Leonardo Flamini

Based on a survey testing people’s intuitions about questions, Lani Watson has recently claimed that the act of seeking information captures the nature of genuine questions and what distinguishes them from rhetorical ones. In this paper, I will argue that Watson’s account fails to provide an accurate theory of questions. By revisiting the survey cases and results, and using Searle’s conception of the illocutionary point of directives, I will first argue that the cases support and confirm a simple and straightforward aim-constitutivist theory of the speech act of asking: One asks a real question by uttering an interrogative sentence only if one’s utterance is an attempt that aims to get the addressee to answer the question it expresses. Otherwise, one is asking a fake or rhetorical question. Moreover, based on Friedman’s perspective on inquiring attitudes as states in which one has a question open in one’s thought, I will argue that the survey cases can be taken to expand and deepen the sincerity conditions for questions that Searle had initially proposed: One sincerely asks a question if one wants the addressee to answer the uttered question to settle an inquiring state of mind, or to make a target audience enter into it. Finally, in the cases in which the survey participants recognise the presence of a question despite the absence of any apparent speech act of asking, I will argue that they recognise an inquiring state of mind rather than simply an information-seeking act: They recognise that one is in a mental state in which one is asking oneself a particular question.

Recently, Jane Friedman has argued that what we call “suspension of judgment” is an interrogative attitude: If one suspends one’s judgment about the question Q, one is inquiring into Q. Many philosophers have criticised or developed Friedman’s idea by offering their own takes on suspended judgment. However, despite the differences we can find in the various accounts recently presented in the literature, there is a widespread idea in our theories of suspended judgment: What we call “suspension of judgment” implies a state of doxastic neutrality and is a condition that is doxastically incoherent and metaphysically or normatively incompatible with belief. In this paper, I propose a new conception of suspended judgment that is not committed to the previous widespread perspective. Following Cohen’s theory of acceptance, I will present a non-doxastic type of suspended judgment described as suspension of acceptance. Considering this new conception, I will first underline how this non-doxastic way of suspending our judgment can be regarded as an interrogative mental act. Then, against the widespread perspective, I will show that something we call “suspension of judgment” is a non-doxastic mental act that does not imply a state of doxastic neutrality and can doxastically cohere and be metaphysically and normatively compatible with belief.

Some philosophers consider knowledge the fundamental state whose presence or absence helps us decide when an inquiry is not permissible. Falbo has recently provided an alternative perspective in which epistemic improvement is what determines when an inquiry into a given question is not permitted: If it’s rational to be sure at t that, by inquiring, one won’t improve epistemically upon the question Q, then inquiry into Q is not permissible at t. In this paper, I will show that Falbo’s view is incorrect and that there are counterexamples to it. Moreover, based on this criticism, I will argue that our epistemic states do not generate a duty not to inquire. However, I will suggest they have a normative role for our inquiries: They provide reasons not to inquire. Finally, by discussing this point, I will claim that even if our epistemic states do not generate duties not to inquire, they can provide a “right not to inquire”. Nonetheless, I will conclude that there cannot be epistemic states that give an absolute right not to inquire, namely, a right that entitles one not to inquire no matter the circumstances one might find oneself in.

Recently, philosophers have shown an increasing interest in the normativity of inquiry. For example, they discuss which doxastic or epistemic state makes an inquiry permissible or impermissible. Moreover, since our inquiries are typically considered goal-directed activities that aim at answering questions, philosophers have offered general principles to capture their instrumental normativity. However, it is notable that these principles – being general – lack specificity: They do not tell us how we should specifically behave to conduct an effective inquiry. The primary goal of this paper is to provide a first formulation of more specific norms of inquiry. To further this goal, I will consider the prominent theory of conversation promoted by Roberts (1996, 2006), which describes conversation as an instance of inquiry. Based on this perspective and the idea that Grice’s maxims (1975) individuate the norms of effective conversation, I will reformulate Gricean maxims in zetetic norms and argue for their intuitive appeal in regulating our inquiries. Moreover, I will point out how these “Gricean zetetic norms” can be fruitful in opening new lines of research about the zetetic domain. In particular, I will show how they can be used to identify and ground the existence of some zetetic virtues – virtues of inquiry: Zetetic parsimony, reliability, focus, and lucidity. Finally, I discuss how compatible these “Gricean zetetic virtues” are with the intellectual virtues we can find in the epistemological literature.

Human beings are naturally inclined to inquire – this is much uncontroversial. However, recent philosophical discussions reveal that the nature of inquiry and the principles that should guide it remain subjects of significant debate. Namely, we lack a straightforward answer to foundational questions about what inquiry entails and how it ought to proceed. Rather, contemporary philosophical literature presents a range of contrasting perspectives on the descriptive and normative dimensions of inquiry, making it a topic of ongoing disagreement and controversy. This work engages with key questions arising from this debate: Is the mental state of suspended judgment essential for engaging in inquiry? Does the suspension of judgment exhibit an inquisitive character? What goal does inquiry aim to achieve? And what normative principles govern the rational conduct of our investigations? By addressing these questions, I aim to provide a fresh perspective on the nature and normativity of our inquiries.

It is a widespread idea that suspended judgement implies a state of doxastic neutrality. Jane Friedman has recently claimed that while inquiring into a given question, one suspends one’s judgement on it. Jointly considered, the previous claims imply that one is in a state of doxastic neutrality about a given question while inquiring into it. In this article, I explore the leading cases against Friedman’s perspective, arguing that it is debatable whether they exhibit inquiries into questions without doxastic neutrality. However, I will propose the possibility of “explorative disconfirmation inquiries” to show that doxastically non-neutral inquiries do exist.

Jane Friedman claims that when we inquire, there is a tension between the instrumental normativity of our inquiries and some basic epistemic norms: The former forbids what the latter permit. Moreover, she argues that since the instrumental normativity of inquiry is epistemic, the previous tension shows that our current conception of epistemic normativity is incoherent and needs to be revised. To solve the problem, she suggests that all our epistemic norms should be considered “zetetic”, namely, norms of inquiry. In this paper, I will argue that the instrumental normativity of inquiry Friedman depicts is inaccurate. I will propose the following alternative picture: All our reasons to inquire and take means to answer our questions are instrumental and can be derivative from the epistemic, the practical, or both. However, developing this alternative view, I will argue that our duties to inquire and take means to answer our questions are just practical in nature. Based on this, I will show that the tension between the epistemic and the zetetic Friedman depicts is just a conflict between the practical and the epistemic: A conflict that does not show per se that the current conception of epistemic normativity is incoherent and needs to be revised.

Many philosophers have recently challenged the monistic idea that knowledge is the sole aim of our inquiries into questions. Specifically, by giving examples, they argue that we can factually and legitimately inquire into questions to achieve states different from the mere knowledge of the correct and complete answer. Given this, they end up with a pluralistic stance about the aim of our inquiries into questions. In this paper, I will show that the pluralists’ cases do not seriously threaten knowledge monism. First, I will describe how a knowledge monist can slightly revise her position and motivate the following claim: The aim of our inquiries into questions is not the mere knowledge but the occurrent knowledge of the correct and complete answer – a type of knowledge that is operative in our actions and cognition. Second, I will show how the monist can defend this position from the cases the pluralists offer by highlighting how our inquiries come in a variety and are bound to contextual aspects. Finally, by analysing the monist’s strategy further, I will end up with a new theory of inquiry: A theory that is contextualist, pluralist about the variety of inquiries, but monistic about their specific aims.