Mengzi famously claims, “If one performs si (思), then one will get it; if not, one will not.” While the role of si in Mengzi’s account of self-cultivation is widely acknowledged, its exact nature remains contested. Although often translated as reflection, thinking, or concentration, si is better understood, I argue, as recognizing an object’s value and seeking it on that basis. More precisely, si involves both appreciating the categories of importance (zhi lei 知類) and seeking (qiu 求). It thus in…
Read moreMengzi famously claims, “If one performs si (思), then one will get it; if not, one will not.” While the role of si in Mengzi’s account of self-cultivation is widely acknowledged, its exact nature remains contested. Although often translated as reflection, thinking, or concentration, si is better understood, I argue, as recognizing an object’s value and seeking it on that basis. More precisely, si involves both appreciating the categories of importance (zhi lei 知類) and seeking (qiu 求). It thus involves two closely connected aspects: value recognition and motivation. An agent who identifies something as genuinely valuable will typically be moved to seek it. Unlike accounts by David S. Nivison, Kwong-loi Shun, and Bryan W. Van Norden, which focus on attention, inner perception, or the extension of emotion, my interpretation identifies the evaluative function of si as the source of its motivational force. I also contrast my view with Chung-ying Cheng’s metaphysical account of Confucian selfhood, which casts moral agency in more transcendent and ontological terms. I conclude by engaging contemporary Western analytic views, such as those of T. M. Scanlon and Jonathan Dancy, which hold that recognizing a reason can, under ordinary conditions, suffice to motivate action.
