Paul B. Cherlin's book on John Dewey's Metaphysical Theory (2023) restores in a single movement both the genesis of Dewey's metaphysics from “empirical data,” its content, and its ethical and political consequences. It shows that a metaphysical scheme of “double movements” partly originates in Dewey's logical studies, and that his metaphysics generalizes it to the scale of existence. It also shows that, for Dewey, metaphysics is not an end in itself, but a means of drawing practical consequences…
Read morePaul B. Cherlin's book on John Dewey's Metaphysical Theory (2023) restores in a single movement both the genesis of Dewey's metaphysics from “empirical data,” its content, and its ethical and political consequences. It shows that a metaphysical scheme of “double movements” partly originates in Dewey's logical studies, and that his metaphysics generalizes it to the scale of existence. It also shows that, for Dewey, metaphysics is not an end in itself, but a means of drawing practical consequences from experience. Cherlin consequently presents his interpretation of Dewey's metaphysics as “naturalistic.” However, the clearly anti-pragmatist form he gives to this metaphysics seems to run counter to such naturalism and to essential aspects of Dewey's thought, such as his experimentalism and his critique of foundationalism. Dewey is no less a pragmatist than he is a naturalist; therefore, the generic nature of the “traits” of existence and experience can only be relative and fallible, not absolute, while still playing a guiding role in social criticism.
