Lorenzo Sala

In this paper I argue for a strong continuity between the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature and the transcendental deduction of the ideas from the first critique. On these grounds, I provide an interpretation of the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature in which I argue that: 1) the necessity of the principle of purposiveness of nature does not derive from its role in solving some specific philosophical problem but from its relation to a cognitive goal; 2) the representation of nature as conforming to the maxims of judgement is a direct, immediate consequence of a certain cognitive goal that the necessity of the empirical laws mentioned by Kant in the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature is not so much their nomic necessity, but their necessity as consequences of higher laws.

In this article, I develop a new account of Wolff's theory of consciousness. In contrast to the received view, I argue that Wolff's texts can be better made sense of by reading ‘perception’ and ‘apperception’ as two radically different acts, each one accounting for radically different aspects of the consciousness of an object and both necessary for its possibility. ‘Perception’ accounts for the intentional component of our representations, that is, for their being about a certain object. Apperception accounts instead for the fact that there is something it is like for us to have a perception of the object in question, without turning the perception in question into one of the intentional objects of consciousness. I also analyse the role played by distinguishing all the other acts that Wolff declares to be necessary for consciousness (attention etc.) and show how they are all necessary for perception to fulfil its role of providing consciousness with its intentional object. On these grounds, I then analyse also Wolff's understanding of self‐consciousness and show how this supports the here proposed reading. Lastly, by comparing their texts, I argue that Wolff's theory of consciousness in his German Metaphysics is fundamentally in line with the one from its Latin counterparts: although in the first the notion of apperception is completely lacking, this does not result into a contrast with the theory from the Latin psychologies, but only in an inferior degree of detail.

In questo articolo si analizzano congiuntamente l'origine delle idee e il loro uso regolativo. A questo scopo si comincia considerando la connessione tra uso logico della ragione e definizione della ragione in generale come facoltà dei principi. Si considera poi come la rappresentazione di un incondizionato derivi necessariamente dall'uso logico, e come quindi questo implichi necessariamente un uso reale della ragione. Si considera poi come le varie rappresentazioni dell'incondizionato diano origine alle idee trascendentali. Infine, si considera l'uso regolativo delle idee alla luce della pratica di inferire dal quale derivano.