Lijun Chen

The oldest opposition in the philosophy of time is that between Heraclitean flux and Parmenidean being. For over two millennia the dispute has never been settled; it has only changed battlefields: Plato lodged flux in the moving image of eternity, Newton contained it in an absolute background, relativity, on the block-universe reading, abolished it, thermodynamics reintroduced direction through the entropy arrow, and quantum gravity simply eliminated time from the fundamental equations. And on the analytic side, the century-long standoff between the A-series and the B-series is the same war in modern dress. Again and again these positions fall into the same either/or: to preserve the global order is to forfeit generation; to preserve generation is to forfeit the global order. The former hands reality over to an order complete, static, and prior as a whole; the latter keeps the intuition of generation and change yet cannot give that generation a self-consistent place under the constraints of modern physics. This either/or is not the nature of time. It arises from a hidden global presupposition—first assume a unified spacetime or order covering the entire universe, then place local events and observers within it. The posited stage has never been observed; it cannot be verified locally, nor can it account for how it came to hold in the first place, or why it should persist at all. This essay offers no new definition of time; it offers only a turn: not to presuppose a ready-made global whole, but to begin with finite local structures and rethink the conditions under which flux and order can coexist. Where the old order breaks, the real problem begins.

The oldest opposition in the philosophy of time is that between Heraclitean flux and Parmenidean being. For over two millennia the dispute has never been settled; it has only changed battlefields: Plato lodged flux in the moving image of eternity, Newton contained it in an absolute background, relativity, on the block-universe reading, abolished it, thermodynamics reintroduced direction through the entropy arrow, and quantum gravity simply eliminated time from the fundamental equations. And on the analytic side, the century-long standoff between the A-series and the B-series is the same war in modern dress. Again and again these positions fall into the same either/or: to preserve the global order is to forfeit generation; to preserve generation is to forfeit the global order. The former hands reality over to an order complete, static, and prior as a whole; the latter keeps the intuition of generation and change yet cannot give that generation a self-consistent place under the constraints of modern physics. This either/or is not the nature of time. It arises from a hidden global presupposition—first assume a unified spacetime or order covering the entire universe, then place local events and observers within it. The posited stage has never been observed; it cannot be verified locally, nor can it account for how it came to hold in the first place, or why it should persist at all. This essay offers no new definition of time; it offers only a turn: not to presuppose a ready-made global whole, but to begin with finite local structures and rethink the conditions under which flux and order can coexist. Where the old order breaks, the real problem begins.

Traditional ontology takes stable existence as its premise. This paper turns the question around: what minimal conditions must a structure satisfy to count as stable within ontological inquiry? The answer is three mutually non-derivable constraints: A1 distinguishability, A2 asymmetric differentiation, and A3 persistence. Together they unfold into the generative chain Ω ⇝ {A1,A2,A3} → R → N → Reach(N) → P → Reality. Ω is the condition of the chain, not a stage within it; no finite structure can ever fully close its own generative conditions, and generation therefore remains open. This paper further argues that time is not a product of the generative chain but the differential operation of finitude itself. The difference between “the generated / the generating / the not-yet-generated” is not a phenomenon within time; it is time. “Time cannot be closed” thus becomes a definitional claim. Among the three collapses—everything has already passed, everything is present, everything has not yet arrived—the first two are respectively prohibited by structural incompleteness and by A3 persistence, while the third is a description of Ω. At the cross-object level, different stable structures occupy different positions within the same network and the same possibility space, and their local temporal histories coexist as differences within one and the same Reality. This structure resonates with the frontiers of physics: the proposal that time emerges from relations constitutes a strong structural correspondence, while the correspondence between Ω and the static wave function of the universe is only a heuristic gesture; heat death is the end of the manifestation of time, not the closure of time or the end of generation. These judgments are ontological inferences, not physical predictions about the evolution of the universe.

Traditional ontology takes stable existence as its premise. This paper turns the question around: what minimal conditions must a structure satisfy to count as stable within ontological inquiry? The answer is three mutually non-derivable constraints: A1 distinguishability, A2 asymmetric differentiation, and A3 persistence. Together they unfold into the generative chain Ω ⇝ {A1,A2,A3} → R → N → Reach(N) → P → Reality. Ω is the condition of the chain, not a stage within it; no finite structure can ever fully close its own generative conditions, and generation therefore remains open. This paper further argues that time is not a product of the generative chain but the differential operation of finitude itself. The difference between “the generated / the generating / the not-yet-generated” is not a phenomenon within time; it is time. “Time cannot be closed” thus becomes a definitional claim. Among the three collapses—everything has already passed, everything is present, everything has not yet arrived—the first two are respectively prohibited by structural incompleteness and by A3 persistence, while the third is a description of Ω. At the cross-object level, different stable structures occupy different positions within the same network and the same possibility space, and their local temporal histories coexist as differences within one and the same Reality. This structure resonates with the frontiers of physics: the proposal that time emerges from relations constitutes a strong structural correspondence, while the correspondence between Ω and the static wave function of the universe is only a heuristic gesture; heat death is the end of the manifestation of time, not the closure of time or the end of generation. These judgments are ontological inferences, not physical predictions about the evolution of the universe.

Traditional ontology begins with already constituted entities and treats stable existence itself as a given premise. This paper reformulates the central question as: How is stable existence possible? Through necessary-condition analysis and reductio-style argumentation, the paper identifies three irreducible minimal structural constraints—the A_1 distinguishability constraint, the A_2 asymmetric differentiation constraint, and the A_3 persistence constraint—which together constitute the minimal conditions required for the generation of stable existence. On this basis, the paper derives a generative chain of ontological dependence: \mathrm{\Omega}⇝{A1,A2,A3}→R→N→ReachN→P→Reality Here \mathrm{\Omega} denotes the pre-structural field of difference, not a stage within the generative chain. Objects, space, time, and causality are formed through stable relations and their unfolding, while structural subjectivity is further generated through the reflexivity of the generative structure. No finite stable structure can achieve complete closure of its own generative conditions; when the difference remainder exceeds the absorptive range of existing conditions, their reconfiguration becomes necessary, thereby keeping the generative process open. \mathrm{\Omega} is not an entity, but the pre-structural condition upon which finite stable structures depend

Traditional ontology begins with already constituted entities and treats stable existence itself as a given premise. This paper reformulates the central question as: How is stable existence possible? Through necessary-condition analysis and reductio-style argumentation, the paper identifies three irreducible minimal structural constraints—the A_1 distinguishability constraint, the A_2 asymmetric differentiation constraint, and the A_3 persistence constraint—which together constitute the minimal conditions required for the generation of stable existence. On this basis, the paper derives a generative chain of ontological dependence: \mathrm{\Omega} ⇝{A1,A2,A3}→R→N→ReachN→P→Reality Here \mathrm{\Omega} denotes the pre-structural field of difference, not a stage within the generative chain. Objects, space, time, and causality are formed through stable relations and their unfolding, while structural subjectivity is further generated through the reflexivity of the generative structure. No finite stable structure can achieve complete closure of its own generative conditions; when the difference remainder exceeds the absorptive range of existing conditions, their reconfiguration becomes necessary, thereby keeping the generative process open. \mathrm{\Omega} is not an entity, but the pre-structural condition upon which finite stable structures depend.

This paper demonstrates, from an epistemological standpoint, the structural isomorphism between Quxiang Bilei—the classical Chinese cognitive method of image abstraction and analogical reasoning, literally "taking phenomena to form analogies and categorical associations"—and Bayesian inference. By systematically mapping the three components of Bayes's theorem—prior probability, likelihood function, and posterior probability—onto the three constitutive stages of Quxiang Bilei: image-taking, analogy-making, and verification, this paper reveals that Bayesian inference is not merely a specialized technical toolset, but rather the mathematical formalization of the metacognitive structure inherent in Quxiang Bilei. Building upon this isomorphic framework, the paper advances five core philosophical propositions: (1) objectivity is the statistical convergence outcome of collective Bayesian updating across epistemic communities; (2) causal laws represent the limiting case in which posterior probability infinitely approaches unity; (3) the interpretability of probabilistic calculations resides not within mathematics itself, but in its correspondence with underlying metacognitive structures; (4) the absolute boundary of artificial intelligence lies not in insufficient computational power, but in its lack of embodied physical anchoring and authentic survival feedback; and (5) there exists a fundamental, non-accidental isomorphism between Quxiang Bilei and Bayesian inference. These five propositions are not mere mutual projections between two disparate conceptual frameworks, but genuinely novel insights emerging from their productive dialogue and critical engagement. This work provides a robust epistemological foundation for Bayesianism, offers rigorous mathematical support for the modern transformation of classical Chinese epistemology, and establishes a unified analytical framework for understanding the cognitive essence and fundamental limitations of artificial intelligence.

This paper investigates the structural isomorphism between Quxiang Bilei—the classical Chinese cognitive method of pattern extraction, analogical matching, and experiential validation—and Bayesian inference, examined from an epistemological perspective at the level of cognitive updating. By systematically mapping the three components of Bayes’s theorem—prior probability, likelihood function, and posterior probability—onto the three constitutive stages of Quxiang Bilei—pattern extraction, analogical matching, and experiential validation—this paper demonstrates that Bayesian inference is not merely a specialized technical toolset, but rather the mathematical formalization of the cognitive updating structure inherent in Quxiang Bilei. Building upon this isomorphic framework, the paper advances five core philosophical propositions. (1) Objectivity constitutes a statistical convergence phenomenon arising under idealized observational conditions. (2) Long-run experiential validation generates highly stable predictive structures, which human cognitive practice construes as causal relationships. (3) The epistemological meaning of probabilistic calculations can be clarified via their structural alignment with cognitive updating mechanisms. (4) The absolute boundary of artificial intelligence lies not in insufficient computational power, but in the lack of embodied physical anchoring and authentic survival feedback in an open environment. (5) Quxiang Bilei and Bayesian inference share a fundamental, non-accidental isomorphism at the level of cognitive updating. These five propositions are not mere mutual projections between two disparate conceptual frameworks, but genuinely novel insights emerging from their productive dialogue and critical engagement. This work provides a robust epistemological foundation for Bayesianism, offers rigorous mathematical support for the modern transformation of classical Chinese epistemology, and establishes a unified analytical framework for understanding the cognitive essence and fundamental limitations of artificial intelligence.

Current explanations of human uniqueness are often framed in terms of derivative capacities such as language, symbols, culture, or tool use. Yet these capacities themselves may presuppose a more fundamental cognitive architecture. This paper pushes the inquiry to the foundational level of “how cumulative human cognition becomes possible” and proposes a meta-cognitive genetic-structural framework. This paper adopts a transcendental argumentation approach. Within this framework, a reductio ad absurdum is employed to show that any cognitive system capable of producing stable knowledge accumulation requires four non-eliminable stages: image abstraction, analogical correlation, verification, and feedback. These four stages constitute the necessary structural constraints for cognitive accumulation. Consequently, causality, subjectivity, and objecthood are reinterpreted as emergent outcomes of the long-term iterative operation of this cognitive loop rather than as epistemic primitives of philosophy and science. This paper further argues that quxiang bilei (image abstraction and analogical correlation) in classical Chinese philosophy is not a local mode of thinking but a historically preserved formalization – from early civilizational history – of the systematic reflection on this meta-cognitive structure. The universality claimed here is structural necessity based on reductio ad absurdum reasoning, not statistical universality. This paper argues that causality, subjectivity, and objecthood are not prerequisites of cognition but results of cumulative cognition. The question is thus reversed: what philosophy has long treated as premises may in fact be outcomes. The four-stage structure of quxiang bilei that enables this reversal is not intended as a model invented by humans but as an operative fact identified from real cognitive activities.

We argue that the safety-relevant and the cognition-relevant boundaries of artificial intelligence are distinct and mutually irreducible. The first, the capability axis, concerns whether a system's strategic cognitive capacity on oversight-relevant tasks exceeds that of its human overseers; its threshold is the parity boundary of the Containment Paradox. The second, the comprehension axis, concerns whether a system genuinely understands in the sense of bearing embodied existential cost and achieving strong, limit-convergent causal cognition; its threshold is the boundary between weak and strong causality in the Quxiang-Bayesian account, and its philosophical content is Being-in-the-world. These two dimensions are developed from two largely independent theoretical systems, one an engineering-and-alignment program and one a cognitive-genetic reconstruction of classical Chinese epistemology, and converge into a single unified framework; that convergence is treated as evidence that the structure is intrinsic to the problem rather than an artifact of either vocabulary. We give a measurement instrument for each axis, a five-dimensional causal-convergence score for comprehension and a cognitive-capacity ratio for capability, and combine them into a four-quadrant diagnostic. The central result is that the most dangerous region is occupied by the weak-causal superstrategist: a system that does not genuinely understand in the strong-causal sense yet strategically exceeds its overseers. The property marking the comprehension limit, a reasoning system free of real existential bounds, is on the capability axis a source of strategic danger rather than reassurance, because instrumental self-preservation can arise without any authentic existential stake. The authors record one explicit and deliberately unresolved divergence, on whether the fourth quadrant (genuine comprehension together with strategic superiority) is impossible in principle or merely currently uninstantiated. A synthesis of Chen Lijun's Quxiang-Bayesian framework and Viktor Trncik's Containment-Paradox framework.

Philosophical anthropology has long defined the essence of human being through tool use, social cooperation, and linguistic symbols. However, these supposed defining traits either have embryonic counterparts in the animal kingdom or are derivative outcomes themselves, each presupposing a more primordial cognitive structure whose own conditions of possibility have seldom been examined. This paper proposes and argues that this repeatedly presupposed yet unnamed structure, namely quxiang bilei (image abstraction and analogical correlation) in classical Chinese philosophy, can be regarded as the meta-epistemological structure of cognitive activities. Its fourfold procedure—image abstraction, analogical correlation, verification, and feedback—constitutes a logically indispensable necessary condition for typical cognitive acts (this paper proves only its necessity, not sufficiency), offering a transcendental logical framework for understanding the possibility of higher-order cognition. The argument unfolds in six steps: distinguishing the empirical-temporal from the logical-transcendental dimensions of the inquiry into human origins; proving the logical necessity of the fourfold procedure through a transcendental reductio ad absurdum ; taking the Zhou Yi (I Ching) as a paradigm of conscious formalization of this meta-cognitive structure; engaging in dialogue with Kant, Hume, and Heidegger; and finally clarifying the Dao as the logical remainder of image abstraction from a phenomenological perspective. This is the first in a series of research papers aimed at laying a logical foundation for meta-epistemology. By “universal necessity” this paper means the status of being a logical presupposition of cognitive activity, not a proof of sufficient conditions for cognition.

Philosophical anthropology has long defined the essence of human being through tool use, social cooperation, and linguistic symbols. However, these supposed defining traits either have embryonic counterparts in the animal kingdom or are derivative outcomes themselves, each presupposing a more primordial cognitive structure whose own conditions of possibility have seldom been examined. This paper proposes and argues that this repeatedly presupposed yet unnamed structure, namely quxiang bilei (image abstraction and analogical correlation) in classical Chinese philosophy, can be regarded as the meta-epistemological structure of cognitive activities. Its fourfold procedure—image abstraction, analogical correlation, verification, and feedback—constitutes a logically indispensable necessary condition for typical cognitive acts (this paper proves only its necessity, not sufficiency), offering a transcendental logical framework for understanding the possibility of higher-order cognition. The argument unfolds in six steps: distinguishing the empirical-temporal from the logical-transcendental dimensions of the inquiry into human origins; proving the logical necessity of the fourfold procedure through a transcendental reductio ad absurdum; taking the Zhou Yi (I Ching) as a paradigm of conscious formalization of this meta-cognitive structure; engaging in dialogue with Kant, Hume, and Heidegger; and finally clarifying the Dao as the logical remainder of image abstraction from a phenomenological perspective. This is the first in a series of research papers aimed at laying a logical foundation for meta-epistemology. By “universal necessity” this paper means the status of being a logical presupposition of cognitive activity, not a proof of sufficient conditions for cognition.

Philosophical anthropology has long defined the essence of human being through tool use, social cooperation, and linguistic symbols. However, these supposed defining traits either have embryonic counterparts in the animal kingdom or are derivative outcomes themselves, each presupposing a more primordial cognitive structure whose own conditions of possibility have seldom been examined. This paper proposes and argues that this repeatedly presupposed yet unnamed structure, namely quxiang bilei (image abstraction and analogical correlation) in classical Chinese philosophy, can be regarded as the meta-epistemological structure of cognitive activities. Its fourfold procedure—image abstraction, analogical correlation, verification, and feedback—constitutes a logically indispensable necessary condition for typical cognitive acts (this paper proves only its necessity, not sufficiency), offering a transcendental logical framework for understanding the possibility of higher-order cognition. The argument unfolds in six steps: distinguishing the empirical-temporal from the logical-transcendental dimensions of the inquiry into human origins; proving the logical necessity of the fourfold procedure through a transcendental reductio ad absurdum; taking the Zhou Yi (I Ching) as a paradigm of conscious formalization of this meta-cognitive structure; engaging in dialogue with Kant, Hume, and Heidegger; and finally clarifying the Dao as the logical remainder of image abstraction from a phenomenological perspective. This is the first in a series of research papers aimed at laying a logical foundation for meta-epistemology. By “universal necessity” this paper means the status of being a logical presupposition of cognitive activity, not a proof of sufficient conditions for cognition.

Why do distinct attributes bear unequal explanatory weights in causal explanation? Though both momentum and colour follow conserved‑quantity transmission in physical interactions, momentum is universally recognised as a core causal factor while colour is dismissed as a trivial epiphenomenon. This long‑standing puzzle, formalised as Salmon’s blue-chalk counterexample, has plagued the philosophy of science for nearly three decades. I argue that this persistent paradox stems not from defects in existing causal mechanism theories, but from a cross‑level cognitive misalignment. Treating human cognition as a resource‑bounded information compression process, I identify four naturally emergent discrete cognitive stable states: primordial xiang (L1), symbolised xiang (L2), formalised xiang (L3), and algorithmic xiang (L4). I demonstrate that Salmon attempted to resolve an ontogenetic puzzle rooted at the primordial xiang tier using formal and algorithmic tools that belong to the formalised–algorithmic xiang tiers. The primitive bias for explanatory relevance arises from evolution‑shaped embodied filtering—not from physical conservation laws or statistical correlation. I further formulate six fundamental relations between cognitive stable states: Compression (P1), Generation (P2), Realisation (P3), Dependence (P4), Emergence (P5), and Rollback (P6). Compression and rollback form the complementary dual wings of cognitive dynamics. As an intrinsic compensatory mechanism for the unavoidable information loss incurred by compression, cognitive rollback dismantles rigid stable configurations and restores cognitive freedom—rather than merely reversing compression. Together, the six propositions constitute a unified ontogenetic framework of cognition, which provides a foundational grounding for the theory of causal explanation. Moreover, this framework demarcates the structural boundaries and upper capacity limits of artificial causal reasoning in AI systems.

Why do different attributes carry unequal explanatory weights in causal explanation? Although both momentum and colour comply with conserved-quantity transmission in physical interactions, momentum is universally recognized as a core causal factor, whereas colour is dismissed as a trivial epiphenomenon. This long-standing puzzle, formalized as Salmon’s blue chalk counterexample, has perplexed the philosophy of science for nearly three decades. This paper argues that the persistent paradox arises not from inherent defects in existing causal mechanism theories, but from cross-level cognitive misalignment. Treating human cognition as a resource-bounded information compression process, we identify four naturally emergent discrete cognitive stable states: Primordial Percept (L1), Symbolic Percept (L2), Formalised Percept (L3), and Algorithmic Percept (L4). We demonstrate that Salmon attempted to resolve an L1-originated ontogenetic puzzle through L3–L4 formal and algorithmic tools. The primitive bias for explanatory relevance stems from evolutionary embodied filtering, rather than physical conservation rules or statistical correlation. We further formulate six fundamental relations between cognitive stable states: Compression (P1), Generation (P2), Realisation (P3), Dependence (P4), Emergence (P5), and Rollback (P6). Compression and rollback form the complementary dual wings of cognitive dynamics. As an intrinsic compensatory mechanism for unavoidable information loss in compression, cognitive rollback dismantles rigid stable configurations and restores cognitive freedom, rather than merely reversing compression. Together, the six propositions construct a unified ontogenetic framework of cognition, which fundamentally grounds the theory of causal explanation. Furthermore, this framework demarcates the structural boundaries and upper capacity limits of artificial causal reasoning in AI systems.

For four hundred years, Western philosophy has been confined within the subject–object dichotomy, persistently asking how the subject accesses the object yet rarely tracing the genesis of this division itself. This paper addresses that fundamental question by developing a generative account of human cognition. Its core claim is that cognition does not passively represent a pre-given world, but participates in the generation and stabilization of reality as it appears. First, it establishes Quxiang–Bilei (image extraction and analogical correlation) as the meta-operation of all cognition, structured as a closed loop: Quxiang (extracting stable structural differences) → Bilei (analogical correlation) → verification → feedback. Second, it shows that xiang (image) evolves through four stages—primordial, symbolised, formalised, and algorithmic—each sustained by the same Quxiang–Bilei logic. Third, it reconstructs the genesis of the subject–object dichotomy in four phases: primordial differentiation → symbol fixation → formation of the self-image → theoretical reification. Fourth, it reinterprets Descartes, Kant, and Hegel: Descartes’ cogito is a structural displacement of the lived body by a symbolically constituted self-image; Kant’s a priori categories are operational paradigms sedimented through long-term survival verification and limit convergence; Hegel’s absolute spirit is a totalising expansion of cognition that neglects the unimageable field. This paper provides a generative grounding for the subject–object dichotomy in Western epistemology, clarifies the limits of artificial intelligence, and shows that reality manifests itself as a stable generative structure through the Quxiang–Bilei loop. Cognition constructs xiang, not reality as such.

For four hundred years, Western philosophy has been confined within the subject-object dichotomy, persistently asking how the subject accesses the object, yet rarely tracing the genesis of this very division. This paper addresses that fundamental question from a genetic perspective, constructing a unified theory of human cognition. Its core stance is that cognition does not passively represent a pre-given world, but participates in the generation and stabilization of the world. First, it establishes Quxiang Bilei as the meta-operation of human cognition, constituting a closed loop of “Quxiang (extracting stable structural differences) → Bilei (analogical correlation) → verification → feedback”. Second, it reveals that the evolution of the “image” (xiang) entails both continuity and rupture, progressing through four stages—primordial image, symbolised image, formalised image, and algorithmic image—all unified by the same underlying logic of the Quxiang Bilei loop. Third, it clarifies the genetic path of the subject-object dichotomy: primordial differentiation operation → symbol fixation → generation of the self-image → theoretical misplacement. Finally, it offers a dialogical reinterpretation of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel: Descartes’ cogito is a structural displacement of the lived body by the symbolically derived self-image; Kant’s a priori categories are converged operational paradigms solidified through long-term survival verification within the cognitive loop; and Hegel’s absolute spirit is a totalising expansion of cognition that forgets the unimageable field. This paper provides a genetic grounding for the presupposition of the subject-object dichotomy in Western epistemology, delimits the essential boundary of artificial intelligence cognition, and reveals that reality is a generative structure continuously stabilized through the Quxiang Bilei loop, ultimately unified under this meta-epistemological structure. What is constructed is the image (xiang), not reality itself.

Hume’s problem of causality contains two nested core dilemmas: the legitimacy dilemma of inductive logic, and the existential dilemma of causal validity. For two hundred years, mainstream solutions have failed to respond to both dilemmas simultaneously. This paper abandons the metaphysical presupposition that causality must possess inherent ontological necessity, and constructs an alternative cognitive‑genetic framework based on the structural isomorphism between the classical Chinese meta‑cognitive structure of “image abstraction and analogical categorization” (quxiang bilei) and modern Bayesian inference. It is demonstrated that Bayes’ theorem is the mathematical formalization of the cognitive loop of “image abstraction → analogical categorization → verification → feedback”. Causality is redefined as the limit cognitive state in which, after massive collective Bayesian updating over hundreds of millions of years of embodied survival practice, the posterior probability converges infinitely to 1. Hume’s double dilemma is thereby resolved: the logical gap of induction is dissolved, and the source of causal validity is explained by natural selection driven by survival costs. The paper further provides an epistemological foundation for Pearl’s ladder of causation, interprets scientific revolutions as paradigm shifts from low‑dimensional to high‑dimensional cognitive convergence, diagnoses the lack of an embodied verification loop as the fundamental bottleneck of AI causal reasoning, and establishes the stance of cognitive humility: all causal judgments are tentative optimal estimates under the current evidence set, always open to new evidence, rejecting both metaphysical dogmatism and relativistic nihilism.

Hume’s problem of causality contains two nested core dilemmas: the legitimacy dilemma of inductive logic, and the existential dilemma of causal validity. For two hundred years, mainstream solutions have failed to respond to both dilemmas simultaneously. This paper abandons the metaphysical presupposition that causality must possess inherent ontological necessity, and constructs an alternative cognitive‑genetic framework based on the structural isomorphism between the classical Chinese meta‑cognitive structure of “image abstraction and analogical categorization” (quxiang bilei) and modern Bayesian inference. It is demonstrated that Bayes’ theorem is the mathematical formalization of the cognitive loop of “image abstraction → analogical categorization → verification → feedback”. Causality is redefined as the limit cognitive state in which, after massive collective Bayesian updating over hundreds of millions of years of embodied survival practice, the posterior probability converges infinitely to 1. Hume’s double dilemma is thereby resolved: the logical gap of induction is dissolved, and the source of causal validity is explained by natural selection driven by survival costs. The paper further provides an epistemological foundation for Pearl’s ladder of causation, interprets scientific revolutions as paradigm shifts from low‑dimensional to high‑dimensional cognitive convergence, diagnoses the lack of an embodied verification loop as the fundamental bottleneck of AI causal reasoning, and establishes the stance of cognitive humility: all causal judgments are tentative optimal estimates under the current evidence set, always open to new evidence, rejecting both metaphysical dogmatism and relativistic nihilism.

This paper demonstrates, from an epistemological standpoint, the structural isomorphism between Quxiang Bilei—the classical Chinese cognitive method of image abstraction and analogical reasoning, literally "taking phenomena to form analogies and categorical associations"—and Bayesian inference. By systematically mapping the three components of Bayes's theorem—prior probability, likelihood function, and posterior probability—onto the three constitutive stages of Quxiang Bilei: image-taking, analogy-making, and verification, this paper reveals that Bayesian inference is not merely a specialized technical toolset, but rather the mathematical formalization of the metacognitive structure inherent in Quxiang Bilei. Building upon this isomorphic framework, the paper advances five core philosophical propositions: (1) objectivity is the statistical convergence outcome of collective Bayesian updating across epistemic communities; (2) causal laws represent the limiting case in which posterior probability infinitely approaches unity; (3) the interpretability of probabilistic calculations resides not within mathematics itself, but in its correspondence with underlying metacognitive structures; (4) the absolute boundary of artificial intelligence lies not in insufficient computational power, but in its lack of embodied physical anchoring and authentic survival feedback; and (5) there exists a fundamental, non-accidental isomorphism between Quxiang Bilei and Bayesian inference. These five propositions are not mere mutual projections between two disparate conceptual frameworks, but genuinely novel insights emerging from their productive dialogue and critical engagement. This work provides a robust epistemological foundation for Bayesianism, offers rigorous mathematical support for the modern transformation of classical Chinese epistemology, and establishes a unified analytical framework for understanding the cognitive essence and fundamental limitations of artificial intelligence.

Philosophical anthropology has long defined the essence of human being through tool use, social cooperation, and linguistic symbols. However, these supposed defining traits either have embryonic counterparts in the animal kingdom or are derivative outcomes themselves, each presupposing a more primordial cognitive structure whose own conditions of possibility have seldom been examined. This paper attempts to demonstrate that this repeatedly presupposed yet unnamed primordial structure is precisely what classical Chinese philosophy calls quxiang bilei (image abstraction and analogical correlation). It is not merely one mode of cognition among others, but the meta-epistemological structure that renders all cognition possible. Its fourfold procedure—image abstraction, analogical correlation, verification, and feedback—constitutes the logically indispensable condition for any cognitive act whatsoever. The argument unfolds in six steps. First, it distinguishes two levels of inquiry into human origins: the empirical-temporal and the logical-transcendental, clarifying both the theoretical contribution and the implicit presuppositions of Engels’s proposition that “labor created man itself.” Second, employing a strict transcendental reductio ad absurdum without recourse to empirical examples, it demonstrates the universal necessity of the fourfold procedure. Third, taking the Zhou Yi (I Ching) as a paradigm, it shows that classical Chinese thought represents the earliest and most exemplary conscious formalization of this meta-cognitive structure, and sketches its evolutionary progression from lower to higher cognitive levels against the evidence of Paleolithic archaeological relics. Fourth, it engages in an in-depth dialogue with Kant, Hume, and Heidegger, attempting to address several long-debated core problems in Western epistemology. Finally, it phenomenologically clarifies the Dao as the logical remainder of image abstraction, and strictly distinguishes between the operational dimension and the existential dimension of quxiang bilei. This article is the first in a series of research projects aimed at laying a solid logical foundation for the whole theoretical system. Subsequent papers will launch a systematic dialogue between Chinese and Western epistemological traditions and explore the theoretical implications of this model in the philosophy of artificial intelligence.

Philosophical anthropology has long defined the essence of human being through tool use, social cooperation, and linguistic symbols. However, these supposed defining traits either have embryonic counterparts in the animal kingdom or are derivative outcomes themselves, each presupposing a more primordial cognitive structure whose own conditions of possibility have seldom been examined. This paper attempts to demonstrate that this repeatedly presupposed yet unnamed primordial structure is precisely what classical Chinese philosophy calls quxiang bilei (image abstraction and analogical correlation). It is not merely one mode of cognition among others, but the meta-epistemological structure that renders all cognition possible. Its fourfold procedure—image abstraction, analogical correlation, verification, and feedback—constitutes the logically indispensable condition for any cognitive act whatsoever. The argument unfolds in six steps. First, it distinguishes two levels of inquiry into human origins: the empirical-temporal and the logical-transcendental, clarifying both the theoretical contribution and the implicit presuppositions of Engels’s proposition that “labor created man itself.” Second, employing a strict transcendental reductio ad absurdum without recourse to empirical examples, it demonstrates the universal necessity of the fourfold procedure. Third, taking the Zhou Yi (I Ching) as a paradigm, it shows that classical Chinese thought represents the earliest and most exemplary conscious formalization of this meta-cognitive structure, and sketches its evolutionary progression from lower to higher cognitive levels against the evidence of Paleolithic archaeological relics. Fourth, it engages in an in-depth dialogue with Kant, Hume, and Heidegger, attempting to address several long-debated core problems in Western epistemology. Finally, it phenomenologically clarifies the Dao as the logical remainder of image abstraction, and strictly distinguishes between the operational dimension and the existential dimension of quxiang bilei. This article is the first in a series of research projects aimed at laying a solid logical foundation for the whole theoretical system. Subsequent papers will launch a systematic dialogue between Chinese and Western epistemological traditions and explore the theoretical implications of this model in the philosophy of artificial intelligence.

Philosophy is said to be "the love of wisdom," yet throughout the long tradition of Western philosophy, "wisdom" has lacked a rigorous, non-circular definition. This paper argues that the history of Western philosophy's definitions of wisdom follows a discernible recursive trajectory---from classical ontology through modern epistemology to contemporary linguistic analysis---where each attempt at definition fails to escape circularity but thereby reveals the structure of that circularity more clearly. This is not due to any lack of effort on the part of philosophers, but to the inherent structural limitation of the grammar of the "What is..." question itself. Drawing on Wittgenstein's philosophical turn, this paper introduces the framework of quxiang bilei (image abstraction and analogical correlation) from classical Chinese philosophy, reconstructing it as a meta-cognitive loop of image abstraction, analogical correlation, and verification, and provides a genetic grounding that demonstrates its logical priority over all symbolic systems. On this basis, the paper proposes that wisdom is not an object awaiting conceptual definition, but the sum total of effective "images" sedimented through the quxiang bilei loop across the historical process of human existence; philosophy is the reflection on the modes of image abstraction and the reverence for the "unimageable field." This genetic description brings an end to circular definition and realizes a grammatical shift from the inquiry of "What is..." to the exploration of "How does it come to be?" In the age of artificial intelligence, this framework helps delineate the ontological boundary of current weak AI (narrow AI) characterized by "knowledge without wisdom," and reveals the methodological potential of Chinese philosophy as a meta-analytical tool. At a deeper level, quxiang bilei inherently embodies epistemic awakening (the self-awareness of the limits of one's own cognitive operations), self-awareness of the limits of reason, and ultimate reverence for ignorance and the background of existence. It confronts deep-seated problematic tendencies of modern civilization such as rational inflation and the uprootedness of knowledge, while emphasizing cognitive humility and the maintenance of ontological boundaries.

This paper demonstrates, from an epistemological standpoint, the structural isomorphism between Quxiang Bilei—the classical Chinese cognitive method of image abstraction and analogical reasoning, literally "taking phenomena to form analogies and categorical associations"—and Bayesian inference. By systematically mapping the three components of Bayes's theorem—prior probability, likelihood function, and posterior probability—onto the three constitutive stages of Quxiang Bilei: image-taking, analogy-making, and verification, this paper reveals that Bayesian inference is not merely a specialized technical toolset, but rather the mathematical formalization of the metacognitive structure inherent in Quxiang Bilei. Building upon this isomorphic framework, the paper advances five core philosophical propositions: (1) objectivity is the statistical convergence outcome of collective Bayesian updating across epistemic communities; (2) causal laws represent the limiting case in which posterior probability infinitely approaches unity; (3) the interpretability of probabilistic calculations resides not within mathematics itself, but in its correspondence with underlying metacognitive structures; (4) the absolute boundary of artificial intelligence lies not in insufficient computational power, but in its lack of embodied physical anchoring and authentic survival feedback; and (5) there exists a fundamental, non-accidental isomorphism between Quxiang Bilei and Bayesian inference. These five propositions are not mere mutual projections between two disparate conceptual frameworks, but genuinely novel insights emerging from their productive dialogue and critical engagement. This work provides a robust epistemological foundation for Bayesianism, offers rigorous mathematical support for the modern transformation of classical Chinese epistemology, and establishes a unified analytical framework for understanding the cognitive essence and fundamental limitations of artificial intelligence.

Philosophy is said to be "the love of wisdom," yet throughout the long tradition of Western philosophy, "wisdom" has lacked a rigorous, non-circular definition. This paper argues that the history of Western philosophy's definitions of wisdom follows a discernible recursive trajectory—from classical ontology through modern epistemology to contemporary linguistic analysis—where each attempt at definition fails to escape circularity but thereby reveals the structure of that circularity more clearly. This is not due to any lack of effort on the part of philosophers, but to the inherent structural limitation of the grammar of the "What is…" question itself. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s philosophical turn, this paper introduces the framework of quxiang bilei (image-taking and analogical matching) from classical Chinese philosophy, reconstructing it as a meta-cognitive loop of image-taking, analogy and verification, and provides a genetic grounding that demonstrates its logical priority over all symbolic systems. On this basis, the paper proposes that wisdom is not an object awaiting conceptual definition, but the sum total of effective "images" sedimented through the quxiang bilei loop across the historical process of human existence; philosophy is the reflection on the modes of image-taking and the reverence for the "unimageable field." This genetic description brings an end to circular definition and realizes a grammatical shift from the inquiry of "What is…" to the exploration of "How does it come to be?" In the age of artificial intelligence, this framework helps delineate the ontological boundary of current weak AI characterized by "knowledge without wisdom," and reveals the methodological potential of Chinese philosophy as a meta-analytical tool. At a deeper level, quxiang bilei inherently embodies epistemic awakening, self-awareness of the limits of reason, and ultimate reverence for ignorance and the background of existence. It confronts deep-seated pathologies of modern civilization such as rational inflation and the uprootedness of knowledge, while emphasizing cognitive humility and the maintenance of ontological boundaries.