Luca Dondoni

One of the most pressing challenges that occupy the Russellian panpsychist’s agenda is to come up with a way to reconcile the traditional argument from categorical properties (Seager, 2006; Alter & Nagasawa, 2015) with H. H. Mørch’s dispositionalism-friendly argument from the experience of causation (2014, 2018, 2020) — on the way to a unitary, all-encompassing case for the view. In this regard, Mørch claims that, via the commitment to the Identity theory of properties, one can consistently hold both panpsychist arguments without contradiction (2020: 281) — I shall refer to such proposal as Reconciliation. In my paper, I shall argue that this is not the case. To this extent, I will first consider H. Taylor’s argument that the Identity theorists have the exact same resources as the dispositionalists (as, after careful enquiry, their views on the metaphysics of properties turn out to coincide (2018: 1438)), and thus contend that Reconciliation fails to obtain. Then, I will suggest that one can avoid the problem and reconcile the arguments by adopting a different version of the powerful qualities view, namely the Compound view — and thus advance a reformulated version of the claim, i.e. Reconciliation*. Finally, even though pursuing my proposed solution might expose Russellian panpsychism to the risk of epiphenomenalism, I shall conclude that such specific form of epiphenomenalism is a rather benign one, and thus that, via Reconciliation*, the constitution of a unitary case for panpsychism as a positive proposal (and not as a mere alternative to dualism and physicalism) can be achieved.

We are all familiar with flames, but what are they, really? Plato’s account of the ontology of sensibles in the Timaeus is notoriously controversial. The “traditional” interpretation holds that sensible entities are particulars, across the dialogue. By contrast, “reconstructionists” maintain that the ‘new beginning’ (48e2) heralds an argument whereby sensibles are proposed to be repeatable characteristics. My paper offers a novel case for traditionalism. Specifically, I argue that, at 48e2ff., we find an account of sensible particulars as consisting of co-located, non-repeatable, non-persistent property-instances, each existing at exclusively one region of the Receptacle at one time. The form of traditionalism I advocate fits better with the text than the rival versions of the view and avoids the objections raised by reconstructionists.

In my paper, I shall provide a reading of Diogenes of Apollonia such that his understanding of the metaphysics of differentiation and of individual ensoulment may constitute an ingenious answer to the problems of his time. To this extent, I will argue that Diogenes' worldview solves the difficulties of Anaxagoras' metaphysics and successfully integrates mentality in a causally closed conception of nature. Finally, I will suggest that a Diogenes-inspired approach might be relevant to treat some pressing concerns in the contemporary philosophy of mind – thus demonstrating how his production might offer some interesting solutions for the problems of our time too.