Lisa Bortolotti

Dans cet article, nous soutenons que la pratique de la philosophie est bénéfique au public. En engageant leurs connaissances et leurs méthodes philosophiques, les agents épistémiques développent leur capacité à acquérir, produire, partager et utiliser des connaissances à la poursuite de leurs fins. Pour préciser ce que peut impliquer « faire de la philosophie », nous nous appuyons sur la littérature pédagogique et philosophique récente et présentons deux exemples illustrant la manière dont des ressources et des activités peuvent être élaborées et mises en place afin de favoriser l’implication du public envers la philosophie. Dans les études de cas présentées, un cadre stimulant et inclusif est instauré, permettant à toutes et à tous de pratiquer des tâches philosophiques, individuellement et en groupe. Les participant·e·s sont encouragé·e·s à réfléchir à une question en lien avec leur vie, à identifier les limites et les biais de leur propre raisonnement ou de leur perspective, et à explorer divers points de vue sur cette question avec curiosité.

Optimistically biased beliefs are beliefs about oneself that are more positive than is warranted by the evidence. Optimistically biased beliefs are the result of the influence of cognitive and motivational factors on people’s capacity to acquire, retrieve, and use information about themselves, and they resist counterevidence due to biases in belief updating. From a psychological point of view, optimistically biased beliefs contribute positively to subjective wellbeing, mental health, resilience, motivation, caring behaviour, and productivity. This chapter argues that optimistically biased beliefs also have significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. In particular, they enhance socialization, leading to both exchanging information with one’s peers and receiving feedback from them, and they support one’s sense of self as that of a competent, largely coherent, and effective agent, helping sustain one’s motivation in the pursuit of one’s goals.

Aesop-style fables are narratives that serve as arguments from analogy. Because they are short and structurally simple, have no substantial plot development, and feature interactions between animal characters, fables are easy to read, listen to, and remember. Due to their having an explicitly stated message in the end and often offering practical advice, they are exactly the type of story that can promote personal reflection and can be used to introduce a philosophical concept or kickstart a philosophical discussion in a classroom with children and young people. In this paper, I suggest that in our digital age explainer videos are an effective and versatile means to share fables in the context of primary and secondary education. Content that is communicated visually is accessible and engaging for young people with varying reading abilities and can be easily consumed and shared online. I suggest that explainer videos can be used to do philosophy with children and young people by introducing philosophical issues of practical importance and illustrating different perspectives on such issues.

Dans cet article, nous soutenons que la pratique de la philosophie est bénéfique au public. En engageant leurs connaissances et leurs méthodes philosophiques, les agents épistémiques développent leur capacité à acquérir, produire, partager et utiliser des connaissances à la poursuite de leurs fins. Pour préciser ce que peut impliquer « faire de la philosophie », nous nous appuyons sur la littérature pédagogique et philosophique récente et présentons deux exemples illustrant la manière dont des ressources et des activités peuvent être élaborées et mises en place afin de favoriser l’implication du public envers la philosophie. Dans les études de cas présentées, un cadre stimulant et inclusif est instauré, permettant à toutes et à tous de pratiquer des tâches philosophiques, individuellement et en groupe. Les participant·e·s sont encouragé·e·s à réfléchir à une question en lien avec leur vie, à identifier les limites et les biais de leur propre raisonnement ou de leur perspective, et à explorer divers points de vue sur cette question avec curiosité.

Recent work on clinical communication has highlighted the possibility that vulnerable young people may experience epistemic injustice and have their sense of agency undermined in encounters with mental healthcare providers. In particular, five dimensions of agency have been studied: validation of the person’s perspective; legitimisation of the person’s concerns; acknowledgement that the person may have complex interests and needs; affirmation of the person’s capacity to contribute to change; and inclusion of the person in shared decision-making processes. Building on previous work in this area, and utilising the illustrative power of Aesop-style fables, we identify three potential areas where empirical investigation could help advance the study of epistemic injustice in interactions involving young people who hear voices.

Across many domains, it is important for us to feel that we are understood by others. This is crucial when we are disclosing a vulnerability or seeking help for a problem. When these disclosures or help-seeking requests relate to mental health difficulties, our interactions with others can carry many threats, including stigmatisation; inappropriate moral or character judgements; overly stringent threshold evaluations; and assumptions about our personal circumstances and social resources. In this chapter, we summarise some of the core findings from empirical and qualitative studies which examine what happens when young people meet with health professionals to disclose or to seek help for their experiences with poor mental health. We then draw out some key implications for improving relational and communicative practices amongst mental health professionals. We focus on those implications which are highlighted by those members of our team who are young adults with experiences of accessing mental health services and reflect on these implications in the light of insights from the literature on epistemic injustice.

This open access book explores epistemic justice in mental healthcare, bringing together perspectives from psychologists, psychiatrists, philosophers, activists, and lived experience researchers. Through eight chapters, authors identify threats to the agency of people who hear voices, experience depression, have psychotic symptoms, live with dementia, are diagnosed with personality disorders, and face serious mental health issues while receiving palliative care. Considering the power asymmetries in clinical interactions, where patients are vulnerable and healthcare professionals are uniquely placed to offer support, this book reaffirms the importance of recognizing patients as agents and collaborators. Topics covered include trust in the therapeutic relationship, dignity at the end of life, the social dimension of health, stigma in an acute ward, the harm caused by biases and stereotypes, the role of clinical communication, and the promise of digital health. Students, academic researchers, practitioners, as well as mental health charities will benefit from this timely collection.

When people share a nonmainstream explanation of a significant event and the explanation involves a plot, that explanation is often called a conspiracy theory. As Karen Douglas and her collaborators have persuasively argued, conspiracy theories respond to people’s need for a causal explanation of the significant event, and also address their needs for closure, control, and uniqueness. Conspiracy theories do not always lead to social exclusion and stigmatisation, because they are often shared in well-defined social groups, and are not typically responsible for disrupting people’s lives. However, beliefs in conspiracy theories are considered as implausible and unshakeable by those who endorse the mainstream explanation of the significant event. So, conspiracy theories attract epistemic disapproval. In this paper I ask whether beliefs in conspiracy theories potentially meet the conditions for epistemic innocence. An epistemically innocent belief is thought to be epistemically irrational but also carries an epistemic benefit that could not be easily attained otherwise. By comparing beliefs in conspiracy theories with other beliefs that have a potential for epistemic innocence, such as distorted memory beliefs, motivated delusions, confabulatory explanations, and optimistically biased beliefs, I make a case for the epistemic innocence potential of conspiracy beliefs. In the end, I defend the view that there are some advantages in asking whether beliefs in conspiracy theories are epistemically innocent even though there is no satisfactory answer to that question that applies to all cases of conspiracy belief.

In interactions characterized by agential epistemic injustice, the interpreter avoids engaging with the speaker’s perspective and challenges or distorts the speaker’s contribution before taking time to explore it. Where the success of the interaction depends on a genuine knowledge exchange between interpreters and speakers, epistemic injustice compromises the success of the interaction. Building on recent qualitative work on communication in youth mental health, I argue that clinical interactions are less likely to achieve their aims when practitioners fail to engage with the perspective of the person seeking support, and challenge or distort the person’s contribution before taking time to explore it.

Recently, in the mainstream media and cognitive science research, there has been a tendency not only to compare beliefs in conspiracy theories with clinical delusions but also to label as delusional various non-clinical beliefs that are considered epistemically problematic. Sam Wilkinson proposed that when we call a belief delusional, we express our common-sense epistemic disapproval for a belief that we do not share. In this respect, it is part of Wilkinson’s proposal that the attribution of delusional character to beliefs plays an expressive rather than a descriptive role. The implication is that calling certain beliefs delusional is not mediated by the fact that those beliefs satisfy certain conditions, and the expression of disapproval cannot be further unpacked. In this article, we accept that calling beliefs ‘delusional’ is a way of expressing disapproval, but we resist the idea that the reasons for disapproval cannot be further unpacked. We propose that a belief is called ‘delusional’ when it is considered (1) implausible, in the sense that it has no appearance of truth because it is in tension with existing beliefs, and (2) unshakable, in the sense that it is not usually abandoned under the pressure of counterarguments or counterevidence. Although other features of the beliefs also shed light on why we call them delusional, we will focus on implausibility and unshakeability as epistemic criteria for the delusional character of beliefs.

This paper starts from an observation of our practices: when people are ascribed delusional beliefs or conspiracy beliefs, they tend to be excluded from shared epistemic projects relevant to the content of their beliefs. What might motivate this exclusion? One possibility is that delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs are considered as evidence of irrationality and pathology, and thus endorsing them suggests that one’s epistemic agency is compromised, at least in some contexts. One common argument for the irrational and pathological nature of delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs lies in their being the outputs of faulty cognition. There are some areas of overlap in the cognitive antecedents of delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs as identified in the empirical literature. For instance, some biases and thinking styles have been correlated either with the adoption of delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs, or with the strength of conviction in such beliefs. The paper challenges the claim that, if delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs are the outputs of biased cognition, then it is justified to exclude people endorsing delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs from epistemic projects relevant to the content of their beliefs. The relevant biases and thinking styles are widespread in the non-clinical population, do not need to be part of a dysfunctional cognitive process, and can be adaptive in some contexts.

Why Delusions Matter is a reflection on the importance of the study of delusions for better understanding and reshaping our mutual interactions. The study of delusions has transformed the philosophy of mind and psychology in the last thirty years, helping redefine the relationship between rationality and intentionality. It has still a lot to offer to emerging areas at the intersection of ethics and epistemology. These are areas where the focus of the investigation of beliefs is moving from a painstaking assessment of the individual’s cognitive achievements and failures to a broader examination of the environmental and social pressures on the adoption, revisions, and maintenance of beliefs at individual and collective levels. In the book, there is an exploration of the notion of delusionality across clinical and non-clinical contexts which shows how delusions are meaningful beliefs that matter to the speaker's identity but are received by the interpreter as implausible and unshakeable. Delusions are not pathological by default, but they can bring epistemic and psychological costs as well as temporary benefits. Although a speaker's delusions can make collaboration difficult, this should not discourage interpreters from attempts at genuine engagement. Delusions are not a sign of a breakdown in the speaker's capacity for agency and thus understanding them can help interpreters appreciate the speaker's perspective.

In this paper, I re-elaborate some of the ideas presented in Why Delusions Matter (Bloomsbury 2023) in response to four commentaries on the book. My proposed conception of delusionality cuts across clinical and non-clinical contexts: an interpreter calls a speaker’s belief delusionalwhen the belief seems to be central to the speaker’s identity, but the interpreter finds it both implausible and unshakeable. Here I frame the emphasis on what all delusional beliefs have in common as an attempt to resist simplistic dichotomies about human agency. Ideal agents seek the truth and accurately represent the world, engaging with it in such a way as to further their goals, exercise control over themselves and the surrounding environment, and successfully coordinate with others. Human agents can sometimes rely on comforting illusions and constructed worlds to establish or restore a connection with other agents and the shared environment at challenging times. But coordination can fail, and control is always limited. Delusions are an expression of agency in the sense that they can be understood as a response to the epistemic and psychological needs of human agents. Delusions are meaningful and may contain germs of truth about the speaker. But they should be replaced when better strategies for engaging with the world become available to the speaker.

In this paper we argue that society should make available reliable information about parenting to everybody from an early age. The reason why parental education is important (when offered in a comprehensive and systematic way) is that it can help young people understand better the responsibilities associated with reproduction, and the skills required for parenting. This would allow them to make more informed life-choices about reproduction and parenting, and exercise their autonomy with respect to these choices. We do not believe that parental education would constitute a limitation of individual freedom. Rather, the acquisition of relevant information about reproduction and parenting and the acquisition of self-knowledge with respect to reproductive and parenting choices can help give shape to individual life plans. We make a case for compulsory parental education on the basis of the need to respect and enhance individual reproductive and parental autonomy within a culture that presents contradictory attitudes towards reproduction and where decisions about whether to become a parent are subject to significant pressure and scrutiny.

In this paper the permissibility of stem cell research on early human embryos is defended. It is argued that, in order to have moral status, an individual must have an interest in its own wellbeing. Sentience is a prerequisite for having an interest in avoiding pain, and personhood is a prerequisite for having an interest in the continuation of one's own existence. Early human embryos are not sentient and therefore they are not recipients of direct moral consideration. Early human embryos do not satisfy the requirements for personhood, but there are arguments to the effect that they should be treated as persons nonetheless. These are the arguments from potentiality, symbolic value and the principle of human dignity. These arguments are challenged in this paper and it is claimed that they offer us no good reason to believe that early human embryos should be treated as persons.

Delusions are often portrayed as paradigmatic instances of incomprehensibility and meaninglessness. Here we investigate the relationship between delusions and meaning from a philosophical perspective, integrating arguments and evidence from cognitive psychology and phenomenological psychopathology. We review some of the empirical and philosophical literature relevant to two claims about delusions and meaning: delusions are meaningful, despite being described as irrational and implausible beliefs; some delusions can also enhance the sense that one’s life is meaningful, supporting agency and creativity in some circumstances. Delusions are not incomprehensible representations of reality. Rather, they can help make sense of one’s unusual experiences and in some circumstances even support one’s endeavours, albeit temporarily and imperfectly. Acknowledging that delusions have meaning and can also give meaning to people’s lives has implications for our understanding of psychotic symptoms and for addressing the stigma associated with psychiatric conditions.

Is curiosity a virtue or a vice? Curiosity, as a disposition to attain new, worthwhile information, can manifest as an epistemic virtue. When the disposition to attain new information is not manifested virtuously, this is either because the agent lacks the appropriate motivation to attain the information or because the agent has poor judgement, seeking information that is not worthwhile or seeking information by inappropriate means. In the right circumstances, curiosity contributes to the agent’s excellence in character: it is appropriate to praise the agent for being curious, blame the agent for not being curious, and also prompt the agent to cultivate such curiosity, at least in some of the relevant contexts. We believe curiosity can also manifest as a moral virtue when it helps an interpreter view a speaker as an agent with a valuable perspective on the world. Especially in interactions where either there is a marked power imbalance between interpreter and speaker, or interpreter and speaker have identity beliefs that lead them to radically different worldviews, curiosity can help foster mutual understanding, and prevent the interpreter from dismissing, marginalizing, or pathologizing the speaker’s perspective.

Delusions can be many things. They can be symptoms of mental health problems, such as schizophrenia, clinical delusions, or simply the beliefs that people cling to which are unsupported by evidence. We call the latter everyday delusions and they can include anything from the benefits of homeopathy to the dangers of alien abduction. Yet, why do people adopt delusional beliefs and why can they be so reluctant to part with them? In Why Delusions Matter, Lisa Bortolotti explains what delusions really are and that despite their negative reputation, that they can also play a positive role in someone's life, such as providing meaning to people’s experiences and strengthening their identities. In a clear and accessible style, she contributes to the growing study of philosophy and the cognitive sciences, providing an intelligent and nuanced view of delusions.

Findings from the cognitive sciences suggest that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for some memory errors are adaptive, bringing benefits to the organism. In this paper we argue that the same cognitive mechanisms also bring a suite of significant epistemic benefits, increasing the chance of an agent obtaining epistemic goods like true belief and knowledge. This result provides a significant challenge to the folk conception of memory beliefs that are false, according to which they are a sign of cognitive frailty, indicating that a person is less reliable than others or their former self. Evidence of memory errors can undermine a person’s view of themselves as a competent epistemic agent, but we show that false memory beliefs can be the result of the ordinary operation of cognitive mechanisms found across the species, which bring substantial epistemic benefits. This challenge to the folk conception is not adequately captured by existing epistemological theories. However, it can be captured by the notion of epistemic innocence, which has previously been deployed to highlight how beliefs which have epistemic costs can also bring significant epistemic benefits. We therefore argue that the notion of epistemic innocence should be expanded so that it applies not just to beliefs but also to cognitive mechanisms.

On both sides of the debate on the use of embryos in stem cell research, and in reproductive technologies more generally, rhetoric and symbolic images have been evoked to influence public opinion. Human embryos themselves are described as either “very small human beings” or “small clusters of cells.” The intentions behind the use of these phrases are clear. One description suggests that embryos are already members of our community and share with us a right to life or at least respectful treatment, whereas the other focuses on the differences between embryos and adult human beings with normal capacities, that is, their lack of sentience and of personal identity. The research on stem cells has been nicknamed “Frankenstein science” or presented as “research that could stop Parkinson disease.” Again, one description reminds us of scary science-fiction scenarios where the scientist is guilty of “playing God,” whereas the other description highlights the worth and potential benefits of the research outcomes