Liz Hemsley

An institutional analysis of art posits the theory that works of art are classified as such not by virtue of their exhibited properties, but rather by virtue of their relational ones, and more specifically by virtue of their place within an institutional framework, the ‘artworld’. The most thorough and compelling account of an institutional theory is provided by George Dickie in his book ‘The Art Circle’. As such, it is on the institutional definition of art presented therein that I shall focus this essay.

This paper examines the ways in which liberal theory and democratic procedure have sought to address the justificatory challenge posed by the existence of coercive states, given the liberal account of individuals as naturally free and equal. In doing so, this paper invokes the justifications for the limited state advanced by the Austrian school of political economy, referring in particular to the work of F.A.Hayek. It argues that the scepticism this school of theory advances, with regard to the effectiveness and desirability of state intervention into the affairs of free individuals, offers a better approach to understanding state legitimacy than does the ideal theory often relied upon by liberal political theorists. It further argues that the simple inclusion of majoritarian democratic procedure as the method for deciding whether, when and how states should intervene into the affairs of free individuals cannot legitimise these interventions in a manner consistent with the demands of liberalism. This paper finally employs the Austrian school’s scepticism about the state’s capacity to ‘do good’ in order to advance a proposal for reducing the degree to which any individual need be coerced by a state seeking to advance particular ends, rather than to enforce general rules.

Immigration restrictions close-off large portions of the earth to large proportions of the earth’s population. For those who regard the earth and its natural resources as belonging to mankind equally and in common, this is a morally impermissible state of affairs. This is because, if the earth and its resources belong to all equally, then the exclusion of anyone from any portion of the earth will be a violation of their natural ownership rights. A commitment to Natural Resource Egalitarianism (NRE) is therefore held to entail a commitment to substantially more open, or even fully open borders. This paper does not seek to directly refute the claims of NRE, but rather seeks to demonstrate the failure of arguments from NRE, to establish the moral necessity of a general opening of borders. This paper addresses the two most prominent accounts of Open Borders NRE—Equal Division NRE and Egalitarian Ownership NRE—as well as a more recent attempt to advocate for open borders by combining these two positions into a so-called ‘Combined Model’. This paper argues that none of these three positions can plausibly and coherently account for the moral necessity of open borders.