9–12). By reconstructing the dialectical structure of this first part of the chapter, I highlight that Aristotle’s remarks mirror Plato’s statements in negative f…
Read moreThis paper presents a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s negative definitions of recollection (ἀνάμνησις) in De memoria et reminiscentia 2 (451a18–452a4), arguing that his apophatic method critiques Plato’s core definitional claims rather than merely setting up the positive definition of recollection as a simile reasoning process (453a9–12). By reconstructing the dialectical structure of this first part of the chapter, I highlight that Aristotle’s remarks mirror Plato’s statements in negative form, revealing his polemical intent. This reading leads to three key conclusions: first, it deepens our understanding of Plato’s influence in De memoria; second, it shows that Aristotle rejects Plato’s recollection definition as inadequate for explaining the recovery of past contents (Philebus 34b–c; Meno 81d); and third, it highlights the philosophical significance of Aristotle’s theory, which focuses on the unique recovery functions of recollection. Thus, De memoria 2 should be seen as Aristotle’s physiological response to Plato’s theory and a continuation of his epistemological critique of Analytics.
