Louis Austin-Eames

New omnivorism is a novel view in food and animal ethics that stipulates that relative to a vegan diet, we ought to scale back arable farming by substituting plant foods, such as wheat, barley, beans, and potatoes, for animal products, such as beef. We should do this, counterintuitively, in virtue of animal welfare considerations. Specifically, we should scale back arable farming because it harms non-human animals. In this paper, I provide a novel consideration which counts against new omnivorism. I start by highlighting that new omnivorism assumes that scaling back industrial arable farming will reduce overall harm to non-human animals. I then argue that we have reason to doubt this assumption in light of the alternative outcome for field animals – their existence (and death) in the wild. Thereafter, I note that this underexplored consideration has significant implications for the extant objections to new omnivorism. Finally, I consider possible objections to the consideration I offer.

Persson and Savulescu argue that if we continue to pursue cognitive enhancement without also pursuing moral enhancement, then we run the significant risk of a morally corrupt minority causing substantial harm. Conversely, Harris worries that if we stop pursuing cognitive enhancement until moral enhancement has been developed, we will fail to prevent significant suffering and death which could have been prevented with the relevant scientific progress. Aiming to safeguard against these worries, Gordon and Ragonese suggest providing cognitive enhancements exclusively to moral enhancement researchers with the aim of developing safe and effective moral enhancement technology, which can then be distributed to the public and be a prerequisite for undergoing cognitive enhancement. In this paper, I provide novel reasons which count against Gordon and Ragonese’s proposal, namely that it does not do enough to prevent the suffering and death which will result from delaying scientific progress. I then offer an alternative proposal for safe and effective cognitive and moral enhancement which I think fares better. I argue that we should not limit cognitive enhancements to moral enhancement researchers, rather we ought to provide them to individuals involved in research which, if successful, would prevent a great deal of suffering and death. Thereafter, I consider and respond to potential objections.

Crutchfield (Crutchfield in Bioethics 33:112–121, [4]) has argued that if moral bioenhancement (MBE) ought to be compulsory, then it ought to be covert. More precisely, they argue that MBE is a public health intervention, and for this reason should be governed by public health ethics. Taking from various public health frameworks, Crutchfield provides an array of values to consider, such as: utility, liberty, equality, transparency, social trust, and autonomy. Subsequently, they argue that a covert MBE programme does better than an overt one, in preserving or promoting said values, and hence, that a covert MBE is preferable. In this paper, I will provide novel reasons to doubt that the relevant values are in fact better promoted or preserved by a covert MBE programme. Additionally, I will provide a novel autonomy-based consideration which counts in favour of the MBE programme being overt, rather than covert. Given that as things currently stand it is unclear which kind of MBE programme is preferable, the upshot of my criticism of Crutchfield will be to provide some recommendations as to how we might proceed in establishing whether a covert or overt MBE programme fares better.

Joona Räsänen argues that vegans ought to be anti-natalists and therefore abstain from having children. More precisely, Räsänen claims that vegans who accept a utilitarian or rights-based argument for veganism, ought to, by parity of reasoning, accept an analogous argument for anti-natalism. In this paper, I argue that the reasons vegans have for refraining from purchasing animal products do not commit them to abstaining from having children. I provide novel arguments to the following conclusion: while there is good reason to believe that factory farming results in a net disutility and involves treating non-human animals as mere means, there is not good reason to believe that having children results in a net disutility or involves treating the children as mere means. Subsequently, I respond to what I take to be Räsänen’s underlying reasoning—that vegans are committed to abstaining from other practices which cause unnecessary suffering. I respond by arguing that this is plausibly false as various practices which cause unnecessary suffering are likely permissible, whereas factory farming is not.