Louis Longin

Artificial Intelligence (AI) profoundly affects how people communicate, work, and perceive the world. While autonomous AI systems are the focal point in societal and academic discussions, advisory AI systems, which influence human decisions but don't undertake independent actions, often remain unexplored. Examples range from automated purchase recommendations to medical diagnoses. This dissertation seeks to understand what advisory AI systems truly are. Are they capable of autonomous, human-like action? Or can they be reduced to inert tools? And what happens when advisory AI systems are closely linked with human perception, especially through Augmented Reality and sensory augmentation? Does their ontological status change? This dissertation concludes that, regardless of their implementation, advisory AI systems occupy an ontological status between tools and humans. They are more than just tools but less than humans.

The recent rise of artificial intelligence (AI) systems has led to intense discussions on their ability to achieve higher-level mental states or the ethics of their implementation. One question, which so far has been neglected in the literature, is the question of whether AI systems are capable of action. While the philosophical tradition appeals to intentional mental states, others have argued for a widely inclusive theory of agency. In this paper, I will argue for a gradual concept of agency because both traditional concepts of agency fail to differentiate the agential capacities of AI systems.