Louis Doulas

This introductory chapter serves three primary functions. First, it offers a compact account of L. Susan Stebbing’s life and philosophical contributions. Second, it contextualizes her absence from several influential narratives in the history of analytic tradition, examining how and why she has been overlooked. Third, it provides a guide to the volume’s structure and central themes. In doing so, the chapter aims to introduce Stebbing’s work to new readers and to reposition her as a foundational yet long-neglected figure, whose contributions—spanning logic, language, metaphysics, critical thinking, ethics, and the philosophy of science—remain deeply relevant both to the historical study of early analytic philosophy and to contemporary philosophy

I raise two concerns about Bergmann’s philosophical methodology: the first is a parity problem for his intuition-based “autodidactic” approach; the second is a tension between that approach and the commonsense tradition in which he situates it. I then use his approach to reflect on the limits of rational argument and set it alongside an alternative that likewise emphasizes the personal nature of philosophical inquiry while remaining more neutral about the rational standing of competing intuitions.

G. E. Moore’s “Proof of an External World” has long vexed readers. That Moore could regard the proof as cogent, despite its apparent circularity, has often been read as a failure to register the worry, underwriting the charge of philosophical naivete. This paper offers a new interpretation. Drawing on newly discovered archival material, I argue that “Proof” is best read as the culmination of Moore’s efforts to come to grips with a “fourth condition” on proof—beyond premise–conclusion distinctness, known premises, and validity—namely, a proof’s capacity to extend knowledge. On this interpretation, Moore’s proof embodies a more complex account than commentators have recognized, clarifying both its seemingly paradoxical character and the unease it provokes in readers.

This chapter argues that Susan Stebbing's account of common sense is both more distinct from and more indebted to G. E. Moore's than is typically acknowledged. Drawing on overlooked textual evidence, I first show that Moore's views on common sense are far less monolithic than traditionally assumed. On this basis, and against the grain of recent scholarship, I argue that Stebbing and Moore are largely aligned with respect to the extent to which the truths of common sense may be philosophically analyzed. Their key divergence, I suggest, lies in Stebbing's effort to integrate the common-sense worldview with the scientific one. This is encapsulated in what I call her "unity thesis": the idea that common-sense knowledge and scientific knowledge are not in tension but deeply interwoven—a commitment that underpins her broader philosophy of science and her vision for reconciling the everyday world with the world of science. The upshot is a distinctive, dynamic position in which common sense concepts may be clarified or revised by scientific progress, but not displaced wholesale.

This volume is the first to be dedicated exclusively to the philosophy of Susan Stebbing (1885–1943)—a pivotal yet neglected figure in the male-dominated tradition of analytic philosophy, and the first woman to hold a Chair in Philosophy in Britain. This volume collects eleven new essays that explore central themes of Stebbing’s philosophy: the significance of her work on metaphysical analysis; her contributions to public philosophy, including her work in the philosophy of physics, critical thinking, ethics, and counter-propaganda efforts; and her work in philosophical logic and the philosophy of language. The volume and its contributors seek both to reinstate Stebbing’s place in the analytic tradition by examining her work in context and to highlight the continued relevance of her ideas to contemporary philosophy.

Just as skepticism about our knowledge of the external world is thought to engender a kind of despair, skepticism about our philosophical knowledge, if true, engenders a despair of a similar kind. We remain optimistic. Despair, we urge, needn’t get the best of us. Philosophical knowledge is attainable. Progress is possible. But we aren’t overly optimistic either. Philosophical skepticism has its place. In this chapter, we show how philosophical knowledge and philosophical progress is possible in light of widespread disagreement in philosophy.

Philosophers disagree. A lot. Pervasive disagreement is part of the territory; consensus is hard to find. Some think this should lead us to embrace philosophical skepticism: skepticism about the extent to which we can know, or justifiably believe, the philosophical views we defend and advance. Most philosophers in the literature fall into one camp or the other: philosophical skepticism or philosophical anti-skepticism. Drawing on the insights of hinge epistemology, this paper proposes another way forward, an intermediate position that appeals both to skeptical and anti-skeptical intuitions concerning the possibility and scope of philosophical knowledge. The main advantage of our account is that it’s able to recover some philosophical knowledge while also being compatible with philosophical skepticism.

This chapter serves as an opinionated introduction to the problem of convergence (that there is no clear convergence to the truth in philosophy) and the problem of peer disagreement (that disagreement with a peer rationally demands suspending one’s beliefs), and some of the issues they give rise to, namely, philosophical skepticism and progress in philosophy. After introducing both topics and surveying the various positions in the literature we explore the prospects of an alternative, hinge-theoretic account.