•  31
    This article offers a distinctive way of grounding the regulative duties held by social media companies (SMCs). One function of the democratic state is to provide what we term the right to democratic epistemic participation within the public sphere. But social media has transformed our public sphere, such that SMCs now facilitate citizens’ right to democratic epistemic participation and do so on a scale that was previously impossible. We argue that this role of SMCs in expanding the scope of wha…Read more
  •  1
    In Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics Catherine Lu argues that structural reconciliation, rather than interactional reconciliation, ought to be the primary normative goal for political reconciliation efforts. I suggest that we might have good reason to want to retain relational approaches – such as that of Linda Radzik – as the primary focus of reconciliatory efforts, but that Lu’s approach is invaluable for identifying the parties who ought to bear responsibility for those efforts in …Read more
  •  10
    Collective Agents and Global Structural Injustice: An Introduction to the Special Issue
    with Christina Friedlaender
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (1): 1-6. 2021.
  •  39
    Epistemic Injustice and the Attention Economy
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5): 777-795. 2020.
    In recent years, a significant body of literature has emerged on the subject of epistemic injustice: wrongful harms done to people in their capacities as knowers. Up to now this literature has ignored the role that attention has to play in epistemic injustice. This paper makes a first step towards addressing this gap. We argue that giving someone less attention than they are due, which we call an epistemic attention deficit, is a distinct form of epistemic injustice. We begin by outlining what w…Read more
  •  8
    In Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics Catherine Lu argues that structural reconciliation, rather than interactional reconciliation, ought to be the primary normative goal for political reconciliation efforts. I suggest that we might have good reason to want to retain relational approaches – such as that of Linda Radzik – as the primary focus of reconciliatory efforts, but that Lu’s approach is invaluable for identifying the parties who ought to bear responsibility for those efforts in …Read more
  •  22
    Opponents and proponents alike of the freedom of the UK press to print prejudicial content about marginalised groups typically frame the debate in classic ‘free speech’ vs ‘harm principle’ terms. Those in favour of press freedom argue that the print press' right to freedom of expression beats any perceived or actual harm caused, and those against argue the opposite. Predictably, little progress is made in either party convincing the other. I suggest that we ought to instead ask, what grounds the…Read more
  •  48
    Suggestions and Challenges for a Social Account of Sensitivity
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6 (5): 18-26. 2016.
    In this paper, I put the claim that sensitivity is a necessary condition for knowledge under pressure, by considering its applicability with regard to testimonially-formed beliefs. Building on, and departing from, Goldberg, I positively draw out how we might understand the required sensitivity as a social interaction between speaker and hearer in testimonial cases. In doing so however, I identify a concern which places the whole notion of testimonial sensitivity in potential jeopardy: the proble…Read more
  •  28
    How Might Financial Aid Form a Part of the Negative Duty Not to Harm in the Case of Global Poverty?
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (3). forthcoming.
    The pro tanto duty not to harm is arguably the most widely accepted basis for moral demand. However, in the case of global poverty, even if we accept that individual members of wealthier nations are responsible for harming the global poor (through their constitution of, or participation in or with, global institutions that harm), it remains difficult to claim that individuals violate a negative duty in doing so. For an agent to hold a duty, that duty must be at least (a) recognizable to a reason…Read more
  •  125
    Performative accounts of personhood argue that group agents are persons, fit to be held responsible within the social sphere. Nonetheless, these accounts want to retain a moral distinction between group and individual persons. That: Group-persons can be responsible for their actions qua persons, but that group-persons might nonetheless not have rights equivalent to those of human persons. I present an argument which makes sense of this disanalogy, without recourse to normative claims or addition…Read more