Louise Campbell

Humanitarian health care practitioners working outside familiar settings, and without familiar supports, encounter ethical challenges both familiar and distinct. The ethical guidance they rely upon ought to reflect this. Using data from empirical studies, we explore the strengths and weaknesses of two ethical models that could serve as resources for understanding ethical challenges in humanitarian health care: clinical ethics and public health ethics. The qualitative interviews demonstrate the degree to which traditional teaching and values of clinical health ethics seem insufficient for addressing all the realities of health care practice during humanitarian missions. They equally suggest that greater good orientations of public health ethics can thwart the best intentions of health care professionals wanting to attend to the interests of individual patients. Even though neither is complete on its own for helping guide health professionals on field missions, taken together these models have much to offer. At the same time, the narratives of the humanitarian health care workers illustrate how some of the crucial differences between public health ethics and clinical ethics generate tensions in humanitarian health practice. We offer an analysis of some of the complexities this creates for humanitarian health care ethics, and consider ways of adjudicating between the two models

In his essay on paternalism and personal identity, Wilkinson draws on Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons (1984) to call for a reappraisal of the role of paternalism in healthcare decision-making in situations in which patients with capacity make decisions which are likely to have harmful consequences for themselves.1 The imperative to respect autonomy, coupled with JS Mill’s insistence that the state is justified in interfering with an individual’s liberty only in situations in which she harms or threatens to harm another person, leaves clinicians with little room to constrain decisions in which a patient’s choice may seriously harm her. Parfit reduces personal identity to the continuity of psychological and physical traits across the lifecourse, and suggests that, since these sets of characteristics change significantly over time, it may make more sense to view a person at different time points as different ‘selves’, rather than as the same person. Parfit’s defence of paternalism involves arguing that, given this inevitable lack of continuity, causing harm to one’s future self is analogous to harming another person and that intervening to prevent this may be justifiable in accordance with the Harm Principle.2 The issue of personal identity has received considerable attention in the philosophical literature and it remains a vexed question. Parfit’s argument, along with the thought experiments on …

ABSTRACT In discussions of the regulation of teaching, there are a number of issues which arise concerning how teachers understand the professional expectations upon them and the role that such standards play in supporting and maintaining the ethical dimensions of teachers’ practice. Arguably, teachers’ professional standards evolve to meet the needs of the societies in which they exist. Consequently, they provide a locus for analysis of the desires, aspirations and philosophical perspectives of the social and educational systems to which they belong. Durkheim’s ideas about professional ethics provide a means of making sense of the complex and varied landscape of teacher regulation. They provide a way of seeing teacher professional standards as not constrained by neoliberal conceptions of regulation in which the fear of sanction may limit imaginative engagement with the profession. Instead, even within highly managerial systems, we begin to see professional standards as a prompt to engaged and ethical action for the greater good. In this sense, Durkheim’s work facilitates a way of seeing professional standards as having the capacity to magnify teachers’ innate potential for positive social impact regardless of the context in which they work.

The Republic of Ireland has some of the most restrictive abortion legislation in the world which grants to the ‘unborn’ an equal right to life to that of the pregnant woman. This article outlines recent developments in the public discourse on abortion in Ireland and explains the particular cultural and religious context that informs the ethical case for access to abortion services. Our perspective rests on respect for two very familiar moral principles – autonomy and justice – which are at the centre of social and democratic societies around the world. This article explains the context for the deployment of these concepts in order to support the claim that the current legislation and its operationalisation in clinical practice poses serious risks to the health, lives and well-being of pregnant women, tramples on their autonomy rights and requires of them a self-sacrifice that is unreasonable and unjust.

Although clinical ethics support services are becoming increasingly prevalent in Europe and North America, they remain an uncommon feature of the Irish healthcare system and Irish health professionals lack formal support when faced with ethically challenging cases. We have developed a variant on existing clinical ethics decision-making tools which is designed to build capacity and confidence amongst Irish practitioners and enable them to confront challenging situations in the absence of any dedicated support structure. The tool provided below follows a transparent stepwise procedure which avoids an overcomplicated analysis while remaining sensitive to the complexity of the issues addressed. The novelty of the tool lies in the explicit association it makes between each step in the process and one or more responsibilities based on established norms of ethical decision-making in the public domain.