Leonardo Mazzanti

This article deals with a complicated philological problem in section 133 of Epicurus’ Epistle to Menoeceus. There is a lacuna in the text; various supplements have been proposed, but the resulting syntax remains anomalous. This article argues that the interpretation of the syntax which underlies all the most influential supplements proposed to date, from Usener to Sedley and beyond, should be rejected. A new suggestion is put forward, based on a different syntactical interpretation and on a careful new analysis of the readings preserved in MS P.

This paper presents a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s negative definitions of recollection (ἀνάμνησις) in De memoria et reminiscentia 2 (451a18–452a4), arguing that his apophatic method critiques Plato’s core definitional claims rather than merely setting up the positive definition of recollection as a simile reasoning process (453a9–12). By reconstructing the dialectical structure of this first part of the chapter, I highlight that Aristotle’s remarks mirror Plato’s statements in negative form, revealing his polemical intent. This reading leads to three key conclusions: first, it deepens our understanding of Plato’s influence in De memoria; second, it shows that Aristotle rejects Plato’s recollection definition as inadequate for explaining the recovery of past contents (Philebus 34b–c; Meno 81d); and third, it highlights the philosophical significance of Aristotle’s theory, which focuses on the unique recovery functions of recollection. Thus, De memoria 2 should be seen as Aristotle’s physiological response to Plato’s theory and a continuation of his epistemological critique of Analytics.