•  2
    How do we punish others socially, and should we do so? In her 2018 Descartes Lectures for Tilburg University, Linda Radzik explores the informal methods ordinary people use to enforce moral norms, such as telling people off, boycotting businesses, and publicly shaming wrongdoers on social media. Over three lectures, Radzik develops an account of what social punishment is, why it is sometimes permissible, and when it must be withheld. She argues that the proper aim of social punishment is to put …Read more
  •  183
    Collective responsibility and duties to respond
    Social Theory and Practice 27 (3): 455-471. 2001.
    This paper defends the claim that collective responsibility can be based on group membership. It argues that collective responsibility is best understood in terms of duties to respond to the victims of collective crimes. Reasonable fear on the part of the victimized groups creates duties to respond for members of the perpetrating group. This account does a better job of capturing our intuitions about actual cases and the phenomenology of collective responsibility than other accounts currently on…Read more
  •  22
    Jus Post Bellum and Political Reconciliation
    In Larry May & Elizabeth Edenberg (eds.), Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice, Cambridge University Press. 2013.
    The category of jus post bellum is a welcome addition to discussions of the justice of war. But, despite its handy Latin label, we will argue that it cannot be properly understood merely as a set of corollaries from jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Instead, an acceptable theory of justice in the postwar period will have to draw on a broader set of normative ideas than those that have been the focus of the just war tradition. In this paper, we will argue that norms of political reconciliation prov…Read more
  •  53
    Boycotts and the social enforcement of justice
    Social Philosophy and Policy 34 (1): 102-122. 2017.
    This essay examines the ethics of boycotting as a social response to injustice or wrongdoing. The boycotts in question are collective actions in which private citizens withdraw from or avoid consumer or cultural interaction with parties perceived to be responsible for some transgression. Whether a particular boycott is justified depends, not only on the reasonableness of the underlying moral critique, but also on what the boycotters are doing in boycotting. The essay considers four possible inte…Read more
  •  16
    The Ethics of Forgiveness, ed. Christel Fricke (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011. 2011.
  •  25
    Forgiveness and Retribution, by Margaret R. Holmgren (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2012. 2012.
  •  75
    Stephen L. Pepper argues that lawyers and clients often act together in ways that their moral convictions would prevent them from acting individually. In an attempt to address this problem, I explore the nature of the attorney's responsibility to help her client reach autonomous decisions. To do this, I review the work of some prominent medical ethicists on a parallel to Pepper's problem in doctor-patient relationships.
  •  107
    Moral Repair and the Moral Saints Problem
    Religious Inquiries 2 (4): 5-19. 2012.
    This article explores the forms of moral repair that the wrongdoer has to perform in an attempt to make amends for her past wrongdoing, with a focus on the issues of interpersonal moral repair; that is, what a wrongdoer can do to merit her victim‘s forgiveness and achieve reconciliation with her community. The article argues against the very general demands of atonement that amount to an obligation to stop being someone who commits wrongs—to become a moral saint—and suggests a new form of atonem…Read more
  •  1
    Tort Processes and Relational Repair
    In John Oberdiek (ed.), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Torts, Oxford University Press. pp. 231-49. 2014.
    The last twenty-five years or so of thought about tort law have been remarkably productive and dynamic, as the dominance of the law and economics model has been challenged by theories that reintroduce the language of corrective justice. Over this same time period, theorizing about corrective justice has sprung up in response to a wide range of social, political and moral issues. I have in mind work on restorative theories in criminal justice; on postwar justice; on truth commissions, political r…Read more
  •  1
    Joseph Butler on Forgiveness
    In Johannes Brachtendorf & Stephan Herzberg (eds.), Vergebung: Philosophische Perspektiven auf ein Problemfeld der Ethik, Mentis. pp. 139-47. 2014.
    While Charles Griswold's interpretation of Bishop Butler's theory of forgiveness is an improvement over the standard reading, it leaves Butler unable to distinguish between forgiveness and justice. The emotions and actions that are offered as definitive of forgiveness instead merely show that the agent is not unjust. However, if we refocus our interpretation of Butler, we can see how he might disentangle forgiveness and justice.
  •  174
    Relationships and Respect for Persons
    Windsor Studies in Argumentation, Vol. 4
    Many theorists writing on the aftermath of wrongdoing have been influenced by Trudy Govier’s emphasis on interpersonal relationships. But George Sher has recently challenged this talk of relationships. Read descriptively, he argues, claims about the interpersonal effects of wrongdoing are either exaggerated or false. Read normatively, relationships add nothing to more traditional moral theory. In this essay, I argue that Govier’s relational framework both avoids Sher’s dilemma and enables her to…Read more
  •  43
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2015.
    Particular conceptions of reconciliation vary across a number of dimensions. As section 1 explains, the kind of relationship at issue in a specific context affects the type of improvement in relations that might be necessary in order to qualify as reconciliation. Reconciliation is widely taken to be a scalar concept. Section 2 discusses the spectrum of intensity along which kinds of improvement in relationships fall, and indicates why, in particular contexts, theorists often disagree about the p…Read more
  •  75
    Hampton on the expressive power of punishment
    with Heather J. Gert and and Michael Hand
    Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (1). 2004.
    In her later writings Jean Hampton develops an expressive theory of punishment she takes to be retributivist. Unlike Feinberg, Hampton claims wrongdoings as well as punishments are expressive. Wrongdoings assert that the victim is less valuable than victimizer. On her view we are obligated to punish because we are obligated to respond to this false assertion. Punishment expresses the moral truth that victim and wrongdoer are equally valuable. We argue that Hampton's argument would work only if s…Read more
  •  139
    When is one person entitled to sanction another for moral wrongdoing? When, instead, must one mind one’s own business? Stephen Darwall argues that the legitimacy of social sanctioning is essential to the very concept of moral obligation. But, I will argue, Darwall’s “second person” theory of accountability unfortunately implies that every person is entitled to sanction every wrongdoer for every misdeed. In this essay, I defend a set of principles for differentiating those who have the standing t…Read more
  •  63
    Justification and the authority of norms
    Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4): 451-461. 2000.
    What features does a norm have to have such that we really ought to follow it? This paper argues that norms are authoritative when they are justified in a particular sense. However, this brand of justification is not any of those with which we are currently familiar. The authority of norms is not a matter of moral, epistemic or prudential justification. It depends instead on what I call "justification simpliciter." The concept of justification simpliciter is defined and defended in this paper.
  •  10
    Do Wrongdoers Have a Right to Make Amends?
    Social Theory and Practice 29 (2): 325-341. 2003.
    The recent literature on criminal justice has yielded an intriguing suggestion: that someone who does wrong has a right to make amends. In this essay, I evaluate arguments for and against this claim with regard to cases of both criminal wrongdoing and private wrongs. I conclude that the balance of arguments speaks in favor of a right to make amends. This conclusion has ramifications for the just design of criminal sanctions, and these will also be addressed here.
  •  27
    Contested commodities
    Law and Philosophy 16 (6): 603-616. 1997.
    No Abstract
  •  15
    Uncertainty in everyday life
    The Philosophers' Magazine 66 77-83. 2014.
    We sometimes witness events that might be dangerous (e.g. that might end in someone being abused) but that might not be. These cases involve various kinds of uncertainty. How does a morally responsible bystander respond? This essay describes and evaluates Active Bystander training programs.
  •  69
    An ethic for wrongdoers -- Repaying moral debts : self-punishment and restitution -- Changing one's heart, changing the past : repentance and moral transformation -- Reforming relationships : the reconciliation theory of atonement -- Forgiveness, self-forgiveness, and redemption -- Making amends for crime : an evaluation of restorative justice -- Collective atonement : making amends to the Magdalen penitents.
  •  67
    Hampton on Forgiveness
    APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Law 10 (2): 1-6. 2011.
    This essay argues that the theory of forgiveness that Jean Hampton presents in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY has been misunderstood and undervalued. By placing the impersonal reactive attitudes at the center of her account of forgiveness, Hampton offers a valuable alternative to the standard view.
  •  13
    Collective Responsibility and Duties to Respond
    Social Theory and Practice 27 (3): 455-471. 2001.
  •  14
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.
  •  10
    Offenders, the Making of Amends and the State
    In Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. van Ness (eds.), Handbook of Restorative Justice, . pp. 192--207. 2007.
    This essay asks whether restorative justice practices in criminal legal systems are consistent with the aims of a liberal state.
  •  125
    Justice in the family: A defence of feminist contractarianism
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1). 2005.
    Jean Hampton argues that we can detect exploitation in personal relationships by thinking about what we would agree to were we to set aside the emotional benefits we receive from those relationships. Hampton calls her account "feminist contractarianism," but it has recently been critiqued as decidedly unfeminist, on the grounds that it is hostile to women's interests and women's values. Furthermore, Hampton's requirement that we imaginatively distance ourselves from our emotional connections to …Read more
  •  30
    Forgiveness and Love, by Glen Pettigrove
    Mind 122 (488): 1164-1167. 2013.
  •  5
    Contested Commodities
    Law and Philosophy 16 (6): 603-616. 1997.
  •  62
    Moral Bystanders and the Virtue of Forgiveness
    In Christopher R. Allers & Marieke Smit (eds.), Forgiveness in Perspective, Rodopi. pp. 66--69. 2010.
    According to standard philosophical analyses, only victims can forgive. There are good reasons to reject this view. After all, people who are neither direct nor indirect victims of a wrong frequently feel moral anger over injustice. The choice to foreswear or overcome such moral anger is subject to most of the same sorts of considerations as victims’ choices to forgive. Furthermore, bystanders’ reactions to their experiences of moral anger often reflect either virtues or vices that are of a piec…Read more
  •  8
  •  50
    Desert of What? On Murphy’s Reluctant Retributivism
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1): 161-173. 2017.
    In Punishment and the Moral Emotions, Jeffrie Murphy rejects his earlier, strong endorsements of retributivism. Questioning both our motivations for embracing retributivism and our views about the basis of desert, he now describes himself as a “reluctant retributivist.” In this essay, I argue that Murphy should reject retributivism altogether. Even if we grant that criminals have negative desert, why should we suppose that it is desert of suffering? I argue that it is possible to defend desert-b…Read more