Logan Mitchell

Secular mindfulness is often conceived of not merely as a therapeutic technique, but as a valuable way of life. Yet on such accounts, mindfulness is also commonly thought to preclude disapproving moral emotions and judgments directed at an object. This raises a tension between morality and secular accounts of mindfulness: on such accounts, mindfulness precludes sustaining disapproving attitudes toward an object, but such attitudes are commonly held to be crucial to the moral life (e.g. anger at injustice). I argue that secular theories of mindfulness must accommodate sustaining at least some disapproving attitudes within a mindful state if mindfulness is to be widely recommended as a way of life. I then develop a positive, secular theory of mindfulness that makes such accommodations, arguing that mindfulness is best conceived of as involving an orientation of openness – a receptive, non-egocentric acknowledgment of an object as it is. Openness can accommodate relevant disapproving moral emotions and judgments while aligning with the spirit of prominent accounts of mindfulness, making an openness-based account of mindfulness well-suited to be widely recommended as a way of life.

In this article, I argue that academic institutions have a pro tanto obligation to delegitimize transphobic views, which in many contexts is undefeated. By this, I mean academic institutions generally should not take such views seriously as viable candidates for belief, though sometimes this obligation may be outweighed by other considerations. Three premises together justify this conclusion. First, if academic institutions do not delegitimize transphobic views, then they structurally perpetuate the subordination of trans people. Second, institutions have a pro tanto obligation to avoid structurally perpetuating subordination, and this obligation can be defeated only when such avoidance is excessively burdensome. Third, academic institutions can delegitimize transphobic views in a manner that is not excessively burdensome, at least in many contexts. More specifically, delegitimizing transphobic views aligns with important institutional norms and a robust notion of academic freedom.

Background: Nonhuman animals are regularly enhanced genomically with CRISPR and other gene editing tools as scientists aim at better models for biomedical research, more tractable agricultural animals, or animals that are otherwise well suited to a defined purpose. This study investigated how genome editors and policymakers perceived ethical or policy benefits and drawbacks for animal enhancement and how perceived benefits and drawbacks are alike, or differ from, those for human genome editing. Methods: We identified scientists through relevant literature searches as well as conference presentations. Policymakers were identified through rosters of genome editing oversight groups (e.g., International Commission on the Clinical Use of Human Germline Genome Editing, World Health Organization) or efforts aimed at influencing policy (e.g., deliberative democracy groups). Interviews covered participants’ views on ethical differences between interventions affecting somatic or germline cells and distinctions between using gene editing for disease treatment, prevention, and enhancement purposes. Results: Of the 92 participants interviewed, 81 were genome editing scientists, and 33 were policymakers, with 22 interviewees being both scientists and policymakers. Multiple areas were identified in which the ethical implications of genomic enhancements for nonhuman animals differ from those for human animals including with respect to experiential welfare; germline edits; environmental sustainability; and justice. Conclusions: Overall, respondents viewed that animal enhancement is unburdened by the ethical complexities of human enhancement. These views may be related to participant perceptions of animals’ lesser moral status and because germline editing in animals is common practice.