Logan Carter

Laura Ruetsche (2024) argues that the underdetermination problem is trouble for realists because, if there is no “winning interpretation” of QM, realists cannot execute the conclusion of the No Miracles Argument (NMA). In this paper, I will offer a realist response to Ruetsche’s argument. My response has two parts. In the first part, I argue that what motivates realists to believe in QM is not a matter of interpretation but of explanation. In part two, I argue for an ontic structural realist view that allows realists to execute the conclusion of the NMA, contra Ruetsche, without a winning interpretation of QM. For simplicity’s sake, our discussion will be restricted to non-relativistic QM. (Note that this manuscript is unpublished and in progress.)

The original Frankfurt-style cases are meant to motivate the compatibilist position that one can be free and morally responsible even though one could not have done otherwise. Libertarians typically reject Frankfurt-style cases for two reasons. First, libertarians argue that agents cannot be free or morally responsible if they cannot do otherwise. Second, libertarians argue that if indeterminism is present up to the point of decision or action, then the spirit of Frankfurt-style cases is undermined, because indeterminism leaves it open for the agent to do otherwise. In this paper, I will show that we can conceptualize a Frankfurt-style case, or a cousin of such a case, in which both of these reasons for rejecting Frankfurt-style cases are accommodated. The Carter case is a Frankfurt-style case (of sorts) with a twist: the agent’s decision-making process and the manipulator’s process are indeterministic. This makes it so that the manipulative process can only raise the probability that an agent will decide to A at t (but the probability cannot be one), and, unlike in typical Frankfurt-style cases, the agent can do otherwise than A at t. I will consider three possible outcomes for the Carter case. Whereas the libertarian free will outcome is a standard example of libertarian free will, the manipulation success and manipulation failure outcomes highlight what appears to be a serious problem for libertarians. Given that the Carter case accommodates the typical reasons libertarians use to reject Frankfurt-style cases, we determined that libertarians must turn to some third, separate reason for thinking that an agent is not free or morally responsible in the manipulation success case. This reason, which is likely the manipulation’s direct interference with the agent’s decision-making process, puts the libertarian on a slippery slope. I will argue that the burden is on libertarians to draw the line in the sand as to where free will and moral responsibility are granted or precluded based on the amount of manipulation present in the setup. I take it that no satisfactory line can be drawn, especially from the compatibilist point of view.

In this paper, I’ll present two objections against Robert Kane’s (2024) libertarian account of free will. First, to accommodate deliberative libertarian views, Kane must reconceptualize how indeterminism operates in deliberation. Second, in light of a discussion concerning the time indeterminism terminates in deliberation, we do not have good reason to prefer Kane’s account over deliberative views. I leave it open as to which view better captures libertarian free will. I only wish to show that deliberative views are no less plausible than Kane’s account. NOTE THAT THIS WORK IS UNPUBLISHED/IN PROGRESS. A better version is coming soon :)

Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) models have undoubtedly become useful tools in science. In general, scientists and ML developers are optimistic – perhaps rightfully so – about the potential that these models have in facilitating scientific progress. The philosophy of AI literature carries a different mood. The attention of philosophers remains on potential epistemological issues that stem from the so-called “black box” features of ML models. For instance, Eamon Duede (2023) argues that opacity in deep learning models (DLMs) is epistemically problematic in the context of justification, though not in the context of discovery. In this paper, I aim to show that a similar epistemological concern is echoed in the epistemology of imagination literature. It is traditionally held that, given its black box features, reliance on the imagination is epistemically problematic in the context of justification, though not in the context of discovery. The constraints-based approach to the imagination answers the epistemological concern by providing an account of how we can rely on the imagination in the context of justification by way of constraints. I argue by analogy that a similar approach can be applied to the opaque DLM case. Ultimately, my goal is to explore just how far this analogy extends, and whether a constraints-based approach to opaque DLMs can answer the epistemological concern surrounding their black box features in the context of justification. (Note that this paper is IN PROGRESS and UNPUBLISHED).

In this paper, I will analyze Rawad El Skaf’s (2017 & 2021) account of thought experiments (TEs) in physics. I will argue that El Skaf’s account is strengthened by taking on Amy Kind’s (2016 & 2018) constraints-based approach to the imagination, which highlights the epistemic significance of imaginative processes. First, I will present El Skaf’s step-by-step structure of TEs wherein he discusses their form, content, and epistemic function. Second, I will explain a canonical TE in physics known as the clock-in-the-box. In turn, I will lay out El Skaf’s analysis of the clock-in-the-box TE. Then, I will present Amy Kind’s constraints-based approach to the imagination. I will then offer three critiques of El Skaf’s account and suggest that each critique is resolved by applying a constraints-based approach to his view. Once the hybrid view is laid out, I will discuss incompatible constraints on the imagination, which I call the home and away constraints. I will argue that a thought experimenter (TEer) may overcome this incompatibility by transforming away constraints into home constraints via metaphor. Lastly, I will argue that physics TEs are special since it is an essential feature of theirs that they ask the TEer to consider incompatible constraints on the imagination.

This is an extension of my earlier work, How in the World Are There Many Worlds and it's a lot more interesting! This paper explores personal identity and persistence through time in the many-worlds framework, governed by the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics (QM). First, I will motivate our consideration of the MWI in this context. Second, I will introduce endurantism, which is one answer to the puzzle concerning persistence through time. Third, I will explain the foundational physics underlying the MWI that lends itself to branching worlds. In turn, I will explain what exactly a world amounts to in this picture. Then, I will present three views on personal identity and persistence through time: the bye-bye Betty view, the every-branch view, and the privileged branch view. I will argue that the privileged branch view is the most attractive of the bunch for determining the best candidate among close continuers. Finally, I will discuss knowledge, attitudes, and moral responsibility within the privileged branch view.

This is an extension of my earlier work, The Coast is Not Clear. This paper offers an alternative view in the discussion of passive action between Harry Frankfurt (1978) and Alfred Mele (1997). First, I will describe Frankfurt’s noncausal account of action. Second, I will present counterexamples on behalf of Mele’s causal account. Then, I will introduce the Frankfurt-friendly View (FFV) which captures Frankfurt’s judgments about action while rejecting Frankfurt-style cases. I will explore what constitutes and explains actions in each view. I will then analyze the counterexamples using Mele’s view and the FFV. Finally, I will explain the interpretive differences between the competing views. (Note that this work is not published and in its early draft stages.)

This paper offers an alternative view within the discussion of passive action between Harry Frankfurt (1978) and Alfred Mele (1997). The so-called new view presented here is unique in that it captures Frankfurt's judgments on action while, at the same time, denying Frankfurt-style cases. Though Mele's 'coasting' counterexamples severely threaten Frankfurt's view, the new view manages to avoid these objections. I leave it open to which view best characterizes passive action. (Note that this work is in its early draft stages - later versions will be updated and revised).

This paper explores personal identity and persistence through time in the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics (QM). First, I will motivate the MWI’s relevance in the domain of metaphysics. Second, I will define endurantism. Third, I will explain the foundational physics underlying the MWI which entails branching worlds. Finally, I will argue that the privileged branch view best captures endurantist judgments about personal identity and persistence through time in the many-worlds framework. (Note that this work is in its early draft stages - later versions will be updated and revised).

This paper is intended to persuade an uncommitted audience that free will is illusory. I examine free will through the lens of three interpretations of quantum theory: dynamical collapse theories, hidden variable theories, and many-worlds theories. Dynamical collapse theories, hereon called collapse theories, are the primary focus of this work since they are the most widely accepted in the current philosophy of physics climate. The core postulations and mechanics of the collapse theories are articulated. Accompanying these postulations are a few assumptions regarding the role quantum mechanics may have in one’s decisions. The postulations and assumptions together lead to the conclusion that agents are not free in the collapse theory framework. Then, I anticipate and respond to the following objections. First, that agents are at least partially free through their ability to control and change personal dispositions. Second, that the psychological level is the most appropriate scale for discussions regarding freedom. Finally, I extend my argument against free will to the hidden variables and many-worlds theories. (Note that this work is in its early draft stages - later versions will be updated and revised).