Liesbeth De Mol

In his autobiographical essay written in 1999, ‘From logic to computer science and back’, Martin David Davis (1928 3 8–2023 1 1) indicated that he viewed himself as a logician and a computer scientist. He expanded the essay in 2016 and expressed a new perspective through a changed title, ‘My life as a logician’. He points out that logic was the unifying theme underlying his scientific career. Our paper attempts to provide a consistent vision that illuminates Davis’s successive contributions leading to his landmark writings on computability, unsolvable problems, automated reasoning, as well as the history and philosophy of computing.

This book presents a systematic philosophical and historical analysis of operating systems (0S). The discussion starts with the evolution of OSs since before their birth. It continues with a comprehensive philosophical analysis grounded in technical aspects. Coverage looks at software and (where appropriate) hardware as well as their historical developments. The authors not only offer historical and philosophical reflections on operating systems. They also explore the programs they coordinate and trace the epsitemic and ontological consequences of their designs. Each chapter investigates one or more overlapping fragments of this fascinating history. These include: the birth of the UNIX system and the development of early systems and prototypes; a conceptual analysis of the plurality of systems; an investigation into business, ethical, and aesthetics aspects related to operating systems; and logical principles of formal languages. This book will interest researchers from a diversity of backgrounds. It will appeal to historians, philosophers, as well as logicians and computer scientists who want to engage with topics relevant to the history and philosophy of programming and more specifically that of operating systems.

In 1931 Kurt Gödel published his incompleteness results, and some years later Church and Turing showed that the decision problem for certain systems of symbolic logic has a negative solution. However, already in 1921 the young logician Emil Post worked on similar problems which resulted in what he called an “anticipation” of these results. For several reasons though he did not submit these results to a journal until 1941. This failure ‘to be the first’, did not discourage him: his contributions to mathematical logic and its foundations should not be underestimated. It is the purpose of this article to show that an interest in the early work of Emil Post should be motivated not only by this historical fact, but also by the fact that Post’s approach and method differs substantially from those offered by Gödel, Turing and Church. In this paper it will be shown how this method evolved in his early work and how it finally led him to his results.

This article reinterprets algorithmic rationality by looking at the interaction between mathematical logic, mechanized reasoning, and, later, computing in the Russian Imperial and Soviet contexts to offer a history of the algorithm as a mathematical object bridging the inner and outer worlds, a humanistic vision that we, following logician Vladimir Uspensky, call the “culture of the impossible.” We unfold the deep roots of this vision as embodied in scientific intelligentsia. In Part I, we examine continuities between the turn-of-the-twentieth-century discussions of poznaniye—an epistemic orientation towards the process of knowledge acquisition—and the postwar rise of the Soviet school of mathematical logic. Establishing this connection allows us to explain, in Part II, the role of the algorithm in disciplinary dynamics between mathematical logic and cybernetics and a characteristic understanding of programming, not as a narrow skill, but as a matter of consciousness.

A history of writing the history of computing is presented in its relationship to the history of mathematics. As with many historiographies, the initial history of computing was very much an internalistic history. In the late 1970s, the field became more serious and started looking at the histories of mathematics and technology for (methodological) inspiration. Whereas the history of mathematics was initially quite influential, it is the history of technology (in its U.S. form) that has become the dominant framework for doing history of computing since the 1990s.

What is the significance of high-speed computation for the sciences? How far does it result in a practice of simulation which affects the sciences on a very basic level? To offer more historical context to these recurring questions, this paper revisits the roots of computer simulation in the development of the ENIAC computer and the Monte Carlo method. With the aim of identifying more clearly what really changed (or not) in the history of science in the 1940s and 1950s due to the computer, I will emphasize the continuities with older practices and develop a two-fold argument. Firstly, one can find a diversity of practices around ENIAC which tends to be ignored if one focuses only on the ENIAC itself as the originator of Monte Carlo simulation. Following from this, I claim, secondly, that there was no simulation around ENIAC. Not only is the term ‘simulation’ not used within that context, but the analysis also shows how ‘simulation’ is an effect of three interrelated sets of different practices around the machine: (1) the mathematics which the ENIAC users employed and developed, (2) the programs, (3) the physicality of the machine. I conclude that, in the context discussed, the most important shifts in practice are about rethinking existing computational methods. This was done in view of adapting them to the high-speed and programmability of the new machine. Simulation then is but one facet of this process of adaptation, singled out by posterity to be viewed as its principal aspect.