Lorenzo Serini

Recent approaches are unable to make full sense of Nietzsche's distinction between weak and strong skepticism (BGE 208–209; A54). In this paper, I propose an alternative interpretation. My suggestion is that this distinction is best understood in the context of his virtue epistemology. My approach follows and extends Alfano's proposal to interpret Nietzsche as an inquiry responsibilist virtue epistemologist. However, I part ways with Alfano about the normative framework for Nietzsche's virtue epistemology. My contention is that Alfano's framework for Nietzschean virtue is unable to satisfactorily frame the distinction between strong and weak skepticism. In contrast, I offer an alternative framework that is better suited to interpreting Nietzsche's distinction and to articulating his conception of skepticism in terms of intellectual virtue and vice. I provide an account of Nietzsche's virtue/vice conception of skepticism that is currently lacking in the literature, and that is worthy of the attention of virtue epistemologists.

This volume provides a geographically and historically diverse overview of philosophical traditions that establish a deep connection between truth and practice, or even see truth itself as a kind of practice. Under the label "practices of truth" are subsumed disparate approaches that can be fruitfully brought together to explore the intersections between truth and practice in philosophy as well as to address a range of intriguing questions about truth that fall outside the domain of pure theory. The chapters in this volume provide a variety of perspectives on key practices of truth in philosophy and in the history of philosophy, enriching our understanding of the different ways in which truth and practice may be connected, including the role of certain practices in enabling philosophical insight into truth; the ways in which truth may actually be embedded in some practices; and the impact of truth on practice. Practices of Truth in Philosophy will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in the history of philosophy, comparative philosophy, ethics, epistemology, and the metaphysics of truth.

Cheerfulness or serenity (Heiterkeit) is one of the most important themes in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Throughout his writings, from first to last, he can be found wrestling with conceptions of cheerfulness and promoting a cheerful mode of philosophizing. Despite the importance and recurrence of the theme of cheerfulness in Nietzsche’s entire œuvre, there have been relatively few studies specifically devoted to it. An important debate on cheerfulness has recently taken place in the literature on Nietzsche between Robert Pippin and Lanier Anderson and Rachel Cristy. Both sides of the debate have explored Nietzsche’s practice of cheerfulness in direct relation to Montaigne. According to Pippin, Nietzsche never succeeds in writing with the kind of cheerfulness of Montaigne. In contrast, Anderson and Cristy have contended that both Nietzsche and Montaigne conceive of cheerfulness as a complex, non-naïve spiritual state or attitude that is to be cultivated through the practice of philosophy as a way of life. According to Anderson and Cristy, this is a deep form of love of life that both Nietzsche and Montaigne practice and perhaps achieve at least in part by and through writing. In this essay, we aim to contribute to this debate by offering a threefold argument. First, we argue that Nietzsche conceives of cheerfulness not only as a psychological ideal, as a desirable state or attitude of the spirit, but also as an aesthetic ideal, as a desirable quality or style of thinking and writing (sections 1–2). Second, we argue that, in addition to Montaigne, Ralph Waldo Emerson is an equally important but neglected influence on Nietzsche’s conception and practice of cheerfulness (section 2). Third, by reconstructing Nietzsche’s self-presentation as a cheerful thinker and writer in the 1886 prefaces and in Ecce homo (1888), we conclude that it is possible to argue that starting from his middle writings Nietzsche thinks and writes cheerfully in some of his works, including a number of his most significant texts (section 3).

Cheerfulness or serenity (Heiterkeit) is one of the most important themes in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Throughout his writings, from first to last, he can be found wrestling with conceptions of cheerfulness and promoting a cheerful mode of philosophizing. Despite the importance and recurrence of the theme of cheerfulness in Nietzsche’s entire œuvre, there have been relatively few studies specifically devoted to it. An important debate on cheerfulness has recently taken place in the literature on Nietzsche between Robert Pippin and Lanier Anderson and Rachel Cristy. Both sides of the debate have explored Nietzsche’s practice of cheerfulness in direct relation to Montaigne. According to Pippin, Nietzsche never succeeds in writing with the kind of cheerfulness of Montaigne. In contrast, Anderson and Cristy have contended that both Nietzsche and Montaigne conceive of cheerfulness as a complex, non-naïve spiritual state or attitude that is to be cultivated through the practice of philosophy as a way of life. According to Anderson and Cristy, this is a deep form of love of life that both Nietzsche and Montaigne practice and perhaps achieve at least in part by and through writing. In this essay, we aim to contribute to this debate by offering a threefold argument. First, we argue that Nietzsche conceives of cheerfulness not only as a psychological ideal, as a desirable state or attitude of the spirit, but also as an aesthetic ideal, as a desirable quality or style of thinking and writing (sections 1–2). Second, we argue that, in addition to Montaigne, Ralph Waldo Emerson is an equally important but neglected influence on Nietzsche’s conception and practice of cheerfulness (section 2). Third, by reconstructing Nietzsche’s self-presentation as a cheerful thinker and writer in the 1886 prefaces and in Ecce homo (1888), we conclude that it is possible to argue that starting from his middle writings Nietzsche thinks and writes cheerfully in some of his works, including a number of his most significant texts (section 3).

This thesis explores the multiple senses of scepticism in Nietzsche’s middle writings, arguing that starting from Human, All Too Human Nietzsche becomes a sceptic, albeit of an idiosyncratic kind, for he consistently defines the task of his developing philosophical projects in alliance with various sceptical practices, which he selects, appropriates, and transforms from both ancient and modern traditions for his philosophical ends. There are two major failings in the secondary literature on Nietzsche and scepticism. First, commentators have largely neglected the importance that scepticism assumes in Nietzsche’s middle writings. Second, they have frequently overlooked the plurality of senses or forms that scepticism takes in these writings, as well as their roles in Nietzsche’s philosophical projects. In contrast, this thesis is intended to show how and why Nietzsche becomes a sceptic in the turn from his early writings to Human, All Too Human; to appreciate the multiple senses of scepticism and of sceptical practice, especially in his middle writings; and to illuminate the essential roles that various forms of scepticism play in his middle philosophy. First and foremost, then, this work is an attempt to make sense of Nietzsche as a sceptic and of his multifarious sceptical practice. Its main contention is that appreciating the senses of scepticism in Nietzsche’s writings is of key importance for an understanding of Nietzsche’s identity – or identities – as a philosopher.

Resumo: O objetivo do presente ensaio consiste em esclarecer a concepção nietzschiana de ceticismo presente em Schopenhauer como educador - em especial, à luz do §3 da aludida obra. Sem passar ao largo das principais preocupações de Nietzsche em sua filosofia de juventude como um todo, bem como do horizonte hermenêutico pós-kantiano que lhe é contemporâneo, o texto conta enfatizar que, na terceira Consideração extemporânea, Nietzsche está sobretudo preocupado com as consequências corrosivas do ceticismo à filosofia, e, potencialmente, à inteira cultura de sua época, razão pela qual estaria empenhado, já, na elaboração de uma sabedoria capaz de neutralizar tal periculosidade, fornecendo uma orientação aos nossos mais profundos e efetivos problemas vitais.: This article aims at clarifying Nietzsche’s conception of scepticism in Schopenhauer as Educator - especially in light of its third section. Without ignoring Nietzsche’s principal concerns within his early writings as a whole, as well as their post-Kantian hermeneutic framework, the text intends to highlight that, in the third Untimely meditation, Nietzsche is principally concerned with the detrimental consequences of scepticism for philosophy and potentially for the entire culture of the age, so that he would already be committed to creating a kind of wisdom capable of neutralize such a dangerousness, providing a guidance for our most deep and real vital problems.