Liam D Ryan

Is mercy merely compatible with institutional justice, or is it partly constitutive of it? I defend the constitutive justice thesis that a legal system instantiates institutional justice only if it includes an authorised, internal corrective capacity for exceptional cases, properly characterised as mercy. This position opposes formalist conceptions that identify institutional justice with impartial ruleapplication alone. The argument proceeds by motivating the need for an authorised, internal, corrective capacity for corrective judgement in exceptional cases. It is then argued that when such correction operates in punitive and remedial contexts, it is properly characterised as mercy. Sophocles’ Antigone is then employed as a diagnostic case to show that a legal system which excludes this corrective capacity forfeits its claim to justice altogether. It is thereby shown that a conception of justice which excludes mercy risks collapsing into an inhuman and ultimately selfundermining form of legality

This paper introduces a novel approach to interpreting the problem of evil, centred on a dynamic interplay between pre-formalised notions and their formal representations. Our thesis posits that the resolution to the problem lies in comprehending the underlying intentions of the premise set, rather than resorting to ad hoc, syllogistic rebuttals to the perceived contradictions. By applying this reasoning to the historical dialectic of the problem, we observe that certain resolutions to the problem of evil are more effective than others. The most effective solutions are those that maintain the integrity of the accumulated pre-formalised notions, while less effective ones either confront the contradiction head-on or disregard it entirely. Moreover, we discover that the process of striving and failing in this context yields valuable insights, enhancing our understanding and broadening the scope of our initial pre-formal notions about the problem of evil.

The purpose of this dissertation is to come to a better understanding of the nature of philosophical problems, and what it means to make philosophical progress. It is proposed that it is the unsolvable nature of such problems that makes them truly philosophical. It is also proposed that philosophical progress is made by engaging with philosophical problems in a philosophically satisfying manner: neither abandoning unsolvable philosophical problems nor reducing all philosophical problems to formal problems. In support of these objectives, a particular approach to making philosophical progress is proposed, called receptivism. This approach is employed in analyses of four specific problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of religion: the problem of consciousness for physicalism, the problem of possibilia, the problem of religious beliefs, and the problem of evil.

Some philosophers argue that mental properties are ontologically distinct from physical properties and that, therefore, physicalism ought to be rejected. There are philosophers who feel the force of this challenge but who wish to maintain their physicalism. They suggest that mentality is grounded in inscrutable properties or ‘incrutables’: properties that are not revealed through physical enquiry but that do not violate physicalism. Our analysis reveals that appealing to inscrutables is not a successful strategy for these physicalists, for the following reasons: first, inscrutables likely do violate the conditions of physicalism; second, inscrutables lend greater support to panpsychism than physicalism; third, there is good reason to be agnostic as to whether or not inscrutables count as physical properties. Each of these reasons undermines the physicalist’s purpose in positing inscrutables. If one wishes to remain a physicalist, they ought to direct their philosophical analysis and energies toward revisiting and defeasing the arguments that purport to show that mental properties are ontologically distinct from physical properties.

Does religious belief differ in any interesting way from other kinds of belief? For now, take ‘belief’ to mean how one takes the world to be, on the basis of which they act. Call beliefs like this ‘ordinary beliefs’. There are also more complicated, or abstract, beliefs. Call such beliefs ‘non-ordinary beliefs’. Are religious beliefs different in any significant or interesting way from what we call ‘standard belief’? Our analysis shows that they are not. Although the content of religious belief is different, and sometimes so is the function, religious beliefs are still mental, dispositional attitudes that aim to provide a correct representation of the world. Therefore, religious beliefs are best understood as a sub-category of standard beliefs, alongside ordinary and non-ordinary beliefs. This account of religious belief provides further insight into the meaning of belief and supports a revision of a strict demarcation between standard and non-standard beliefs.

I defend the continuing importance, and attraction of, moral saints. The objective of this paper is twofold; firstly, to critique Wolf’s definition of sainthood, and secondly, to argue against her view that one should not desire to be a moral saint, nor emulate them. In section 1, I argue that moral saints are highly complex moral agents, and that Wolf’s definition does not capture this complexity. My second argument is that Wolf’s account that there are two kinds of saints, loving and rational, leads to a tension. Either: (1) the distinction between loving and rational saints is justifiable; but then argu- ments against the benefits of sainthood ought to be directed independently against each kind of saint which, Wolf does not do; or (2) the distinction is not justifiable, in which case the division is explanatorily impotent. In section 2, I will present Wolf’s argument for why one should not want to be a moral saint, nor even know one. I counter that Wolf over-emphasises non-moral values, to the point that these values have a monopoly on what constitutes a well-rounded life. Wolf must provide a more definitive scope for non-moral values, as the distinction between moral and non-moral values is ambiguous. Finally, I argue that moral saints can serve as moral exemplars and visionaries. By admir- ing and emulating them, we can adapt our own moral behavior, and by example, moral saints can discover new and better ways of pursuing moral goods.

How should we understand the Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names (zhengming): what does it mean that an object’s name must be in accordance with its reality, and why does it matter? The aim of this paper is to answer this question by advocating a novel interpretation of the later Confucian, Xunzi’s account of the doctrine. Xunzi claims that sage-kings ascribe names and values to objects by convention, and since they are sages, they know the truth. When we misuse names, we are departing from a sagely convention of naming. As sagely convention determines moral truth, departure from the linguistic convention of the sages is a departure from moral truth. On my interpretation of Xunzi, the rectification of names is not a doctrine about what is true, but a doctrine about how we aim at truth. We are aiming at descriptive truth when our language conforms to the correct name of an object according to what I call ‘Confucian conventionalism’. When we correctly aim at descriptive truth we can aim at moral truth. Therefore, I claim that the doctrine of the rectification of names is concerned with discerning the literal accordance of language with an object (what is descriptively, linguistically true), to determine what is normatively, or morally, true. According to Xunzi, moral truth is grounded in linguistic truth.