Louis Loock

Since Clark and Chalmers advanced “The Extended Mind” in 1998, a persistent dispute evolved on how our tool interactions shape the kind of cognition we have. Extended cognition generally views us as cognitively augmented and enhanced by our tool practices, which shall render our cognitive constitution extended to those tools. Bounded and embedded cognition have primarily criticized this metaphysical claim. However, another contender may arise from considering how we use more intelligent tools. We arguably employ advanced technologies that capture, mimic, and then replace our cognitive skills, which we then no longer need to exercise ourselves. This precedes any metaphysical debate, since such practices might stand in a more fundamental conflict with extended cognition. The counter-hypothesis of extracted cognition states that we primarily tend to use tools that initially attain and eventually displace our cognitive responsibilities and involvements. This paper evaluates extended and extracted cognition by comparing theoretical, practical, and ethical arguments respectively. If extracted cognition describes most convincingly how such tool interactions shape our kind of cognition, then we may also endorse “The Extracted Mind”.