Linh Mac

The controversy over the slogan #BelieveWomen, which challenges the widespread skepticism directed towards women’s sexual assault testimony, raises the even more fundamental issue of belief in this context. I argue that the belief norms prescribed for testimony by the prevailing epistemological frameworks of non-reductionism, reductionism, and dualism are problematic when applied to sexual assault accusations. Because we have good reasons to think most sexual assault claims are true, we should expect theories of testimony to prescribe belief in most testimony about sexual violence. These frameworks, however, are consistent with setting a high bar for belief. Thus, they legitimize the non-monolithic culture of doubt around sexual assault accusations. This culture of doubt is manifested in courtrooms in the inconsistent application of legal rules in adjudicating sexual assault cases. When judges subject sexual assault claims to stringent interpretations of relevant legal rules, they accordingly raise the bar for belief in the claims in question. Certainly, when assessing the credibility of both the accuser and the accused, we should bear in mind the complex nature of credibility assignments, as well as the various ways that rape myths negatively shape credibility assessments. I posit that in cases of accusations met with denials without additional compelling evidence, we should lend default credibility to the party with less social power.

This paper articulates a kind of epistemic injustice in respect of judgement. I dub it ‘krinostic injustice’ (in Ancient Greek, the verb ϰϱίνω means ‘to decide’). It illuminates a phenomenon in which a hearer believes a speaker’s testimonies insofar as they constitute what I call ‘basic’ reports, such as recollections of a series of events, but disbelieves the speaker’s testimony concerning the characterisation of their experience. To motivate the distinction between basic reports and characterisations, I examine a lawyer’s cross-examination of a complainant in a sexual assault case. I then explain when a hearer’s disbelief of a speaker’s interpretative report can constitute krinostic injustice. Finally, I consider objections to my view.