Lillian Wilde

Traumatic experiences do not merely impact on the individual’s body and psyche, they alter the way we experience others, our interpersonal relationships, and how we make sense of the world. In my dissertation, I integrate work in phenomenology, psychopathology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychiatry, and trauma studies, and draw on trauma testimonies ob- tained in an online questionnaire. I engage analytically with the question of what constitutes a trauma, whether psychological trauma is necessarily pathological, and what the causal and im- plicatory relations between traumatising and post-traumatic experiences are. Informed by these preliminary elaborations, I focus on the intersubjective dimension of trauma, drawing on a qualitative study I conducted in 2020. I show that empathic abilities may be altered but are not necessarily diminished through traumatising experiences; I suggest a framework for under- standing feelings of alienation in the aftermath of trauma; and I demonstrate how feelings of belonging may be re-established. My dissertation is exemplary of how phenomenological frameworks can contribute to a better understanding of psychological trauma and that engaging with trauma can, in turn, inform and enrich philosophical thinking.

This is a commentary on the article “The Empathic Migrant” (Aragona et al., 2020), in which the authors explore the experience of empathy in male African refugees and asylum seekers in Italy with a diagnosis of PTSD (N=20). In the publication cited by the authors, I theorise that empathy may be impacted in individuals diagnosed with PTSD. I am drawing on a thin, phenomenological notion of empathy as a pre-reflective mode of perception and argue that in some situations, traumatised individuals may cease to experience the other as another subject that offers possibilities for interaction (Wilde, 2019; cf. Stein, 1917, p. 53). The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) administered by the authors suggests a different understanding of empathy.

Reports of not feeling understood are frequent in testimonies of psychological trauma. I argue that these feelings are not a matter of a cognitive failure but rather an expression of the absence of a more pervasive background feeling of belonging. Contemporary accounts of we-intentionality promise but ultimately fall short in explaining this sense of belonging. Gerda Walther offers an alternative account of communal experiences. Her notion of “habitual unification” can explain the background feelings of belonging that are woven through the individual’s everyday experience of being in a shared world. Having unified with another person, the world feels different. It is now experienced in light of a “we.” This is not only the case in actual, singular person-to-person encounters. Unification with others becomes habitual: it retreats into the background of the individual’s awareness, colouring their experience of the world. Thus sedimented, it forms a background sense of belonging to a shared world. Unification is enabled by experiencing others as being similar in a significant way, such as having the same experiences, values, or basic attitude: in Walther’s words, as being a “human, who also....” This, I shall argue, is impacted through traumatizing experiences. Trauma survivors struggle to experience others as “humans, who also...,” resulting in a failure of unification and thus impeding feelings of belonging. Trauma testimonies also suggest that actively seeking out recognition of similarities and shared aspects of experience may once again enable experiencing others as “humans, who also...,” thus enabling unification and re-establishing a sense of belonging.

The relationship between traumatic experiences and subsequent distress is not well understood, and little research focuses on the lived experience of psychological trauma. I draw on Louis Sass’s phenomenological taxonomy to address this lacuna. I present his differentiation between relations of phenomenological causality and implication and demonstrate that his taxonomy can be applied to experiences of trauma. Relations of phenomenological causality and implication can be identified in the genesis and constitution of post-traumatic distress. My adaptation of Sass’s taxonomy will furthermore offer an extension and development of his account, applying it to the study of post-traumatic experiences and elaborating it in the process. I shall demonstrate that whether experiences occur synchronically or diachronically is not essential to their categorization in terms of phenomenological implication and causality, respectively. I will show that an alteration in perception or behavior post trauma might temporally succeed the traumatizing event while, at the same time, being implied in the experience of the event. Thereby, I demonstrate how phenomenology may contribute to a detailed understanding of experiences of trauma. Scrutiny of traumatic experiences furthermore promises to contribute to the philosophical discourse on causality, implication, and temporal experience.

In this paper, I enquire into the nature of the influence culture has on the experience of trauma. I begin with a brief elaboration of the dominant conceptualisation of post-traumatic experiences: the diagnostic category of PTSD as it can be found in the DSM. Then, I scrutinise the nature and extent to which cultural factors may influence the phenomenology of the experience of certain events as traumatic and subsequent symptoms of post-traumatic stress. It seems that cultural circumstances alter the way in which trauma is experienced; it is not clear whether there is in fact a core pathology of PTSD, as the DSM assumes, or whether the structure of the experience of trauma is too multifaceted to be summarised in one diagnostic category. Finally, I show that phenomenological enquiry promises to identify the structural similarities that would justify the delineation of a distinct diagnostic category.

With my research, I wish to contribute to the discussion of post-traumatic psychopathologies from a phenomenological perspective. The main question I pursue is to what extent PTSD can be understood as an intersubjective psychopathology and which implications this view might have. In this paper, I argue that the mode of perception allowing for intersubjective experience is vulnerable to disruptions through traumatic events. I begin with a short elaboration on what intersubjectivity entails before proceeding to illustrate how it can be impaired. Then, I focus on the concept of empathy as a mode of perception: I propose that due to a disruption of the ability to empathize an individual suffering from PTSD may cease to experience the other as another subject that offers possibilities for interaction. The traumatized individual is thus unable to establish meaningful connections with others. I offer some implications this view might entail for thinking about trauma treatment.

Plato’s dialogues, most notably the Phaedrus and the Symposium, mark the beginning of 2,400 years of written philosophical contemplations on love. Many lovers have loved since, and many thinkers have thought and struggled to understand. Who has never asked themselves the question: What is love? The various discussions since range from Aristotle to an abundance of contemporary philosophy and fiction on the topic. Alain Badiou’s In Praise of Love, Alain de Botton’s Essays in Love, and Byung Chul Han’s Die Agonie des Eros, all published in the past ten years, refer to Plato’s account, so it is clear that Plato’s treatment of love remains relevant. Naturally, the conception has also dramatically changed over this long period of time. The non-sexual, purely intellectual relationship that the modern English speaker understands as ‘Platonic love’ is rather distinct from the account we get in Plato’s own works, which are predominantly focused on a striving for perfection through beauty. Modern everyday understandings of personal love, ranging from motherly to romantic love, are something else altogether.