Focusing on plurally de re epistemically modalised sentences—that is, sentences that assert or deny a joint epistemic possibility for a group of individuals—I discuss a range of problems for the standard view of epistemic modals. Two alternative accounts are considered. The first account allows epistemic modals to shift the world parameter used to track actuality, while the second draws on the notion of constrained epistemic modality. I argue that, although the first account addresses some of th…
Read moreFocusing on plurally de re epistemically modalised sentences—that is, sentences that assert or deny a joint epistemic possibility for a group of individuals—I discuss a range of problems for the standard view of epistemic modals. Two alternative accounts are considered. The first account allows epistemic modals to shift the world parameter used to track actuality, while the second draws on the notion of constrained epistemic modality. I argue that, although the first account addresses some of the problems posed by plurally de re constructions, it leaves others unexplained and introduces its own complications. By contrast, the second account resolves all these problems and provides a more unified treatment of individually and plurally de re epistemic modality.
